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Abstract 
 
Safety evaluation and risk assessment in processing plants can improve the reliability of 
systems  and  reduce  the  number  of  hazardous  events  or  eliminate  the  undesirable 
consequences of these events. Safety and risk study may be conducted at any stage of 
the  plant  life  cycle  from  the  conceptual  design  to  the  operational  phase.  Although 
performing safety improvement and risk treatment in any step of plant life would have 
important benefits, only early consideration of risk and safety results in permanent and 
fundamental impacts on the reliability of the system. Integration of safety assessment 
into process design provides the opportunity to take preventive and proactive actions to 
eliminate possible hazards. It allows to fundamentally enhance the safety status of the 
plant rather than using passive add-on controls and taking corrective actions which were 
common  in  traditional  approaches.  A  number  of  works  have  addressed  this  topic 
previously,  however,  few  works  have  tried  to  develop  an  integrated  framework  to 
implement both process design and safety assessment concurrently.    
 
Petri net tool has been introduced and investigated in this study to achieve integration of 
safety assessment and process design. The Petri net is a powerful graphical modelling 
tool  with  the  mathematical  ability  to  implement  multiple  functions  simultaneously. 
Inherent safety assessment method and probabilistic risk analysis technique have been 
combined to create a new measure for safety evaluation and risk assessment of the plant. 
The  integrated  framework  has  been  developed  based  on  the  implementation  of  the 
combined method using the introduced Petri net tool. The proposed approach has the 
capability  to  automatically  generate  all  possible  combinations  of  the  basic  unit 
operations  and  the  unit  operations  which  are  available  for  safety  enhancement  in  a 
processing plant.  
  
iv 
 
The  performance  of  the  integrated  framework  has  been  demonstrated  and  evaluated 
through two case studies: an acrylic acid production plant and a gold processing plant. 
The results with the outcomes of application of two well-known methods of inherent safety 
assessment and probabilistic risk analysis confirmed the reliability of the proposed method. 
It showed that the proposed approach has the ability to generate all possible process 
options  and  execute  the  safety  evaluation  simultaneously.  The  final  safety  factor 
calculated for each process option takes into account a wide range of safety and risk 
aspects. This approach provides a more comprehensive safety and risk assessment in 
comparison  with  the  other  existing  methods.  It  was  concluded  that  the  proposed 
framework is an efficient solution to safety consideration during the early design stages.  
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C Ch ha ap pt te er r   1 1   
I In nt tr ro od du uc ct ti io on n      
1.1  Background  
Although risk analysis  and safety assessment  methods have  been applied  in  various 
forms for many years, interest has increased recently among industries in developing 
more efficient  methods. Factors such as  increased population density  near  industrial 
complexes, larger size of operations, higher complexity and use of extreme operating 
conditions,  in  addition  to  increased  public  concern  for  safety  issues  have  led  plant 
designers to  investigate the development and use of  better hazard  identification and 
analysis techniques (Palaniappan et al., 2004). Moreover, because of the  increase  in 
workplace  automation,  the  safety  evaluation  has  become  more  and  more  complex 
(Vernez et al., 2004). Nowadays, the consideration of environmental problems plays an 
ever-increasingly important role in chemical process design as well. The last decade of 
the  20
th  century  saw  significant  progress  made  in  industrial  activities  concerning 
environmental issues (Hoyningen-Huene et al., 1999).  
 
Integration  of  the  safety  analysis  and  design  phase  of  a  plant  life  cycle  introduces 
numerous benefits such as making the process permanently safer and reducing the need 
for  corrective  actions,  repair  work  and  replacement.  Considering  the  competitive 
market, huge replacement and repair costs, limited availability of human expertise and 
time  constraints,  concurrent  safety  analysis  and  process  design  can  be  of  great 
assistance. It can be through an automated process which reduces the need for human Chapter 1. Introduction                         2 
 
 
intervention and the probability of human errors. Early identification of possible hazards 
provides the opportunity to make efficient modifications prior to the implementation 
phase. Consequently, a great amount of time and expenses related to taking corrective 
actions are saved. Moreover, application of an integrated framework results in designing 
a  fundamentally  safer  process  option  which  means  reducing  the  probability  of 
irrecoverable human injuries and environmental damage.  
 
While concurrent safety analysis and process design offers several benefits a very well-
defined and systematic approach is required to properly achieve it. There are a number 
of factors that make it complicated. A proper methodology to be used for this purpose 
needs to have specific characteristics. It has to rely on limited process data which is 
available in the initial design phases. In the mean time, the results of risk and safety 
evaluation have to be accurate to an extent to be usable as decision-making factors. The 
other  complicating  issues  are  the  required  level  of  flexibility  and  simplicity  for 
methodologies and tools. The approach must be simple enough to not require special 
expertise. It also has to have the flexibility of being applied in different systems, deal 
with various input data and perform efficiently. These are the main issues faced in the 
development of an integrated framework for safety evaluation and process design. 
 
Past researches have mostly focused on identifying the approaches which can properly 
analyse  safety  levels  of  a  production  route.  However,  recent  researches  are  giving 
special importance to the potential applicability of the safety assessment methods in the 
early design stages. Surviving in the highly competitive market requires extra efforts. 
One of the major necessities is being fast in modifications and precise in entering into 
market and the other one is keeping the plants‟ lifetime cost reasonably low to be able to 
compete in the market. Early safety evaluation would result in recognising the needed 
modifications  before  time.  Hence,  the  time  and  cost  required  for  taking  corrective 
actions would be saved. Moreover, it will provide the opportunity of creating proactive 
safety features instead of passive control options and lead to designing fundamentally 
safer process alternatives which  again  means cut down on the time and cost of the 
corrective actions. However, with the rapid growth in the number of the competitors and Chapter 1. Introduction                         3 
 
 
the harsh market situation, integrated safety analysis and design process has become 
more popular (Sherwin & Jonsson, 1995).    
 
1.2  Scope of the study  
The overall objective of this research was to develop an integrated safety evaluation and 
process design  method applicable to process  industry. The sub-objectives are briefly 
described as follows:  
1.  To provide an exhaustive survey of the literature directed towards the applicable 
safety  and  risk  analysis  methodology  in  the  process  industries  and  an 
investigation of their evaluation techniques and implementation tools. 
2.  To identify the available approaches with the technical potential to be applied 
concurrently  with  the  process  design  phase  and  investigate  their  limits  and 
strengths. 
3.  To identify the appropriate tools to implement the integrated safety evaluation 
and  process  design  and  to  make  required  modifications  to  enhance  their 
performance. 
4.  To develop a robust methodology to enable the development of an integrated 
framework and cover a wide range of safety aspects. 
5.  To examine and illustrate the performance of the proposed tool and methodology 
via visiting different case studies.  
 
1.3  Structure of the thesis  
An exhaustive literature survey is given in Chapter 2. This survey addresses the most 
important  safety  and  risk  evaluation  methodologies  and  tools  with  applications  in 
process industry.  
 
Chapter 3 explains the general procedure which is followed in this study to achieve the 
main objectives. Chapter 1. Introduction                         4 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 provides details on Petri net tool which is an appropriate tool. This chapter 
highlights the strengths of the Petri net tool and emphasises its suitability to the current 
research by revisiting a case study adapted from the literature. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates different types of Petri net tools in more detail. Stochastic Petri 
net and fuzzy Petri net and their application in safety and risk evaluation are studied to 
evaluate the ability of this tool to be applied in different systems. 
  
Building on the previous chapters, Chapter 6 explains why inherent safety assessment 
and  probabilistic  risk  analysis  are  suitable  techniques  to  be  used  as  bases  of  the 
methodology development. Then, the process of developing the new methodology is 
explained  step-by-step.  The  efficient  performance  of  the  proposed  method  and 
developed tool is tested through undertaking the previous case study. 
 
An industrial application of the proposed approach is illustrated in Chapter 7. Three 
different gold production processes using various technologies are considered as basic 
options for further investigation in this case study. 
 
Finally,  the  study  is  summarised  and  discussed  in  Chapter  8.  Significance  of  the 
achieved  results  is  outlined  and  possible  further  research  and  investigations  are 
suggested.    
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C Ch ha ap pt te er r   2 2   
L Li it te er ra at tu ur re e   R Re ev vi ie ew w      
2.1  Introduction 
In this chapter a brief literature review of the risk and safety analysis is given. Since this 
is a relatively wide area of research the literature on this topic is extensive. The scope of 
literature review in this study is limited to risk and safety evaluation methods with the 
potential of being applied in process industries. 
 
Section 2.2 defines  some  important concepts  in this area. Subsequently, Section 2.3 
reviews  the  literature  in  the  area  of  safety  and  risk  analysis  methods.  Different 
approaches in classification of these methods are presented in this section. Finally, the 
chapter  concludes  in  Section  2.4    with  a  discussion  on  shortcomings  of  applicable 
methods of risk and safety assessment in process industries. 
 
2.2  Definitions  
Hazard: In this thesis generally, a hazard is an event that can result in any kind of 
injury, fatality, damage and loss of time and/or money (Main, 2004). An environmental 
hazard specifically, is any exposure to hazardous materials followed by harm to human 
health or the environment (Achour et al., 2005). 
 
Risk and safety: Risk can be defined as the product of probability of occurring any 
potential hazard and the severity of its consequences. Safety is the condition of being Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        7 
 
 
protected  against  occurring  of  potential  hazards  and/or  their  consequences.  In  other 
words, the reciprocal of safety is risk (Main, 2004). 
 
Risk/safety assessment method: In this study, any approach, procedure or technique 
that attempts to evaluate risks or safety associated with a process can be considered as a 
risk or safety assessment method. 
 
Risk/safety assessment tool: The techniques or approaches that help with systematic 
and/or automated implementation of the risk/safety assessment methods in processes are 
referred to as risk/safety assessment tools.   
  
2.3  Risk/safety assessment methods  
There are many approaches for the risk or safety analysis of workplaces. Based on the 
specific purpose of each approach, it may focus on some particular aspects of safety in 
production  plants  and  be  implemented  through  different  techniques  and  tools 
(Lichtenstein, 1996).  
 
Risk  and  safety  assessment  methods  come  into  two  main  groups  of  methods  with 
general application or with specifically environmental application. In each of these main 
groups, different classes of qualitative, quantitative and semi-quantitative methods can 
be recognised. Moreover, the risk and safety assessment techniques can be categorised 
based on their compatibility with  top-down and/or bottom-up approaches. An overall 
view of these classifications are given in Table 2.1. Depending on the type of results 
required from safety analysis process and the accessible input safety data, one of these 
categories would  be  more suitable and applicable. These classes and approaches are 
briefly explained as follows:   
 
Quantitative methods: The purpose of quantitative safety analysis is to provide the 
system designers with the quantified measures to assess safety and risk associated with 
the  system.  Quantified  measures  are  easy  to  use  and  understand  and  provide  clear Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        8 
 
 
comparison base to compare different systems according to their risk and safety levels. 
Quantitative  techniques  are  generally  resource  demanding  and  require  accurate 
statistical data. On the other hand, application of these methods usually ends up with 
deeper understanding of the system and more detailed information for further system 
improvement (Ruxton, 1997). 
 
Qualitative methods: This category of safety assessment methods is suitable to identify 
possible failure events and suggest required safety guards to minimize the frequencies 
and/or  moderate  the  associated  consequences  with  each  event.  Instead  of  using 
numerical  data  some  linguistic  ranges  may  be  used  to  measure  the  possibility  of 
occurrence of a hazard and the severity of the consequences of that hazard. An example 
of these ranges is „catastrophic‟ to „negligible‟ for the severity of consequences and 
„frequent‟ to „remote‟ for the probability of occurrence of a hazard (Ruxton, 1997). 
 
Semi-Quantitative  methods:  The  same  as  quantitative  methods  these  methods  are 
based on identification of risk parameters and possible losses and include most of the 
advantages of the quantitative methods. However, this category of approaches is not as 
precise  as  quantitative  methods  and  consequently    it  is  not  as  resource  intensive 
(Bhimavarapu  &  Stavrianidis,  2000).  Instead  of  using  accurate  numerical  data  the 
majority  of  methods  in  this  category  apply  different  indexing  systems  to  convert 
qualitative concepts into quantitative measures.   
 
Efficient use of safety analysis methods in the design stage involves the study of the 
characteristics  of  each  safety  analysis  method  and  the  characteristics  of  the  process 
design.  Two  general  approaches  are  available  to  implement  different  qualitative, 
quantitative and semi-quantitative safety assessment methods based on characteristics of 
systems under study. These approaches are described as follows: 
 
Top-down Approach: A top-down analysis is based on identification of  the critical top 
events while further study is required to define the hierarchy of causes from the top level 
to  the  lower  level.  This  process  continues  to  reach  the  appropriate  level  of  causes Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        9 
 
 
(Ruxton, 1997). Both qualitative and quantitative analysis approaches can be applied to 
estimate and evaluate the risk in a top-down design for safety process. The Fault-Tree 
analysis method is an example of a typical top-down method. 
 
Bottom-up  Approach:  The  break  down  of  a  system  to  its  subsystems  and  the 
components of each subsystem to identify all possible hazards is the logic that bottom-
up analysis is based on. All possible hazards are identified at the bottom level up to the 
top  one  and  then  a  risk  evaluation  can  be  undertaken  based  on  identified  hazards 
(Ruxton, 1997). 
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Table 2.1 – Risk and safety assessment methods; specifications summary 
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2.3.1  General risk/safety assessment methods  
Several  basic  quantitative  and  qualitative  techniques  for  risk/safety  analysis  are 
identified  in the literature. Moreover, ever-increasing importance of this science and 
rapid  advancement  of  engineering  technologies  is  leading  to  development  of  many 
innovative approaches in this area. In addition to basic methods several new approaches 
are usually being created through merging two or more basic techniques or modifying 
them  by  adding  some  features  in  order  to  ease  their  application,  overcome  their 
limitations, improve their efficiency and/or speed up their performance.  
 
The  major  basic  techniques  and  some  of  the  second  generation  methodologies  are 
described briefly in this section: 
 
Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA): this is a qualitative technique which involves a 
disciplined analysis of the event sequences that could transform a potential hazard into 
an accident (Andrews  & Moss, 1993). Event  identification  is the  first step which  is 
followed by more detailed studies to find preventive and corrective measures for the 
hazardous events and their consequences (Ruxton, 1997).  
  
Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA/FMECA): this procedure based qualitative 
method tries to analyse each potential failure mode in a system and determine its effect 
on the system then classify it according to its severity (Andrews & Moss, 1993). Failure 
mode and effects criticality analysis (FMECA) is the extended version of FMEA which 
includes criticality analysis. It is probably the most widely applied hazard identification 
method  in  the  industries.  The  severity  of  the  identified  impacts  may  be  defined  by 
linguistic  variables  such  as:  catastrophic,  critical,  marginal  and  negligible  (Ruxton, 
1997).  
 
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP): this qualitative method is a systematic 
critical examination of the process and a series of engineering actions on new or existing 
facilities to evaluate the hazard potential resulting from deviation in specifications and 
their effects on the facilities. A set of guidewords is used in this method to identify Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        12 
 
 
hazardous  situations  or  operational  problems  (American  Institute  of  Chemical 
Engineers, 1989; Andrews & Moss, 1993; Suokas & Rouhiainen, 1993; Sutton, 1992). 
The HAZOP methodology introduces a better chance of detecting failure modes than 
other alternative methods used in the risk identification phase in chemical process plants 
(Ruxton, 1997). 
 
Fault-tree Analysis (FTA): this  method uses a deductive reasoning  logical diagram 
which shows the relation between system failure such as a specific undesirable event in 
the system, and the failures of components of the system (Aven, 1992). An undesirable 
event or an event with severe consequences is usually the top event of the logic diagram 
in FTA. The failure events that lead to the top event are located immediately below in 
successive  levels  of  diagram.  Each  chain  of  failure  events  in  a  fault-tree  diagram 
represents a failure mode which causes the top event to happen (Ruxton, 1997). The 
fault-tree can be used in qualitative and quantitative risk analysis (Sutton, 1992). 
  
Event-tree Analysis (ETA): this method is used to show the sequence of events that 
may occur after an identified initial event (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 
1989; Suokas & Rouhiainen, 1993; Sutton, 1992). ETA is based on inductive bottom-up 
logic  in  which  quantitative  analysis  can  be  carried  out  to  assess  the  probability  of 
occurrence of each possible resulting consequence (Ruxton, 1997). 
  
Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA): this method combines cause analysis (FTA) and 
consequence analysis (ETA) to take advantage of the strengths of both deductive and 
inductive analysis methods. The purpose of CCA is to identify chain of events that may 
result in undesirable consequences. Using the likelihood of events, the probabilities of 
the consequences can be calculated (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1989; 
Aven,  1992;  Fullwood  &  Hall,  1988;  Henley  &  Kumamoto,  1996;  Suokas  & 
Rouhiainen, 1993). 
 
Decision  Table  Analysis  (DTA):  this  method  contains  a  Boolean  table  and  can  be 
considered  as  an  automatic  fault-tree  construction  technique.  The  Boolean  table Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        13 
 
 
represents the whole engineering system based on its components, input events, output 
events and their interactions. Boolean modelling is a bottom-up method that starts at the 
lowest level of the system and continues to the appropriate upper levels. The concluding 
table comprises all possible top events and associated cut sets. This modelling technique 
provides  a  manageable  representation  of  the  failure  modes  associated  with  systems 
containing multiple state components (Joshua & Garber, 1992; Kuhlman, 1977; Sutton, 
1992).  
 
Digraph-based  Analysis  (DA):  this  method  uses  the  mathematics  and  language  of 
graph theory such as „path set‟ (Fullwood & Hall, 1988). It operates based on AND/OR 
gates  and  different  matrices  to  convert  the  graph  language  into  mathematical 
representations. It shows if a fault node will lead to the top event. DA is a bottom-up 
event-based qualitative technique which allows cycles and feedback loops that make it 
attractive for dynamic systems (Ruxton, 1997). 
 
Subjective Reasoning Analysis (SRA): this method uses fuzzy set as the modelling 
technique which is appropriate for measuring safety and hazard parameters concerning 
their uncertain nature. Subjective reasoning is highly practical for modelling the systems 
with unstable situation (Ruxton, 1997). 
 
Simulation (S): different quantitative and qualitative simulation techniques have been 
used in risk assessment of dynamic systems. These methods usually deal with AND/OR 
logic and used together with other formal safety analysis such as FTA, ETA, CCA, and 
FMEA to carry out quantitative analysis. Mont Carlo simulation method is an example 
of this kind of technique (Ruxton, 1997). 
 
  Quantitative simulation: several quantitative simulation algorithms are available 
to deal with systems with different failure distributions for which deterministic 
methods are not suitable. This method is usually used with other techniques such 
as FMECA, FTA, ETA and CCA to obtain different  failure cut sets through 
simulation of basic failure. Computer simulation methods are useful to calculate Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        14 
 
 
the probability of occurrence of the top event and its related cut sets (Ruxton, 
1997). 
  Qualitative  simulation:  this  inductive  method  is  mainly  suitable  for  risk 
identification  and  the  risk  estimation  phases  in  conjunction  with  previously 
described methods such as FTA (Bell et al., 1992; Fullwood & Hall, 1988). 
 
 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA): this method is based on potential major scenarios 
with adverse  impacts on the safety of a system. Two typical parameters need to be 
obtained in PRA. The recognized hazardous scenarios need to be investigated and the 
probability of their occurrence and magnitude of their consequences should be identified 
for each unit operation and piece of equipment. The probability of occurrence of each 
system failure event may be calculated on the basis of the identified cut sets and failure 
probability data of the associated basic events. The cut set is a collection of basic events 
which their occurrences  lead to  happening of top event  (J. Wang  & Ruxton, 1998). 
Severity of consequences  may be measured by considering possible loss of life and 
property damage and the degradation of the environment caused by the failure event 
(Ruxton,  1997). Different  resources  may  be  used  to obtain  required  information  for 
risk/safety  calculation  such  as  experts‟  opinions,  statistical  data  and  experimental 
results.  Risk/safety  level  can  be    quantified  using  Bayesian  probability  theory 
(Apostolakis, 1990). A simple two term equation may be used to calculate the risk factor 
related to each unit operation/piece of equipment (Eq 2.1). Total risk associated with 
each process option is given through summation of risk factors of all units included in 
that option (Eq 2.2) (Bhimavarapu & Stavrianidis, 2000).   
 
Risk = failure rate × consequences                                                                      (Eq 2.1) 
                                                                              (Eq 2.2)      
 
Where   
i=0, …, n   indicates the unit operation/equipment.  Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        15 
 
 
 
Layer  of  Protection  Risk  Analysis  (LOPA):  this  semi-quantitative  risk  analysis 
technique defines the number of required protection  layers  in  a system  based on an 
initial  qualitative  hazard  identification  usually  through  PHA  and  HAZOP.  LOPA 
focuses on pairs of cause-consequence scenarios and creates a numerical estimation of 
the  probability  of  the  occurrence  and  estimates  the  frequency  of  the  consequences 
(Dowell & Hendershot, 2002). This quick and straightforward method quantifies the 
expected failure rate of initiating cause and the probability of failure on demand of the 
safeguards to define the frequency of consequences. In case of dependent failures and 
lack of failure rate data this method can not be implemented efficiently. This limitation 
can  be overcome using FTA which  is  more complicated and time consuming  but is 
capable of evaluating interdependent and compound failure events. Combining LOPA 
with FTA will provide the opportunity to take advantage of technical strength of FTA 
while not sacrificing the simplicity of LOPA (Rothschild, 2005).   
  
Optimal  Risk  Analysis  (ORA):  developing  HAZOP  method  and  equipping  it  with 
some additional steps and analysing techniques has led to the creation of ORA. This 
method comprises four main steps. The first step is a quick identification of process and 
potential hazards considering chemicals, unit productions and conditions which results 
in the generation of a  list of units that require detailed analysis. HAZOP  is used  in 
second step for detailed risk assessment. A computer automated tool is used to carry out 
HAZOP which  is  based on FTA. The third step  involves consequence evaluation  in 
order  to  quantify  impacts  of  possible  accidents  using  mathematical  models  and 
simulations  such  as  source  model,  models  for  explosions  and  fires  and  the  impact 
intensity models. Risk estimation is the concluding step. Based on estimated risk and 
potential  hazards,  hazard-reduction  policies  are  developed  in  this  step  (Khan  et  al., 
2001). 
 
Life Cost-Based FMEA (LCFMEA): the main problem of traditional FMEA is the 
subjectivity of its main parameters: occurrence, severity and detection difficulty. There 
is no unique technique to measure all these parameters. To overcome this problem the Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        16 
 
 
new methodology of Life Cost-Based FMEA has been developed which measures risk 
in terms of cost. Cost can be used as a common language among engineers. As a further 
enhancement, a Mont Carlo simulation is applied to account for the uncertainties in: 
detection  time,  fixing  time,  occurrence,  delay  time,  down  time,  and  model  complex 
scenarios.  Life  Cost-Based  FMEA  tries  to  minimize  the  uncertainties  of  traditional 
FMEA approach (Rhee & Ishii, 2003). 
 
Inherently  Safer  Design  (ISD):  a  fundamentally  different  approach  to  safety 
consideration  in  chemical  process  has  been  introduced  by  Kletz  in  the  late  1970s 
(Hendershot,  1996;  Hendershot  &  Berger,  2006).  This  approach  which  is  called  the 
Inherently Safer Design, is a way of thinking that aims to embed safety considerations 
as a permanent part in the design of chemical process plants. This philosophy is based 
on the idea that safety should be an inseparable characteristic of a process rather than an 
additional element. To make safety inherent in processes, attempts should be made to 
eliminate hazards in the design stages of a plant instead of trying to control them after 
designing the process. Considering hazard reduction in early design phases may result in 
fundamental  changes  in  process  which  usually  make  it  simpler,  containing  less 
hazardous materials and safer operation conditions (Hendershot, 2005). 
 
As  mentioned earlier, risk  is a  measure of  human  injury,  environmental damage, or 
economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the injury, 
damage  or  loss  (Hendershot,  1996).  Thus,  risk  reduction  can  be  achieved  through 
reducing the probability of hazard occurrence or incident frequency;  diminishing the 
severity of consequence such as injury, damage or loss; or a combination of both. Risk 
reduction strategies can be categorized into four general approaches. These categories 
are explained in decreasing order of reliability as follows (Hendershot, 1997): 
 
  Inherent  –  using  less  or  non  hazardous  materials  and  process  conditions  to 
eliminate the hazards. Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        17 
 
 
  Passive – using equipment and processes with specific design which result in 
lower failure rate or more tolerable consequences without any active function of 
devices. 
  Active  –  using  active  devices  or  systems  such  as  controls,  safety  interlocks, 
emergency  shutdown  systems  and  mitigation  devices  to  distinguish  potential 
hazards in different parts of the process and taking corrective action. 
  Procedural – avoiding incidents or reducing their consequences using operating 
procedures, administrative checks, emergency response, and other management 
approaches.   
 
A traditional risk management approach which is to control a hazard by constructing 
protection  layers  can  be  either  an  active  method  or  a  procedural  method.  These 
protection layers are expensive, may fail on demand or not to work efficiently while the 
hazards  still  exist.  On  the  other  hand,  inherently  safer  design  which  attempts  to 
eliminate the hazards and reduce the risk instead of putting up barriers is an example of 
inherent or passive methods. This approach makes the processes fundamentally safer 
(Hendershot, 1997). 
 
Four major strategies are available and used as guidewords to achieve an inherently 
safer design: 
 
  Minimization or Intensification – minimizing the use of hazardous substances. 
  Substitution – substituting a hazardous material with a less hazardous option. 
  Moderation  or  Attenuation  –  reducing  the  impacts  of  hazards  using  safer 
conditions, facilities or materials. 
  Simplification – making the process less complex and reducing the probability of 
operation errors using simple design options (Hendershot, 1996, 2005).  
 
There are some other principles developed by other researchers after Kletz and added to 
the  original  guidewords  mentioned  above.  These  new  principles  are  mainly Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        18 
 
 
subcategories of the initial ones and are not totally different from them. Some of the 
most accepted new guidewords are as follows (Khan & Amyotte, 2004): 
 
  Limitation  of  effects  –  modifying  the  design  and  operation  to  reduce  the 
magnitude of effects. 
  Error tolerance  –  increasing the equipment ability to withstand the undesired 
situations.  
  Avoiding knock-on effects – changing the  layout and construction to a safer 
version. 
  Making  incorrect assembly  impossible  – decreasing human error by applying 
unique systems. 
  Making status clear – using simpler equipment and information. 
  Ease of control – reducing the number of hands-on controls. 
      
As mentioned before, ISD is a philosophy not a tool, hence several researches have been 
conducted  in  order  to  make  the  application  of  this  philosophy  more  acceptable  via 
industries.  Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  quantify  the  qualitative  concepts  of 
inherent safety in order to make the measuring process easier and more understandable. 
In addition the quantitative factors would provide a clear comparison base to evaluate 
different process options. Almost all major approaches in this area are based on indexing 
systems. Several series of indices have been created or modified to serve this purpose. 
Some of these approaches are more widely known and discussed in the literature. These 
approaches are described below: 
 
Property Index for Inherent Safety (PIIS): this system which was developed by Edwards 
and Lawrence takes into account the following factors (Edwards & Lawrence, 1993; 
Rahman et al., 2005):  
 
  Reaction condition such as Temperature and Pressure 
  Properties  of  materials  such  as  the  Upper  Explosive  limit  (UEL),  Lower 
Explosive Limit (LEL), Flammability and Toxicity. Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        19 
 
 
  Process inventory 
  Reaction yield 
 
The total index in PIIS is a sum of a chemical score and a process score (Table 2.2 a-e). 
The chemical score consists of inventory, flammability, explosiveness and toxicity and 
the process score  includes temperature, pressure and  yield. In this  method the  main 
focus is on the reactions and not the other process aspects. This characteristic makes it 
more  suitable  for  route  selection  stage  rather  than  other  stages  such  as  equipment 
selection stage (Edwards & Lawrence, 1993; Heikkila, 1999). 
 
Table 2.2 – (a) Parameters listed by Edwars and Lawrance (1993), (b) Temperature 
scoring, (c) Pressure scoring, (d) Inventory scoring, (e) Explosiveness scoring  
(a) 
Row no.  Parameter 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Inventory (volume or mass) 
Temperature 
Pressure 
Conversion 
Yield 
Toxicity 
Flammability 
Explosiveness 
Corrosiveness 
Side reactions 
Waste and co-products 
Reaction rate 
Catalytic action 
Heat of reaction 
Phase  
Phase change 
Viscosity  Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        20 
 
 
 
(b) 
Temperature (°C)  Score  
T < -25 
-25  T < -10 
-10  T < 10 
10  T < 30 
30  T < 100 
100  T < 200 
200  T < 300 
300  T < 400 
400  T < 500 
500  T < 600 
600  T < 700 
700  T < 800 
800  T < 900 
900  T  
10 
3 
1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
(c) 
Pressure (psi)  Score  
0-90 
91-140 
141-250 
251-420 
421-700 
701-1400 
1401-3400 
3401-4800 
4801-6000 
6001-8000 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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(d) 
Inventory (tonnes)  Score  
0.1-250 
251-2500 
2501-7000 
7001-16000 
16001-26000 
26001-38000 
38001-50000 
50001-65000 
65001-80000 
80001-100000 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
(e) 
S = (UEL – LEL)%  Score  
0  S < 10 
10  S < 20 
20  S < 30 
30  S < 40 
40  S < 50 
50  S < 60 
60  S < 70 
70  S < 80 
80  S < 90 
90  S < 100 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
 
Inherent Safety Index (ISI): this is an index system developed by Heikkila (1999) that 
considers process safety structure, side reactions, corrosiveness, chemical interactions, 
type  of  equipment,  inventory  based  on  annual  throughput  instead  of  yield,  and  a Chapter 2. Literature Review                                                                                        22 
 
 
yardstick that reflects changes in the magnitude and direction in temperature, pressure 
and alternate chemistry  made to the process. ISI consists of two main  index groups 
(Rahman et al., 2005): 
 
  Chemical Inherent (CI) safety index - describes the chemical aspects of inherent 
safety and contains chemical factors affecting the inherent safety of a process 
(Eq 2.3).   
  ICI = IRM,max + IRS,max + IRM,max + IINT,max + (IFL + IEX + ITOX)max + ICOR,max   
                                                                                                                (Eq 2.3) 
Where  
IRM stands for heat of the main reaction, IRS for heat of the side reactions, IINT for 
chemical  interaction  and  subindices  for  hazardous  substances,  IFL  for 
flammability, IEX for explosiveness, ITOX for toxicity, and ICOR for corrosiveness.  
 
The related scores are given in Table 2.3a. 
  Process Inherent safety  index (PI)  - represents the process related aspects. It 
contains the subindices of inventory (II), process temperature (IT) and pressure 
(IP), equipment safety (IEQ) and safe process structure (IST) (Eq 2.4). Table 2.3b 
represents the scores defined for each group. 
IPI = II + IT,max + IP,max + IEQ,max + IST,max                                                  (Eq 2.4) 
 
Inherent safety index (IISI) is a sum of the chemical inherent safety index and the process 
inherent safety index (Eq 2.5). 
 
IISI = ICI + IPI                                                                                                          (Eq 2.5) 
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Table  2.3  –  (a)  Chemical  Inherent  safety  sub-indices,  (b)  Process  Inherent  safety  sub-
indices (Heikkila et al., 1996)    
 (a) 
Chemical inherent safety index, ICI  Symbol  score 
Heat of main reaction 
Heat of side reaction, max 
Flammability 
Explosiveness 
Toxicity 
Corrosiveness 
Chemical interaction 
IRM 
IRS 
IFL 
IEX 
ITOX 
ICOR 
IINT 
0-4 
0-4 
0-4 
0-4 
0-6 
0-2 
0-4 
 
(b) 
Process inherent safety index, IPR  Symbol  Score 
Inventory 
Process temperature 
Process pressure 
Equipment safety 
Safety of process structure 
II 
IT 
IP 
IEQ 
IST 
0-5 
0-4 
0-4 
0-4 
0-5 
 
 
Integrated Safety Index (I2SI): that is a software tool for evaluation of process routes 
from safety and economic points of view. This tool comprises two main sub-indices 
which account for Hazard potential (HI), Inherent Safety Potential (ISPI). Two other 
categories of main sub-indices are developed to measure the economic potential of the 
option. The proposed approach is based on a guideword similar to HAZOP procedure 
(Khan & Amyotte, 2005). 
  Hazard  Index  (HI)  ranges  from  1  to  200.  The  HI  is  calculated  for  the  base 
process  and  will  remain  the  same  for  other  possible  options.  It  is  calculated 
based on two sub-indices, DI and PHCI (Eq 2.6):  
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HI = DI / PHCI                                                                                          (Eq 2.6) 
 
o  Damage Index (DI) is a function of four important parameters: fire and 
explosion  (DIfe),  acute  toxicity  (DIac),  chronic  toxicity  (DIch)  and 
environmental  damage  (DIen).  The  DI  is  computed  for  each  of  these 
parameters using a curve which effectively converts damage radii into 
damage index by scaling up to 100 (Eq 2.7). The calculation method of 
each factor is described in references (Khan & Amyotte, 2004, 2005). 
 
DI = Min{200, [(DIfe)
2 + (DIac)
2 + (DIch)
2 + (DIen)
2]
1/2}              (Eq 2.7) 
 
o  Process and Hazard Control Index (PHCI) is calculated for various add-
on process and hazard control measures that are required or present in the 
system (Eq 2.8). It is quantified subjectively based on mutually agreed 
scale  among  process  safety  experts.  It  ranges  from  1  to  10  and  is 
quantified  based  on  the  necessity  of  each  control  arrangement  in 
maintaining  safe  operation.  Complete  description  is  given  in  the 
references (Khan & Amyotte, 2004, 2005).  
 
PHCI = [PHCIp + PHCIt + PHCIf + PHCIl + PHCIc + PHCIiv + PHCIb 
+ PHCIfr + PHCIs + PHCId]                                                         (Eq 2.8) 
 
Where  
p  stands  for  pressure,  t  for  temperature,  f  for  flow,  l  for  level,  c  for 
concentration, iv for inert venting, b for blastwall, fr for fire resistance 
wall, s for sprinkler system and d for forced dilution. 
 
  Inherent  Safety  Potential  Index  (ISPI)  accounts  for  the  applicability  of  the 
inherent safety principles to the process and ranges from 1 to 200 (Eq 2.9). It is 
calculated based on two sub-indices, ISI and PHCI:  
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ISPI = ISI / PHCI                                                                                       (Eq 2.9) 
 
o  Inherent Safety Index (ISI) is computed through the same procedure as in 
a HAZOP study in which the guidewords of inherent safety principles 
such as minimization, substitution are applied to the process system (Eq 
2.10). Based on the extent of applicability and the ability to reduce the 
hazard, an index value is computed for each guideword. The calculation 
procedure  for  each  index  is  described  in  the  references  (Khan  & 
Amyotte, 2004, 2005). 
 
ISI = Min{200, [(ISIm)
2 +(ISIsu)
2 +(ISIa)
2 +(ISIsi)
2 +(ISIl)
2]
1/2}   (Eq 2.10) 
 
Where  
m stands for minimization, su for substitution, a for attenuation, and l for 
limiting.  
 
o  Second Process and Hazard Control Index (PHCI) is calculated the same 
as the first PHCI described above after all modifications are done based 
on inherent safety guidewords.  
 
Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) is a combination of HI and ISPI (Eq 2.11). If it is 
greater than unity it denotes an inherently safer option. The higher the value, the more 
pronounced the inherent safety impact. The I2SI value for the complete system can be 
calculated using following Eq 2.12.  
 
I2SI = ISPI / HI                                                                                                    (Eq 2.11) 
 
                                                                                (Eq 2.12) 
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subscript i represents the process unit, and N is the total number of process units. 
 
In this method following indices are introduced to take into account financial aspects: 
  Conventional Safety Cost Index (CSCI) is computed using two sub-indices of  
cost of loss (CLoss) and cost of conventional safety (CConvSafety) (Eq 2.13):   
 
CSCI=CConvSafety/CLoss                                                                               (Eq 2.13) 
 
o  Cost of loss comprises four components (Eq 2.14): production loss (PL), 
asset loss (AL), human health loss (HHL), and environmental cleanup 
cost (ECC). 
 
CLoss = CPL + CAL + CHHL + CECC                                               (Eq 2.14) 
Where  
CPL = Likely downtime (hours) × production value ($/hour) 
CAl = Asset density ($/area) × Damage area 
CECC = CSoil + CWater + CAir    
CHHL  =  Damage  area  ×  Population  density  (people/area)  ×  Cost  of 
fatality/injury ($). 
 
o  Cost of conventional safety is the summation of cost of control and add-
on features (Eq 2.15). 
 
CConvSafety = CControl + CAdd-on                                                      (Eq 2.15) 
 
Where  
   and      
Ci and Cj represent the cost of a given process control measure and the 
cost of a given add-on safety measure, respectively; each implemented N 
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  Inherent Safety Cost Index (ISCI) is computed through Eq 2.16 which is similar 
to conventional safety cost calculations. 
 
ISCI = CInhSafety / CLoss                                                                              (Eq 2.16) 
Where   
o  CLoss is the same as what was described earlier (Eq 2.14). 
o  Cost of inherent safety is the summation of the cost of application of 
inherent safety, cost of control and the cost of add-on features (eq 2.17). 
CInhSafety = CInherent + CControl + CAdd-on                                        (Eq 2.17) 
 
In which CControl and CAdd-on are calculated through procedure described 
before and; 
 
CInherent = CM/EM + CS/ES + CA/EA + CSi/ESi + CL/EL                 (Eq 2.18) 
 
Where  
CM,  CS,  CA,  CSi,  and  CL  represent  cost  of  minimization,  substitution, 
attenuation, simplification and limitation of effects, respectively. EM, ES, 
EA, ESi, and EL are the extent of applicability of the respective inherent 
safety principles. 
 
The I2SI index calculation procedure is described in more detail in Appendix A. 
 
Expert system: that is another index based approach to implement ISD (Palaniappan et 
al., 2002a, 2002b). This approach uses a graphical method to analyse reaction networks. 
Inherent safety analysis is done using following indices: 
 
  Individual Chemical Index (ICI) which is related to properties of materials. ICI 
is calculated by summation of the indices assigned for Flammability (Nf) based 
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Explosiveness (Ne) based on difference between explosion limits for a material 
and NFPA reactivity rating (Nr). In contrast to ISI and PIIS, the Expert system 
includes the reactivity as a measure of the stability. 
  Overall Chemical Index (OCI) for a main reaction is equal to the maximum of 
ICI for all of the chemicals involved in the reaction. 
  Individual Reaction Index (IRI) is calculated by summation of the sub-indices 
representing  the  Temperature  (Rt)  as  a  direct  measure  of  the  heat  energy 
available at release, Pressure (Rp) as a measure of energy available to cause a 
release, Yield (Ry) which can be used as a measure of the inventory based on the 
fact  that the  higher  yield  results  in  the  reduction  in  size  of  the  reactors  and 
recycles. The yield sub-index is thus a measure of the capacity of the process and 
the residence time in the vessels and the Heat of reaction (Rh) as a measure of 
the energy available from the reaction. This index is calculated for both main and 
side reactions. 
  Overall Reaction Index (ORI) for a process route is calculated by summing up 
the IRI for each main reaction. The ORI is redefined to include the maximum of 
the heat of reaction index of side reactions (Rhs) in the process route. Final ORI 
is a summation of IRI for each main reaction and max (Rhs). 
  Hazard Chemical Index (HCI) is the maximum of the ICI of all of the chemicals 
in the process. 
  Hazard Reaction Index (HRI)  is the  maximum  of the IRI of all of the  main 
reactions in the process. 
  Overall Safety Index (OSI) accounts for the hazards due to the chemicals in a 
process route and their reactions. It is the sum of ORI and the summation of OCI 
for each main reaction in the process route. 
  Supplementary indices are introduced to differentiate between routes based on 
the number of chemicals or reactions and their hazardous properties. 
o  Worst  Chemical  Index  (WCI)  which  is  the  summation  of  maximum 
values  of  the  flammability,  toxicity,  reactivity  and  explosiveness 
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o  Worst Reaction Index (WRI) which is the summation of the maximum of 
the  individual  sub-indices  of  temperature,  pressure,  yield  and  heat  of 
reaction of all of the reactions involved in the process route. 
o  Total Chemical Index (TCI) is a measure of the number of hazardous 
chemicals involved in the route. That is, a route with just one highly toxic 
chemical  is  safer  compared  to  another  route  with  several  such  toxic 
chemicals. TCI is the sum of the ICI of all of the chemicals involved in 
the process route. 
 
OSI in conjunction with the three supplementary indices are used to rank process routes. 
Routes are first ordered according to the OSI. For cases where two competing routes 
have similar OSIs, the supplementary  indices are then compared.  While the relative 
weight of the three supplementary indices is subjective, they have been weighted TCI, 
WRI and WCI in that order. 
 
Once  the  process  route  for  manufacturing  a  product  is  decided,  more  detailed 
information  is  used  to  develop  alternative  process  flowsheets  and  evaluate  their 
feasibilities. In Expert system, inherent safety analysis during flowsheet development 
stage is implemented using following indices based on the scoring pattern proposed by 
Heikkila (Heikkila, 1999): 
 
  Flowsheet index (FI) is a measure of the hazardous nature of process as a whole 
(Eq 2. 19) and is composed of the chemical index (CI) and the process index 
(PI). 
 
FI = CI + PI                                                                                            (Eq 2. 19) 
 
  Chemical Index (CI) is calculated by the summation of the maximum index of 
parameters related to chemicals involved in the whole process: 
o  Heat of main reaction subindex (Rm) 
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o  Flammability subindex (Nf) 
o  Toxicity subindex (Nt) 
o  Explosiveness subindex (Ne) 
o  Reactivity subindex (Nr) 
o  Chemical interaction subindex (Rci) 
o  Corrosion subindex (Rc) 
 
  Process Index (PI) is calculated by taking into account the operating conditions, 
inventory  and  nature  of  the  equipment.  It  is  sum  of  maximum  of  following 
subindices: 
o  Equipment safety index (Eesi) which involved two categories of Inside 
Battery Limit (ISBL) and Outside Battery Limit (OSBL). The nature and 
type of equipment can also evaluated and an equipment safety subindex 
assigned based on the statistics of the typical equipment involved in the 
accidents which is explained in detail in the references (Heikkila, 1999; 
Heikkila et al., 1996). 
o  Temperature (Et) 
o  Pressure (Ep) 
o  Inventory  (Ei),  which  is  calculated  based  on  the  inventory  in  each 
equipment.  It  comprises  two  subindices:  inside  battery  limit  (ISBL) 
subindex and outside battery limit (OSBL) subindex. 
 
FI is calculated for the overall process flowsheet. It is equal to the addition of maximum 
values of each of the sub-indices calculated over each equipment in the flowsheet or the 
summation  of  the  CI  and  PI  for  the  flowsheet.  An  additional  index  has  also  been 
introduced: 
 
  Individual  Equipment  Index  (IEI)  represents  the  hazardous  nature  of  the 
equipment. The IEI accounts for parameters that influence the inherent safety of 
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nature, Inventory, Reactions (unit processes), Corrosiveness, and the Type of 
equipment (Edwards & Lawrence, 1993; Heikkila, 1999).  
 
In addition to the above mentioned index based methods which include both technical 
and environmental factors, another method has been reported in the literature developed 
specifically for environmental safety assessment. 
 
Global  Environmental  Risk  Assessment  (GERA)  index:  this  method  depicts  the 
individual  contributions  of  the  process  streams  and  the  unit  operations  to  hazards 
occurrence if they interact with the outside environment (Achour et al., 2005). 
 
  An environmental risk index is defined for each component presents in the inlet 
or outlet process streams (Eq 2.20). 
 
                                                                                     (Eq 2.20) 
Where   
αi  is the environmental risk  assessment index  for component i, n  is the total 
number of indices characterizing the component‟s risk, Ij is the component risk 
index value corresponding to the list in Table 2.4.  
 
The higher the value of αi, the higher the risk. The value ranges are given in 
Table 2.5. 
  The  cumulative  risk  effect  of  a  certain  number  of  components  existing  in  a 
process inlet or outlet stream is given by stream environmental risk index, βk, as 
given bellow (Eq 2.21):  
 
                                                                                     (Eq 2.21) 
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nc  is  the  number  of  components  in  the  process  stream,  xi  is  the  mole/mass 
fraction of component i, wi is the weighting factor for each component.  
 
The  weighting  factor  is  assigned  to  the  component  reflecting  the  relative 
contribution to the stream‟s effect on the environment. 
  At the unit operation level, the environmental risk index, θm, is defined for a 
given unit m (Eq 2.22). It represents the risk inherent to the unit, including that 
of operating and design complexity and the amount of material passing through 
or residing in the unit.  
 
                                                       (Eq 2.22) 
Where  
yk is fraction of the outlet stream from the given unit, βk is the environmental risk 
index for the outlet stream from the given unit not directly interacting with the 
outside environment, zm is the size factor for unit m, given value a between 0 and 
1,  M  is  the  total  number  of  indices  characterizing  the  unit  operation‟s 
environmental risk, Ij is the risk value corresponding to the index j (Table 2.6) 
for the given unit operation. 
 
  Final  index  is  Global  Environmental  Risk  Assessment  index  (GERA)  that  is 
calculated based on an overall component risk balance (using the inlet and outlet 
streams to the process) and the  individual risk  indices of the unit operations 
constituting the given process (Eq 2.23). 
 
                                        (Eq 2.23) 
Where  
a and b are the proportional factors (between 0 and 1) reflecting the relative 
contributions of the overall component risk balance and the unit operation‟s risk 
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the process directly interacting with the outside environment (negative value for 
outlet streams and positive value for inlet streams), yk is the fraction of the flow 
rate of stream k compared to the total inlet flow rate, βk is the stream risk index, 
nu is the total number of unit operations constituting the process, θm is the unit 
operation risk index for unit m, wm is the weighting factor for unit operation m 
which is assigned to each unit reflecting the unit‟s relative importance to the 
process, its complexity and its effect on the environment in case of hazard event. 
 
Table 2.4 – List of risk indices for a given chemical component 
Component risk index  Description  
It 
If 
Ii 
Ir 
Io 
Ic 
Ie 
Id 
Im 
In 
Ip 
Ik 
Is 
Ig 
Ix 
Toxicity index 
Flammability index 
Ignitability index 
Reactivity index 
Radioactivity index 
Corrosiveness index 
Treatability index 
Detecability index 
Migration index 
Containment index 
Plant preparedness index (to hazard situation) 
Community knowledge index (of hazard situation) 
Community preparedness index (to hazard events) 
Greenhouse index 
Explosion index 
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Table 2.5 – Rating value of the component’s risk indices.  
 Attribute   Attribute value 
No hazard 
Slight hazard 
Moderate hazard 
Serious hazard 
Severe hazard 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
Table 2.6 – List of inherent risk indices for a given unit operation    
Unit operation risk index  Description  
Iop 
Iin 
Ima 
Ihi 
Iis 
Ifa 
Ico 
Iex 
Isp 
Operator‟s index 
Inspection index 
Maintenance index 
Historic index (failure in similar industries) 
Isolation index (independent unit operation) 
Failure detectability index 
Controllability index (in case of failure) 
Explosion index 
Spill index (in case of failure) 
 
 
2.3.2  Environmental risk/safety assessment methods 
According  to  the  increasing  concerns  about  the  environmental  safety  extensive 
investigation has been started to develop safety assessment methods which can easily 
deal with environmental specifications and account for environmental safety factors. In 
several  studies  above  mentioned  methods  have  been  modified  and  environmental 
parameters  have  been  added  to them  to  cover  environmental  aspects.  Meanwhile,  a 
variety  of  new  technical  terms  have  been  created  and  widely  accepted:  Sustainable 
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Minimization  (WM)  and  Environmental  Impact  Minimization  (EIM)  (Yang  &  Shi, 
2000).  
 
Sustainability is a characteristic of a process or state that can be maintained at a certain 
level indefinitely. The exclusive concept of Sustainable Development aims to meet the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own.  Cleaner  Production  aims  to  make  preventive  policies  as  widely  accepted 
alternatives for corrective policies in industries. Preventive policies take advantages of 
more efficient operations and processes to produce products and services which involve 
less  risk  to  humans  and  the  environment  (Yang  &  Shi,  2000).  A  well-developed 
production  technique  such  as  pollution  prevention,  waste  minimization,  or  source 
reduction is required to serve the purpose of cleaner production (Yang & Shi, 2000). 
Waste minimization is the general term used for those techniques which try to minimize 
the adverse impacts of industrial wastes on the environment. However, this term does 
not fully express the aim of this field. The Environmental Impact Minimization (EIM) is 
a more accurate statement in this regard. Some examples of impact categories usually 
considered in EIM studies are: Energy consumption, resource consumption, greenhouse 
effect, ozone depletion, acidification, eutrophication (terrestrial, aquatic), photochemical 
smog,  human  toxicity,  ecotoxicity  (terrestrial,  aquatic),  area  used/species  diversity, 
odour, and noise (Yang & Shi, 2000). 
 
In order to minimize the environmental impacts of processes or choose the safest option, 
appropriate approaches and techniques are required to enable designers to measure these 
impacts  and  prepare  a  logical  base  to  compare  different  alternatives.  To  serve  this 
purpose several approaches have been developed. Four major approaches are described 
as follows: 
 
WAste Reduction algorithm (WAR): this method assumes that environmental impacts 
of processes are the results of energy and materials used in these processes. To measure 
the impacts of energy and materials six different indices are calculated in this method. 
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surrounding  environment.  The  difference  of  input  and  output  mass/energy  is  called 
generated  mass/energy which  is either negative or positive depending on the related 
reaction.  The  calculated  indices  provide  quantitative  factors  in  order  to  compare 
different routes or a modified route and the basic one (Cabezas et al., 1999). 
 
Mass Exchange Networks (MEN): this method is based on balancing the rich streams 
and  lean streams. There  is a set of rich process streams  in which some transferable 
components are to be removed, and a set of lean Mass Separating Agents (MSAs) to be 
used  for  removing  those  transferable  components  from  rich  streams.  Several  mass 
exchange units are designed for a process to transfer mass between different streams. 
The number of these units depends on process conditions and other objectives such as 
cost efficiency (Chen & Hung, 2005). MEN synthesis is an optimization method which 
studies  the  feasibility  of  mass  exchange  considering  economic  evaluations  and 
thermodynamic theory. Its purpose  is to maximize the possibility of  mass exchange 
while minimizing the cost (Nourai et al., 2001). 
 
Total Site Analysis: is not specifically designed for the purpose of environmental safety 
assessment however can be used in this area considering its  basic  principles which are 
energy usage and pollutant generation in a process and their relation. Process related 
emissions  should  be  directly  related to  energy  use  in  order to  be  predicted  via  this 
method (Nourai et al., 2001). 
 
Life Cycle Assessment (LCA): is a method to evaluate and reduce the environmental 
impacts  of  a  product,  activity  or  process  in  addition  to  their  related  environmental 
burdens and resource use. LCA‟s main stages are:  
  Goal definition and scoping, which defines the main constraints of the system. 
  Burden  definition,  which  defines  the  inventory  of  materials  and  energy 
consumption and also of emissions and solid waste. 
  Impact assessment that evaluates the impacts such as greenhouse effect, ozone 
layer  depletion  and  acidification  by  aggregating  and  quantifying  them  and 
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  The  last  step  is  reducing  the  number  of  environmental  impacts  through 
improving the performance of the activities.  
 
However,  system  improvement  can  not  be  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  LCA  only; 
technical, financial and social factors must also be considered. Since LCA is based on 
linear relationships between activities and environmental burdens, a linear system model 
can be useful. In order to consider other objectives such as financial and social factors, a 
multi-objective  linear  optimisation  model  can  be  applied  (Azapagic  &  Clift,  1995; 
Nourai et al., 2001). 
 
2.4  Concurrent safety analysis and process design 
The  classical  approaches  such  as  checklists  or  sequence  models  for  risk  analysis  in 
complex workplaces are of  limited use.  Also,  because of the  multifaceted  nature of 
workplaces,  the  use  of  single  oriented  methods  such  as  Failure  Modes  and  Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) or Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) is not satisfactory. That is, 
these methods focus on man, system or process one at a time. Hence, they can cover a 
limited number of safety aspects concurrently and need to be implemented separately for 
different aspects which is time consuming and resource demanding. Another limitation 
of an approach such as HAZOP is that both operators‟ activities and events external to 
the production process such  as storage and delivery are addressed to a very  limited 
extent (Andrews & Moss, 1993; Ruxton 1997). These limitations make it difficult to 
analyse industrial workplace hazards from a global perspective. A straightforward way 
to  overcome  these  limitations  is  to  analyse  the  industrial  process  through  several 
analysis  techniques  based  on  different  orientations.  Although  this  method  is  time 
consuming,  it  may  significantly  increase  the  overall  reliability  of  the  process  under 
consideration. The automation of a part of the analysis process as well as the multiple 
oriented approaches may indeed significantly enhance the completeness of the analysis 
and reduce analysing time (Vernez et al., 2004). 
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Furthermore, the desired product can be produced by several routes with different cost 
and safety levels. In any event, it is necessary to evaluate and develop a process for each 
route (Backhurst & Harker, 1983). Most studies to date, focus predominantly on the 
safety during the operational phase and not during the initial design step. Inefficient 
design  methods  with  late  safety  consideration  can  lead  to  various  delays  and  cost 
increases as safety problems may be revealed too late. It can add to complexity, which 
adds to capital and operating costs (Dalzell & Chesterman, 1997). 
 
Some  of  the  existing  techniques  for  risk  assessment  and  design  review  generally 
intervene quite late in the design process, often only at the stage of detailed design; 
while, the important and fundamental decisions about reaction routes, raw materials and 
intermediates  and  reaction  conditions  have  been  already  made  in  previous  stages. 
Existing methods that are used early in the design process generally set constraints and 
are used for review, rather than considering safety as a part of the design objectives. On 
the other hand, some methods have the potential to be implemented early at process 
design stages such as Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) and Inherent Safer Design 
(ISD). As mentioned above execution of these methods is usually a separated process 
from the design process which is  not efficient enough. To overcome this problem a 
capable  risk  and  safety  implementation  tool  is  required  to  integrate  risk  and  safety 
evaluation into process design phase.        
 
In addition, economic considerations have usually caused significant development in 
industry and are one of the main bases for design assessment. However, conventional 
design methods do not provide the ability to express the results of risk assessment in 
terms of cost and economic issues. The information about potential hazards and cost 
efficiency of risk treatment options such as elimination and control measures, has to be 
presented  to  the  designers  in  a  well-organised  pattern  to  help  them  with  making 
decisions about optimal alternative (Schupp & Hale, 2006).     
 
In design projects, it is preferable that risk analysis proceeds in conjunction with design 
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  Time  –  in  a  competitive  industrial  environment  long  delay  in  design 
modification and safety improvement is not acceptable anymore. 
  Cost  –  this  integrated  framework  provides  more  cost  effective  options  and 
increases productivity. 
  Competition – competing ability is increased through using more cost efficient 
and optimal alternatives. 
  International  and  national  influences  –  different  organizations  insist  on 
implementation of risk assessment. 
  Design database – the risk assessment process can provide the opportunity of 
documenting design specifications and information to use in similar cases. 
  Process  liability  –  it  decreases  the  probability  of  occurrence  of  hazards  and 
results in more reliable processes. 
  Lack  of  standards  –  in  case  of  lack  of  general  standards  or  absence  of  the 
updated one, a safety assessment may help to improve design options. 
  Schedule control – systematic safety assessment enables industry to make on-
time decisions and modifications. 
  Other  companies  –  to  interact  with  other  companies  as  client  or  customer 
implementing safety assessment may be a requirement (Main, 2004).  
 
The  safety  aspects  are  most  effectively  being  considered  early  in  chemical  process 
development. Risk analysis at this early stage, can assist in the selection of the optimum 
design concept. Integrating risk analysis with process design provides designers with the 
useful  feedback  during  the  design  period,  so  that  every  aspect  can  be  optimized. 
Considering safety early in design stages can prevent many hazardous events including 
human errors (J. Wang & Ruxton, 1998). 
 
In comparison with other human activities, significant improvement in safety levels has 
been reported in chemical industries. Improving safety level is regarded as one of the 
most important objectives in design process. To achieve better safety situation, chemical 
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Design  for  safety  in  the  chemical  industry  is  becoming  a  more  explicit  and  well-
organised process. However, it requires additional support tools to enable designers to 
pay  attention  to  safety  from  the  earliest  conceptual  design  stage  and  through  the 
subsequent detailing and to design more cost-effectively (Schupp & Hale, 2006). 
 
2.5  Risk/safety assessment implementation tools 
Traditionally, safety assessment and risk analysis methods are implemented by an expert 
team during the operational stage of the process life-cycle. The safety evaluation teams 
are usually included risk and safety experts in addition to the representatives from other 
technical areas. These teams are responsible to study the processes and the plants based 
on their selected safety assessment methods and available data from the history of the 
plants and suggest the appropriate solutions for the raised problems. These evaluations 
are usually done manually by the team members in their scheduled meetings through 
hierarchical approaches. Considering the importance of evaluating risk and safety of the 
processes during the early design stages as discussed above, the evaluation team makes 
attempts to execute these assessments as early as possible (Srinivasan, 1996).  
 
The  manual  implementation  of  the  safety  and  risk  evaluation  contains  a  number  of 
problems which three of the major ones are listed below. 
 
  The evaluation process takes long time and requires lots of efforts to be made by 
the expert team. 
  The evaluation may not be accurate enough as there may be the possibility of 
human errors. 
  Only one safety evaluation method is usually applied according to the limitation 
of  time  and  resources.  Hence,  not  a  wide  range  of  safety  issues  can  be 
considered at a time. 
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 To  overcome  these  problems  and  enhance  the  safety  evaluation  applicability  in 
industries,  the  automation  of  this  process  is  an  appropriate  solution.  To  serve  this 
purpose, several researches have been conducted to develop a suitable automation tool. 
This development in safety and risk evaluation area is still on-going. 
 
The  literature  reports  two  different  categories  of  risk/safety  assessment  automated 
implementation tools which are called briefly risk/safety assessment tools in this study 
and  are  described  in  this  section.  Table  2.7  shows  all  different  categories  of 
conventional and new tools, the compatibility of each group with different classes of 
risk/safety assessment methods, their applicability at the early design stages and their 
capability to automatically implement the assessment process.  
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Table 2.7 – Risk and safety assessment implementation tools; specification summary 
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Hierarchical  approach:  A  hierarchical  approach  is  usually  applied  to  manually 
implement safety assessment. In the hierarchical approach process design is divided into 
different layers. The assessment team goes through these layers step by step and studies 
each layer based on the selected assessment method.  Two general types of hierarchies 
are available for this purpose:  
 
  Physical layers of design; in this category, the design process is divided into four 
different  layers  of;  1)  Material  evaluation  layer  that  involves  the  study  of 
properties of chemical substances. Selection of substances plays an important 
role in the process safety. The goal of safety consideration in this layer is to 
select  safer  materials,  minimize  the  use  of  hazardous  materials  and  use  of 
hazardous materials in less hazardous form; 2) Reactivity assessment layer that 
focuses on exothermic reactions used in process. Loss of control may lead to 
runaway  in  case  of  these  reactions.  Thus,  attempts  to  design  control  and 
mitigation systems in the early stage of process design result in more efficient 
systems; 3) Equipment assessment layer that has important effects on process 
safety.  In  addition  to  choosing  safer  equipment,  a  safer  process  requires 
appropriate preventive and protective measure. This step of process reduces the 
frequency of  consequences of the accidental risks; 4) The Safety-technology 
assessment  layer  in  which  control  measures  are  designed  in  order  to  show 
realistic hazards. Safety consideration in other layers helps to select appropriate 
safety technologies for existing equipment (S. Shah, 2005; Shah et al., 2005). 
The main concept which influences this process is Inherent Safety Design (ISD). 
In all mentioned layers, the designing will be done with ISD principals in mind. 
 
  Conceptual  layers  of  design;  four  main  phases  are  distinguished;  1)  Whole 
project design in which main constraints and objective of the project including 
overall safety constraints are established. In addition, a preliminary screening of 
potential chemical routes with regard to constraints and objectives is done; 2) 
Route selection that involves development of chemistry block diagram and a 
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analysis is done in order to rank available routes. One or two routes are selected 
for process design, taking into consideration cost and safety benefits; 3) Process 
route  definition  which  includes  process  block  diagram  and  considers  the 
implementation of proposed process conditions. The aim of this consideration is 
to produce a process route with optimised safety conditions; 4) Process route 
development in which process flow diagram is developed. This phase focuses on 
selection  of  appropriate  equipment  and  taking  into  account  opportunities  to 
make process safer (Fitzgerald et al., 2001). The same as the previous category, 
the ISD philosophy is used in this category of approaches. However, different 
safety analysis methods such as HAZOP and FTA can be used in any phase if 
required. 
 
Computer  software-based  tools:  Softwares  developed  to  implement  specific 
assessment  methodologies:  several  softwares  have  been  developed  to  automatically 
implement different safety and risk assessment methods using the input data provided by 
the users. These types of softwares are designed based on the procedural patterns to 
implement safety evaluation methods step by step. Any software is specifically designed 
to  execute  a  certain  safety  assessment  method  such  as  the  software  developed  by 
Patterson-Hine and Koen (1988) based on object-oriented programming to implement 
fault tree (Patterson-Hine & Koen, 1988). 
  
Each of these softwares requires some input data considering their own designs and the 
safety and risk evaluation method that they are particularly designed for. Generally, the 
specifications and characteristics of the processes, related unit operations, equipment 
and materials in addition to the safety and risk factors are given to these softwares as 
input data.    
     
Development of different softwares for the purpose of automation of safety and risk 
evaluation is still on going. Customized versions of these softwares are applied by the 
industries.  
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One  of  the  approaches  which  is  quite  common  in  developing  the  safety  and  risk 
evaluation softwares is the knowledge-based approach. Two different categories of the 
knowledge-based systems are available in the literature and described as follows: 
 
  Problems and solutions databases: these systems include hazardous scenarios and 
their  possible  solutions.  In  this  methods,  object-oriented  modelling  is  used  to 
provide safety (accident) scenario objects involving all possible hazards that may 
occur during the process life-time and solution objects such as safety procedures and 
safe guards that can be used in case of facing hazards. Each of these objects has its 
own  attribute  and  appropriate  rules  are  defined  to  link  these  objects  together. 
Different  sources  are  used  to  define  possible  hazards,  such  as;  qualitative  risk 
analysis (HAZOP, PHA), experts knowledge and historical data. Experts knowledge 
and historical data are also used to indicate efficient treatments considering defined 
hazards.  In  addition,  inherently  safer  design  options  can  be  used  as  possible 
alternative in case of hazardous situations. An example of these softwares is called 
EventMAP software which has been proposed by  Fjellheim and Fiksel (1990) to 
support decision-making process (Fjellheim & Fiksel, 1990; Gabbar et al., 2001; Mc 
Greavy et al., 1996). 
 
  Causes  and  effects  databases:  these  approaches  involve  causes  and  effects  in 
different hazardous scenarios. this category of approaches focuses on safety analysis 
and tries to model safety analysis  methods using object-oriented techniques. The 
results provide designers with applicable tools to incorporate safety considerations in 
the process design stage more easily and efficiently. The main object classes in these 
approaches are possible hazards and their probable causes and effects. These object 
classes are developed based on classical safety analysis methods such as HAZOP 
and FTA. Depending on selected process routes and different equipments related 
hazards, this system identifies the causes of potential hazardous situations and points 
them out to the designers. Designers have to make decisions about the safety level 
and appropriate risk treatment strategy if required. Two examples of these softwares 
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and consequences analysis and the PSADAT software developed by Schwarzblat et 
al. (1985) to implement probabilistic safety assessment in the nuclear power plants 
(Leone, 1996; Schwarzblat et al., 1985; Struthers & Illidge, 1995; Toola & Heikkila, 
1996; Virtanen et al., 2006). 
 
The main limitation of knowledge-based systems is that they rely on extremely rich 
databases to be implemented properly. Such databases can be developed only through 
having access to plenty of historical data, various experiences and highly experienced 
professionals. 
 
Generally, the software-based automation technique has eased the application of safety 
assessment methods and reduced the required time. This technique has enhanced the 
safety assessment performance by decreasing the probability of the occurrence of human 
errors. Moreover, using these softwares enable the safety assessment team to save their 
time  on  going  manually  through  the  assessment  process  and  spend  more  time  on 
analysing the results of the automatic safety evaluation to take required actions.  
             
Simulation-based  tools:  Simulation  is  another  approach  which  has  been  used  to 
overcome  the  limitations  of  manual  safety  evaluation.  Two  different  methods  of 
simulation are applied for safety considerations which are described as follows:  
 
  Mathematical programming is one of the very first approaches were applied for the 
simulation  purposes  considering  the  safety  problems.  Optimizing  the  safety  of  a 
process plant can  be considered as a  multi criteria decision-making process or a 
multi-objective problem as the different safety aspects should be optimized together. 
Generally,  mathematical  modelling  is  widely  used  in  the  area  of  multi-objective 
problems.  This  methodology  serves  the  problem  in  two  general  steps:  1) 
Mathematics  help  to  define  and  implicate  behavioural  assumptions  upon  which 
safety analysis is based; 2) Mathematical calculations that should be done efficiently 
and  accurately,  solve  the  defined  model  (French,  1991).  Some  examples  of  the 
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simulation  for  fault  tree  analysis  in  probabilistic  risk  assessment  by  Rao  et  al. 
(2009), Mathematical formulation for event sequence analysis by Swaminathan and 
Smidts (1999) and Mathematical structures applied for probabilistic safety analysis 
by Cooper and Ross (1997). Two major categories have been realised in optimizing 
safety aspects using mathematical programming (Cooper & Ross, 1997; Rao et al., 
2009; Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999): 
 
o  In the first category, failure rates and reliability characteristics of equipment, 
unit operations and processes are used to define the constraints. Other given 
factors such as resource availability, capacity, material balance, demand and 
cost limits complete the list of required constraints. Objective function in this 
method may represent total benefit of the system. It can be the difference 
between  profit  generated  by  delivered  products and  total  cost of  utilities, 
preventive and corrective costs and the initial failure rate costs (Harish et al., 
2003).  This  objective  function  maximizes  the  benefits  subject  to  defined 
constraints including safety and reliability constraints. 
 
o  In the second category of approaches, mathematical modelling focuses only 
on the section of the process under consideration for safety problem and not 
on the whole process. In this category a qualitative safety analysis such as 
HAZOP of the  entire process  is done. This qualitative analysis results  in 
identification of hazardous cases which require further investigations. In this 
step, an appropriate mathematical programming problem is used to indicate 
if the hazard is realizable, its severity and possible causes (Srinivasan et al., 
1997).  The  result  of  the  second  phase  leads  to  decision-making  about 
required modifications or changes in that specific part of the process during 
the design stage. 
 
The mathematical programming is not user-friendly enough to be used in industry. 
Some designers will always desire to deal with the exact problem context, not an 
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resulting optimization problem  can  be  very  large  for industrial  scale  in the  first 
category which models the entire process. Therefore it may be difficult to solve. On 
the other hand, in the second category, although the size of the problem seems to be 
reasonable to solve, it has the shortcoming of not considering the whole process as a 
system. Hence the optimization would not be an overall optimization. 
 
  The other simulation method which is applied for this purpose is graphical method. 
The application of the tools in this category are easier than the previous category 
however the graphical tools are not as powerful and accurate as the mathematical 
tools. Two types of graph applications are reported in the literature: 
 
o   Graphs  which  are  applied  to  illustrate  causes  and  effects  relations  in  a 
process. This type of graphs is usually developed based on the recognized 
hazardous scenarios in the processes to execute whether the bottom-up or the 
top-down approaches. Several customized versions of this type of graphs are 
reported in the literature which some examples are (Chuei-Tin et al., 1997; 
Sancaktar  &  Sharp,  1985):  the  GRAFTER  introduced  by  Sancaktar  and 
Sharp  (1985)  based  on  fault  tree  method  and  a  graphic  tool  for  loop 
identification  in  graph-base  safety  analysis  proposed  by  Chuei-Tin  et  al 
(1997)  and  also  Petri  net  graphs  for  safety  assessment  (Adamyan  &  He, 
2002). 
    
o  Graphs which are used to model the processes. Different type of graphs are 
used by designers and safety evaluation teams to model the processes and 
implement the safety and risk assessment techniques on these models. These 
graphical  tools  allow  the  assessment  to  be  done  easier  and  more 
systematically.  The  examples  of  this  method  are  (Adamyan  &  He,  2002; 
Amendola, 1990; X. Z. Wang et al., 1996): the failure and safety assessment 
using Petri net graphs proposed by Adamyan and He (2002), DYLAM tool 
developed  by  Amendola  (1990)  and  application  of  fuzzy  logic  graph  by 
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2.6  Conclusion 
This  chapter  presented  a  broad  review  of  the  literature  pertaining  to  the  different 
approaches of safety and risk assessment with wider application in process industries. 
Integration of safety evaluation  into process design  stages  is of great  importance to 
achieve safer process options. Hence, the focus of the chapter was on investigation of 
characteristics and abilities of studied methods and tools to recognize the appropriate 
alternatives for application to initial design phases.  
 
Three categories of quantitative, qualitative and semi-quantitative methodologies were 
identified with either bottom-up or top-down analyses approaches. Some methods were 
applicable in general risk and safety assessment while some techniques were specially 
designed for environmental risk and safety evaluation. Another difference which was 
realised among various methods with general application was the safety aspects that 
each method mainly accounts for. Some techniques emphasised more on chemical and 
physical characteristics of the reactions and materials involved in a process while some 
others gave more weight to the reliability of the unit operations/equipment being used in 
the production route.    
  
Consequently,  in  addition  to  limitations  involved  in  each  method  to  be  integrated 
appropriately  into  the  early  design  phases,  existing  methods  are  also  restricted  in 
considering different aspects of safety and reliability. The other common problem with 
the  above  approaches  is  that  they  do  not  consider  different  possible  designs 
concurrently.  Considering  different  routes  simultaneously,  would  result  in  less 
computational time and cost.  
 
As can be concluded, there is still a lack of an applicable tool for choosing the optimal 
process design considering safety. In addition to the shortcomings mentioned above, the 
necessity of being able to meet competitive market challenges in both economic and 
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approaches and tools for integration of safety considerations into the early design stages. 
The new approaches are required to take advantages of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Qualitative characteristics lead to simplicity and less resource intensiveness. 
On the other hand, the benefits of quantitative features are a better understanding of the 
system,  more  explicit  methods  and  steadier  results  which  can  provide  better 
documentation and feedback systems. Furthermore, the tool is required to be relatively 
simple and easy to learn and apply. An appropriate tool is the one with high level of 
simulation ability for systems with any degree of complexity and reasonable flexibility 
in  order  to  be  adopted  in  the  advent  of  new  situations  and  conditions.  The  basic 
requirements  for  an  appropriate  technique  and  tool,  in  addition  to  the  previously 
mentioned factors, can be classified as (Lichtenstein, 1996): 
 
  Adaptability – the technique and tool should be able to translate the systems‟ 
requirements  and  also  be  flexible  to  be  applied  in  all  types  of  system 
configurations. They should have the capability to be customized for particular 
situations. Different quantitative and qualitative techniques should be addressed 
through the method.  
  Reliability and accuracy of results – the overall risk of a process is influenced by 
various factors. The method should be able to provide reasonably reliable and 
accurate results, irrespective of the certainty, subjectivity or completeness of the 
input data. 
  Usability  –  the  technique  and  tool  ideally  would  not  require  high  expertise, 
special software, or complicated training for their application. 
  Being inexpensive to use – the cost of application should be reasonable in order 
to justify the advantages of using them. 
  Reasonably fast – in addition to time pressure in competitive market, the time 
taken to conduct a safety assessment methodology requires resources which cost 
money. 
  Ability to facilitate analysis of different safeguard possibilities – for example by 
allowing exploration of different configurations of safeguards. The methodology 
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  Ability  to  give  clear  and  well-justified  recommendations  –  designers  and 
decision-makers should be able to understand all of the reasons resulted in giving 
priority to a specific design alternative. 
  Automation  –  the  technique  and  tool  should  have  an  acceptable  level  of 
automation.  
  Complexity  –  the  method  should  be  of  limited  complexity.  Less  complexity 
decreases the level of expertise required to utilise the tool. 
  Completeness – the technique and tool must be able to consider all aspects of 
systems with respect to potential risks. Meanwhile, the number of routes that can 
be assessed at certain time is of great importance. 
  Feasibility – the method and tool should be feasible in terms of their availability, 
practicability and scope. 
  Credibility and validity – the system should produce valid and acceptable results 
which can be proven to be correct (Lichtenstein, 1996). 
 
With all  mentioned  factors in  mind, the objective of this project  is to create a new 
technique and its implication tool to overcome the existing limitations in the area of 
concurrent safety analysis and process design. 
 
Table  2.1  showed  that  inherent  safety  design  method  is  one  of  the  most  reliable 
methods.  Its  qualitative  measures  that  can  be  quantified  using  index-based  methods 
make  it  suitable  for  qualitative  and  semi-quantitative  evaluations.  Moreover,  it  is 
applicable in both general and environmental safety assessments and compatible with 
wether  bottom-up  or  top-down  approaches.  Important  specifications  of  this  method 
make it a prior option for further investigations.  
 
To  integrate  quantitative  assessment  and  specifically  risk  studies,  probabilistic  risk 
analysis is chosen as the other assessment method for more detail investigation. It can be 
seen in Table 2.1 that probabilistic risk analysis method is one of the methods with 
specific application in quantitative evaluation.  
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To select the most appropriate implementation tool a quick review of Table 2.7 reveals 
that  a  graphical  simulation  approach  would  be  the  most  competent  choice  for  the 
purpose of this study. Petri net tool, as one of the most powerful options in this group is 
further investigated in Chapters 4 and 5. The broad applicability area of this approach in 
addition to its pronounced technical abilities validates this decision.            
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C Ch ha ap pt te er r   3 3   
R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   D De es si ig gn n      
3.1  Introduction   
The literature review chapter revealed that there is a strong industrial demand for the 
practical and capable safety assessment methods and implementation tools to be applied 
concurrently with the early stages of process design. Hence, this project aims to develop 
an efficient approach to overcome this problem (European Agency for Safety and Health 
at Work, 2009; Touch Oil and Gas, 2010).  
 
The Petri net modelling tool is further investigated in the subsequent chapters is adapted 
as the implementation tool in an integrated framework for safety evaluation and process 
design. Two different safety assessment and risk analysis techniques will also be studied 
as the basic approaches for developing a combined method according to their potential 
complementary  specifications  and  flexibility  to  be  applied  in  different  stages  of  a 
process life-cycle, particularly in the initial process design phase. 
 
Section 3.2 briefly reviews the Petri net‟s capabilities to perform different methods of 
safety evaluation simultaneously with process modelling. Two major methods of safety 
analysis applied in this study to propose a combined approach are discussed in section 
3.3. Section 3.4 explains the remaining chapters and the research procedure followed by 
a conclusion in section 3.5. 
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The aim of this chapter is to analyse which implementation tools and safety evaluation 
methods are selected for further development in this research. The general procedure 
followed by this study to achieve its main objectives is also explained.  
 
3.2  A Petri net tool  
Petri net has been widely used as a powerful modelling tool in the process industries 
(Gu & Bahri, 2002; Zhou & Venkatesh, 1999). Moreover, Petri nets have the ability to 
conduct various methods of safety assessment and risk analysis. Based on these critical 
characteristics, it is proposed that Petri net can be applied to conduct safety assessment 
concurrently  with  the  process  design,  which  is  one  of  the  main  limitations  of  the 
previously used tools discussed in chapter 2. The efficiency of adapting this tool as the 
process modelling and safety evaluation tool in this project is further investigated in the 
following chapter. The initial modifications required to make the general Petri net a 
suitable means for the purpose of this study is also presented in following chapter.  
 
Petri nets are suitable means for performing safety and risk analysis in the early phases 
of the process design. A case study is conducted in the following chapter to demonstrate 
the performance of Petri net as a tool for the stated purpose of this research. The results 
of this case  study  justify the consideration of this tool  for developing an  integrated 
framework  for  safety  evaluation  and  process  design.  The  more  specific  reasons  for 
which a Petri net based method is seen as relevant for the development of the integrated 
framework for process design and  safety evaluation are discussed  in the subsequent 
chapters. 
 
To evaluate the flexibility of the Petri net tool to implement various quantitative and 
qualitative methods of safety assessment, two other versions of Petri nets are introduced 
and  applied  in chapter 5. Stochastic Petri  net and  fuzzy Petri  net are described and 
applied to perform the probabilistic risk analysis and the inherent safety assessment with 
fuzzy indices, respectively during the process modelling phase.  
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To ascertain the effectiveness of the Petri net tool for concurrent safety analysis and 
process design the adapted case study is revisited in chapter 5.  
         
3.3  A combined safety assessment and risk analysis methodology  
As discussed in the literature review chapter, one of the shortcomings of existing risk 
and safety analysis methods is that they cannot provide a comprehensive assessment to 
cover a wide range of safety aspects. Therefore, in addition to creating an integrated 
framework  for  process  design  and  safety  evaluation,  this  study  aims    to  develop  a 
combined methodology to address a wide range of safety issues; such as, chemical and 
physical safety of a process and reliability of the unit operations/equipment.    
 
Extensive surveys of the literature also demonstrated that some methodologies such as 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and probabilistic risk analysis have been 
applied  in  a  wide  spectrum  of  the  industries.  However,  there  are  some  other 
methodologies which are not known by the industries to the same extent, despite their 
great  potential  and  functional  specifications.  This  may  be  a  result  of  the  lack  of 
information available in these industries about these methods and fewer academic works 
to enhance them to the applicable techniques for industrial purposes. Two examples of 
these  methods  are  inherent  safety  assessment  methodology  and  layer  of  protections 
technique (Heikkila, 1999; Khan et al., 2003).  
 
Chapter  6  details  two  methods  from  the  literature  that  have  shown  efficient 
characteristics to serve the purpose of this study. The inherent safety assessment method 
is  adapted  in  this  study  as  a  basic  approach  for  further  development  due  to  its 
sophisticated technical specifications and its flexibility and potential to be applied in all 
stages of a process life-cycle, particularly during the early design stages. This method is 
able to efficiently address the chemical and physical safety of a process. Moreover, the 
I2SI indexing system is adapted with some modifications to quantify the impacts of 
application of the inherent safety method on the process. The probabilistic risk analysis 
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operations/equipment involved in the production route. Based on the complementary 
specifications of these two methods, a new method is proposed which is a combination 
of these approaches to overcome the limitations of each individual method and take 
advantage of their strengths. 
 
The  developed  Petri  net  tool  is  applied  to  implement  the  proposed  method.  The 
combination  of  the  Petri  net  tool  and  the  new  developed  method  provides  the 
opportunity  to  integrate  a  relatively  comprehensive  safety  evaluation  method  to  the 
process design phase. This combined approach fulfils the objective of this research to 
develop an integrated framework. The performance of the final framework is tested on 
an industrial case study adapted from the gold industry and concludes with a discussion 
of the results.  
 
3.4  Research procedure 
The advantages of using Petri nets as the process modelling and safety implementation 
tool are outlined in Chapter 4 of this study. Chapter 5 provides additional examples of 
the  application  of  various  types  of  Petri  net  tools  to  demonstrate  the  efficient 
performance of this tool in different situations in conjunction with a variety of safety 
assessment methods. The obtained results confirm the great flexibility of the proposed 
Petri net tool in diverse systems.  
 
Subsequently, the appropriate risk and safety analysis methodologies which are applied 
as basic methods for further developments and the proposed new approach are described 
in detail in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 the performance of the new methodology is tested on 
an industrial gold mining case study, using the proposed place weighted Petri net as the 
implementation tool.   
 
The research procedure, therefore, can be divided into four distinct phases as follows: 
  Reviewing  the  existing  methods  and  tools  for  safety  evaluation  in  process 
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  Selection of the Petri net tool as an effective process modelling and safety and 
risk  assessment  implementation  tool  and  development  of  a  new  modified 
version of the Petri net tool to address the limitations of the existing tools. 
  Choosing two efficient methods of inherent safety and probabilistic risk analysis 
as the basic methods and developing a new combined measure to cover a wide 
spectrum of safety and risk aspects. 
  Verifying  the  performance  of  the  proposed  integrated  framework  of  safety 
analysis and process design through revisiting of two case studies from literature 
and industry.     
 
3.5  Conclusions  
This chapter has outlined the procedure  for developing an  integrated framework  for 
safety  evaluation  and  process  design  in  this  research  and  provided  the  logical  links 
between different chapters. It has explained that based on the literature review, Petri net 
is  chosen  as  a  suitable  means  for  implementation  of  the  safety  assessment.  Further 
modifications are required to enhance the Petri net to an appropriate tool to be used for 
the purpose of this study.  
 
Two well-known methods of inherent safety assessment and probabilistic risk analysis 
are adapted as the basic techniques in this research. The potential characteristics of these 
methods are the basis for using them to develop a new combined approach to overcome 
the limitations and shortcomings of existing methods.     
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C Ch ha ap pt te er r   4 4   
T To oo ol l   D De ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t         
4.1  Introduction  
The Petri net method is introduced as a suitable tool for implementing an integrated 
framework for safety assessment and process design in following parts of this chapter. 
Chapter 5  is also dedicated to further investigations on different types of the Petri nets 
and their capabilities to be used as a powerful means for implementation of various 
methods of safety evaluation concurrently with the process design. The first part of this 
chapter provides a background to the Petri nets and in particular more details on general 
Petri  net,  timed  place  Petri  net  and  the  place  weighted  Petri  net.  A  number  of  the 
modifications required to change this tool into a proper option for the purpose of this 
study are also presented in this chapter. 
 
A  case  study  is  adapted  from  the  literature  to  demonstrate  the  performance  of  the 
proposed tool for safety assessment and process design in Section 4.3. This application 
shows the capability of Petri nets as a suitable means. 
 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the results obtained from the case study and 
outline of the critical characteristics of the proposed tool in Section 4.4.       
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4.2  Petri net 
Previous applications of Petri nets as mentioned in literature review chapter, revealed 
that it can be a suitable option to be further investigated as a tool for the objectives of 
this project. Generally, Petri net is known as a graphical and mathematical modelling 
tool with application possibility to many systems. Characteristics such as concurrency, 
parallelism,  being  non-deterministic  and  being  stochastic  can  be  modelled  properly 
using  Petri  net.  Graphical  properties  of  this  method  make  it  suitable  as  a  visual-
communication tool to be used as a substitute for flow charts and block diagrams. In the 
meantime, mathematical characteristics of Petri nets allow mathematical models, state 
equations and algebraic equations to be run which is not easily possible in the other 
graphical tools. According to the concurrent graphical and mathematical abilities, Petri 
net  can  be  applied  as  a  powerful  common  language  between  theoreticians  and 
practitioners (Peterson, 1981).  
 
The Petri net theory, was originally founded by Carl Adam Petri during his PhD (Petri, 
1962). After that, in late 1970s and early 1980s, Petri net has become more popular 
among  the  designers  and  analysts  of  the  engineering  systems,  due  to  its  proven 
modelling abilities (Reisig, 1985; Silva, 1985; Yuan, 1988). Since the early 1990s, Petri 
nets have been used for batch process modelling, supervisory control and scheduling 
applications (Desrochers & Al'Jaar, 1995; Ghaeli et al., 2005; Gu & Bahri, 1999, 2002; 
Gu et al., 2000; Moody & Antsaklis, 1998; Zhou & Dicesare, 1993; Zhou & Venkatesh, 
1999).  In  most  of  these  applications,  time  is  also  included  in  the  Petri  net  model 
resulting in Timed Petri net (TPN).  
 
Petri net has been also reported in the literature as an applicable tool for risk analysis 
because of its capability to graphically simulate the cause and effect relationships among 
the events, in addition to the representation of the dynamic behaviour of the system. 
Petri net as a dynamic tool can be used for the automation of risk analysis techniques 
(Vernez et al., 2004). Moreover, Petri net modelling provided the ability to assess the 
quality and reliability impacts caused by the combination of failures (Adamyan & He, 
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based on tracking the markings of Petri net models (Adamyan & He, 2003). Petri net has 
been also suggested as a suitable method in finding the optimal design with respect to 
the  duration  time  for  the  systems  with  different  flexibility  levels  (Tsinarakis  et  al., 
2005). The benefit of Petri net over other graphical methods for the process design is 
that  it  can  represent  the  precedence  relations,  feasible  operation  sequences  and  the 
machine  available  to  perform  each  operation.  In  addition,  the  ability  to  represent 
concurrency,  make  Petri  net  as  a  suitable  and  powerful  tool  to  model  all  different 
designs simultaneously. 
 
This section expands on the definition of three of the major recognised types of Petri 
nets. General Petri net, timed place Petri net and place weighted Petri net are described 
in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, respectively.  
 
4.2.1  General Petri net 
Generally, Petri net is a directed, bipartite graph composed of a set of places P, and a set 
of transitions T, represented with circles and bars, respectively. A set of arcs is used to 
connect  the  places  to  the  transitions.  The  preceding  relationship  of  the  places  and 
transitions are shown by the elements of an Incidence Matrix, where they are -1 for 
those  places  as  inputs  to  the  transitions  and  1  for  those  places  as  outputs  to  the 
transitions. The other part of a Petri net is a set of tokens represented by the dots or 
numbers which reside inside the places and show the dynamic behaviour of the Petri net 
model.  The  distribution  of  the  tokens  over  the  places  is  known  as  marking.  The 
transition‟s firing renders the tokens being redistributed, resulting in a new marking. In 
the  modelling of the process plants using  the Petri net, the places can represent the 
condition or the availability of the resources while the transitions illustrate the start or 
completion of the activities/operations. The tokens allow  visualizing the  flow of the 
materials through the firing of the transitions. Formally, Petri net is a five-tuple    TPN 
=(P, T, I, O, m) where: 
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  T = {T1, T2, …, Tn}  is a finite set of transitions with  PUT ≠ Ø  and  P∩T = Ø; 
  I: P×T →R
+  is the input Incidence Matrix; 
  O: T×P →R
+  is the output Incidence Matrix; 
  m: P →R
+  is the set of positive integers whose i
th  component,  m(Pi),i ∊ {1, 2, 
…, m}, represents the number of tokens in the i
th  place. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows a Petri net model in which P1, P2, P3 and P4 are places, T1and T2  are 
transitions, the arrows represent the arcs and the black dot inside P2 illustrates a token. 
p1 p2 p4
p3
t1 t2
 
Figure 4.1 – A simple example of a Petri net model 
 
Marked Petri net: In a Petri net model, tokens remain in places and their travel in the 
net is regulated by transitions and happen via arcs. The marking of a place shows the 
number of tokens residing in that place. The markings of all places in a Petri net model 
in each step, constitute the marking vector m: P →R
+  related to that step.   
 
Transition firing: In a marked Petri net, a transition is called enabled when all required 
tokens are available  in the  input places of that transition. The  firing of the enabled 
transitions may result in various new markings. Sequential firings of transitions based 
on the  defined Incidence Matrix and state equation, transfer tokens step by step, from 
the initial places to the final places in a Petri net model. A firing sequence is created by 
alternative firings of transition (Eq 4.1) 
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𝜎  = m0  ti0  m1  ti1  m2  ti2 … tik  mk+1                                                                        (Eq 4.1) 
 
Where  
the occurrence of transitions  ti0, ti1, ti2 and tik has a partial relation  ti0 < ti1 <  ti2 < tik.  
 
Incidence Matrix: The Incidence Matrix of a Petri net defines the input and output 
places of all transitions as follows: 
 
 
 
Where  
 C(O – I) = [Cij] is the incidence matrix; 
i = 1, 2, …, n, is the number of places;  
and,  j = 1, 2, …, m, is the number of transitions. 
 
State equation: State equation is the mathematical equation applied to compute the new 
marking of a Petri net after firing a transition using the initial marking (M0) along a 
firing sequence of the transitions (𝜎) (Peterson, 1981). Eq 4.2  is the general format of a 
state equation. 
 
Mk  = M0 + C.W. 𝜎                                                                                                  (Eq 4.2)  
 
Where 
C is the Incident Matrix 
W is the weight factor  
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4.2.2  Timed Petri net  
An original Petri net is a suitable tool to model general behaviours of different systems. 
However, to consider the qualitative properties of the systems in more detail, various 
components can be added to the initial Petri net models such as time or weight. Timed 
Petri  net  (TPN)  was  developed  to  include  the  time  constrains  in  the  models  of  the 
systems to show different types of possible delays during such as firing delay systems 
performance. Time can be attached to any nodes in a Petri net model according to the 
specific requirements of the related system. For example, the timed place Petri net is a 
type of Petri net model in which the time constants are attached to the places. In the 
similar  way,  the  time  constants  are  attached  to  the  transitions  or  arcs  in  a  timed 
transition  Petri  net or timed  arc  Petri  net,  respectively.  The  time  constraints  can  be 
applied on a Petri net model in the form of a mathematical model, the state equations 
and/or algebraic equations. The tokens inside the places transfer the time from one step 
in  the  process  to  the  other  steps.  Any  other  behaviours  of  the  system  can  also  be 
included in the Petri net models in the same way as time.  
 
4.2.3  Modified place weighted Petri net 
In order to analyse the safety behaviour of the processing plants, the main idea behind 
the timed place Petri net has been adapted in this study. In the Petri net model which is 
developed in this research: 
 
  Places are used to represent the unit operations/equipment of the process plants. 
  Transitions show the start and end of each event and/or operation. These start 
and end points may refer to physical points in continuous processes or starting 
and finishing time of operations in batch processes.  
  Arcs illustrate the relations between the places and transitions.  
  Tokens represent the raw materials, semi-finished products and final products. Chapter 4. Tool Development                                                                                      69 
 
 
  Safety  weights  are  pre-defined  constants  attached  to  the  places  in  order  to 
represent the safety attributes of the unit operations/equipment.   
 
This  Petri  net  model  which  is  called  a  place  weighted  Petri  net  in  this  study,  is  a 
modified version of the timed place Petri net. The time constants are replaced with the 
safety weights to allow concurrent safety evaluation and process modelling. The type of 
the safety weight allocated to each place and the number of the elements included in 
each weight factor may vary from one case to the other, based on the employed safety 
assessment methodology. That is, the weights can be single or multiple element factors 
representing different input safety and/or risk data required for safety calculation. The 
same as time constraints, safety calculations can be applied on the Petri net model in the 
form of a  state and/or algebraic equation or a mathematical  model according to the 
requirements of the applied safety assessment methodology. These equations or models 
provide  the  calculation  details  for  the  safety/risk  factors  related  to  the  both  unit 
operations/equipment  and  the  total  process.  The  safety  factor  of  each  unit 
operation/equipment is calculated using a defined equation and related safety input data 
which  are  attached  to  each  place  as  the  weight.  The  tokens  residing  in  each  place 
transfer the safety factor of that unit operation/equipment to the next process step. The 
total safety factor of the process up to each step, is calculated according to the provided 
calculation method by the model or available equations using the data from previous 
steps transferred by the tokens. This set of calculations is repeated for each place in Petri 
net model from the initial step of the process to the final step. The total safety factor 
which is calculated in the final step represents the safety level of the entire process. Two 
cases of different safety assessment methods, the required input safety data, and the 
equations are explained as follows:  
 
Case 1:  In order to implement the inherent safety assessment method concurrently with 
the process design using the proposed place weighted Petri net method: 
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  Places represent the unit operations/equipment. 
  Transitions show start and end of operations. 
  Arcs illustrate the flow of materials in the process. 
  Weights  represent  the  basic  safety  characteristics  of  each  unit 
operation/equipment required for calculation of the safety index such as Hazard 
Index (HI) and Inherent safety Potential Index (ISPI) to calculate final Inherent 
Safety Index (I2SI). 
 
Considering  the  description  of  the  inherent  safety  assessment  method  given  in  the 
literature  review  chapter,  different  indexing  systems  may  be  used  to  quantify  the 
qualitative impacts of this method on the processes. Hence, the type and number of the 
safety input data is defined according to the specific safety indices in each indexing 
system. The safety index calculation method for each unit operation/equipment and the 
total  process is replaced with the state equation in the related Petri net model. Running 
the developed place weighted Petri net model results in calculation of the individual 
safety indices associated with the unit operations/equipment and the total safety index of 
the whole process. 
 
Case 2: in order to implement the probabilistic risk analysis method concurrently with 
the process design: 
  Places represent the unit operations/equipment. 
  Transitions show start and end of operations. 
  Arcs illustrate the flow of material in the process. 
  Weights represent the failure rate and consequences severity related to each unit 
operation/equipment. 
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To apply the probabilistic assessment method, the weight of each place may be a two-
element factor in which one element represents the failure rate while the other element 
gives the severity of the consequences of the failure of related unit operation/equipment. 
In this example, the simple two-sentence equation (Eq 2.1) may be used to calculate the 
risk  factor of each unit operation/equipment. Meanwhile, the total risk  factor of the 
process  can  be  obtained  by  applying  the  Eq  2.2  and  using  the  risk  factors  of  all 
predecessor unit operations/equipment up to any particular step in the process. These 
data are transferred by the tokens in the Petri net model.   
 
Risk = failure rate × consequences                                                                     (Eq 2.1) 
                                                                                    (Eq 2.2)     
Where  
 i=0, …, n   indicates the unit operation/equipment      
 
The performance of the proposed Petri net tool is demonstrated in more detail in the 
next section through a case study adapted from the literature.        
 
4.3  Acrylic acid case study 
An  acrylic  acid  production  process  from  the  literature  is  revisited  in  this  section  to 
describe the application of the developed place weighted Petri net tool. This process has 
been  employed  previously  by  Palanniappan  et  al.  (2002b)  and  Khan  and  Amyotte 
(2005) to demonstrate their proposed methods and techniques. This case study includes 
one basic production route and two modified versions of the base case. In each modified 
route a number of the unit operations/equipment is added to make the process inherently 
safer in comparison with the base case. The initial production route and two improved 
options are described briefly in the following parts. 
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The inherent safety assessment method and I2SI indexing technique is adapted in this 
chapter from Khan and Amyotte (2005) with no modification. Some critical adjustments 
on this method, in addition to further enhancements are given afterwards in Chapter 6.    
 
4.3.1  Acrylic acid production process  
The selected acrylic acid producing process involves catalytic oxidation of propylene in 
the vapour phase at 190°C and 3  atm pressure. Two side reactions of this one-step 
process  result  in  production  of  carbon  dioxide  and  acetic  acid  with  water  (Khan  & 
Amyotte, 2005).  
 
The first and basic production route comprises the following unit operations/equipment; 
however, includes  no additional inherent safety feature: 
 
  An air compressor pressurises the air. 
  A  feed  mixer  is  applied  to  mix  feed  stream,  compressed  air  and  propylene 
stream. 
  A fluidized-bed catalytic reactor is used for partial oxidation of Propylene. 
  An off-gas absorber absorbs off-gas from the combination of acetic acid, acrylic 
acid, un-reacted propylene, and by-products using deionised water. 
  Three distillation columns are used to recover, extract and separate acrylic acid 
and acetic acid from the solvent.  
 
In the second route some safety features have been added to the above described unit 
operations/equipment as follows: 
 
  A quench tower is used to prevent any side reaction. Chapter 4. Tool Development                                                                                      73 
 
 
  An acid extractor is added for liquid-liquid extraction to separate the acid from 
water using diisopropyl ether as the solvent. 
  A solvent tower is used to recycle and recover the diisopropyl ether from the 
organic phase of extraction tower product. 
 
In addition to the basic unit operations/equipment in the first option and extra inherent 
safety features in the second route, another unit operation is added to this production 
route to create the third option: 
 
  A solvent splitter which enables the use of the recycle stream from the off-gas 
absorber. 
 
The third option which contains all basic and additional unit productions is described as 
follows: Acrylic acid is produced by partial oxidation of propylene in a fluidized-bed 
catalytic reactor. To prevent any side reaction a cold recycle quench is used immediately 
after reactor. Deionized water in the off-gas absorber absorbs off-gas from the quench 
tower, containing acetic acid, acrylic acid, un-reacted propylene, and by-products. As 
the next step, an acid extractor is used for liquid-liquid extraction to separate the acid 
from  water  using  diisopropyl  ether  as  the  solvent.  After  that,  diisopropyl  ether  is 
recovered  and  recycled  in  the  solvent  tower  from  the  organic  phase  of  extractor 
products. The bottom stream from this solvent tower is sent to the acid tower to separate 
and cool the acetic acid and acrylic acid and send them to the storage unit. A waste 
tower is used to recover and recycle the solvent from acid extractor‟s aqueous phase 
product. The bottom wastewater stream, containing acetic acid and small amount of 
solvent, is sent to wastewater treatment (Khan & Amyotte, 2005; Palaniappan et al., 
2002).  
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The flowcharts related to the basic case and the second and third options are illustrated 
in Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4,  respectively. 
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Figure 4.2 – Acrylic acid production route – basic option  
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Figure 4.3 – Acrylic acid production route – the second option 
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4.3.2  Petri net model 
A place weighted Petri net model is developed in this case study based on the described 
production routes. Petri net tool has the ability to present all process options together in 
one  model.  This  combined  model  which  covers  all  unit  operations  existing  in  each 
option is called super-net in this study. The super-net model can be divided into smaller 
sub-nets each includes one or more unit operations. A single unit operation or a group of 
unit  operations  which  are  similar  in  different  process  alternatives  creates  a  sub-net 
which  is referred to as common sub-net  in this study. On the other hand, there are 
individual sub-nets that include the unit operation(s) used only in one production route. 
Application  of  super-net  which  can  be  a  huge  model  provides  the  opportunity  to 
consider all process options together. At the mean time, defining appropriate common 
and individual sub-nets would assist designers to considerably reduce the size of the 
super-net.  
 
In this case study all three process options are combined together to create a super-net 
model shown in Figure 4.5. Considering the similarities and differences of these routes, 
following sub-nets are recognized in the super-net model: 
 
  Subnet A: including air compressor. 
  Subnet B: including distillation column I, distillation column II, and distillation 
column III. 
  Subnet C: including solvent splitter. 
  Subnet  D:  including  acid  extraction  tower,  distillation  column  I,  distillation 
column II, distillation column III, and solvent mixer. 
 
The Petri net model of each sub-net is shown in Figure 4.6 a-d. In this model the places 
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operations and events and the tokens are materials. The weights carry safety  indices 
associated with each unit operations/equipment. In this case, the weights on the places 
are  two-element  factors,  to  carry  required  safety  indices  in  applied  method.  These 
indices are described in more detail later in this section. The definitions of all places are 
given in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 – Interpretation of all places in Petri net model 
Place  Description  Place  Description  Place  Description 
P1  Air  P12  Absorber  P23  Water 
P2  Air compressor  P13  Off-gas absorber  P24  Acid extractor 
P3  Compressed air  P14  Off-gas  P25  Dist. column I 
P4  Feed stream  P15  Solvent Splitter  P26  Dist. column II 
P5  Propylene stream  P16  Feed mixer  P27  Acetic acid 
P6  Feed mixer  P17  Dist. column I  P28  Acrylic acid 
P7  Quench tower  P18  Dist. column II  P29  Dist. column III 
P8  Reactor  P19  Dist. column III  P30  Solvent mixer 
P9  Absorber  P20  Water  P31  Water 
P10  Off-gas absorber  P21  Acetic acid  P32  Fresh solvent 
P11  Reactor  P22  Acrylic acid  P33  Acid extractor  
 
 
The Petri net model is implemented in Visual Studio using C++ programming language 
and the developed codes are available in Appendix B. Characteristics of applied PC are 
as follows: Intel[R], Pentium[R] D CPU 3.00 GHz. Running the Petri net model results 
in generation of eight possible combinations of the base case and different sub-nets. The 
unit operations added to the base case in each generated option are as follows:  
 
  Route 1: a quench tower. 
  Route 2: a quench tower and a solvent splitter. Chapter 4. Tool Development                                                                                      77 
 
 
  Route 3: a quench tower, change of solvent, an extraction column, and a solvent 
mixer. This route is the same as the second option in Khan and Amyotte (2005).  
  Route 4: a quench tower, change of solvent, an extraction column, a solvent 
mixer, and solvent splitter. This route is the same as third option in Khan and 
Amyotte (2005).  
  Route 5: the base case which is the same as the first option in Khan and Amyotte 
(2005). 
  Route 6: a solvent splitter. 
  Route 7: change of solvent, an extraction column, and a solvent mixer. 
  Route 8: change of solvent, an extraction column, a solvent mixer, and solvent 
splitter. 
  
The Petri net models and the flowsheets of each generated option is given in Figure 4.7 
a-h. 
 
The Petri net tool provides the opportunity to generate all possible combinations of the 
base case and the additional safety features. Instead of only three process options studied 
by Khan and Amyotte (2005), using the proposed tool, eight different alternatives are 
generated and are available for safety investigation in the current study. 
 
In order to develop an integrated framework for process design and safety evaluation, 
the next step is the enhancement of the Petri net tool to execute the safety assessment 
process concurrently with the process modelling. To serve this purpose, the inherent 
safety approach in conjunction with an integrated indexing system which was proposed 
by Khan and Amyotte (2005) are employed and described below.   
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Figure 4.5 – Super-net model – acrylic acid case study  
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(d) Subnet D 
Figure 4.6 – Sub-nets A, B, C and D included in the super-net model 
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(b) Route 2 and associated Petri net model 
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(c) Route 3 and associated Petri net model 
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(d) Route 4 and associated Petri net model 
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(e) Route 5 and associated Petri net model 
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(g) Route 7 and associated Petri net model 
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(h) Route 8 and associated Petri net model 
Figure 4.7 – Flowsheets of the 8 generated routes and respective Petri net models 
 
4.3.3  Inherent safety assessment method and I2SI indexing system 
The  inherent safety assessment approach has  been discussed  in the  literature review 
chapter. Some of the major indexing systems which have been developed and applied to 
quantify the impacts of the inherent safety principles on the safety level of the processes 
have also  been described. The  integrated safety  index (I2SI) proposed by  Khan  and 
Amyotte (2005) is one of these indexing systems. The I2SI  is based on the calculation 
of three main indices for each unit operation/equipment: the safety index which is called 
I2SI (Eq 2.12); and two cost indices representing conventional safety cost (CSCI)  and 
inherent safety cost (ISCI) using Eq  2.14  and Eq 2.17, respectively. The calculation 
procedures of these indices were detailed in  Chapter 2. The comparison of different 
processing routes in this method is done according to the values of these indices. Greater 
than  unity  amounts  for  I2SI  show  the  positive  response  of  related  unit 
operations/equipment into application of the inherent safety methodology; the greater 
the  I2SI,  the  safer  the  unit  operation/equipment.  Therefore,  the  number  of  non-
responding unit operations/equipment into the inherent safety keywords is considered as 
a weak point for the related process option. On the other hand, the smaller difference 
between the ISCI and CSCI, indicates less increase in the safety costs resulted from the 
application of the inherent safety principles in comparison with the conventional safety 
controls. This can be an economic explanation for application of the inherent safety 
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entire system. The greater values of the I2SIsystem   indicate the safer routes. The I2SI, 
ISCI  and  CSCI  related to  each  unit  operation/equipment  in  each  process  option  are 
given in Table 4.2 a-h.  
 
In  the  application  of  the  proposed  place  weighted  Petri  net,  the  I2SI  of  each  unit 
operation/equipment is defined as a weight element for the related place. Eq 2.13 is 
added  as  an  algebraic  equation  in  the  developed  Petri  net  model  to  integrate  safety 
evaluation  into the design phase. The  calculated I2SI in  each  step of the process  is 
transferred to the next step by available tokens. Running this Petri net model in the 
Visual Studio environment results in generation of eight process options and calculation 
of  the  I2SIsystem  associated  with  each  route.  The  calculated  indices  for  each  unit 
operation/equipment are given in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.2 – Input data not considering the cost factors 
 (a) Route 1 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.74 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.98 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
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(b) Route 2 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
1.05 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.74 
1.48 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.98 
1.30 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
 
 
 
(c) Route 3 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
3.48 
1.41 
4.64 
2.70 
2.04 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.74 
0.67 
2.20 
0.50 
1.01 
1.01 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.98 
0.82 
1.63 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
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(d) Route 4 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
1.05 
3.13 
1.44 
4.71 
2.87 
2.10 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.74 
1.48 
0.60 
2.18 
0.49 
0.94 
0.96 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.98 
1.30 
0.82 
1.63 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
  
 
 
(e) Route 5 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
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(f) Route 6 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
1.05 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.48 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.30 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
 
 
 
 
(g) Route 7 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
3.48 
1.41 
4.64 
2.70 
2.04 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
0.67 
2.20 
0.50 
1.01 
1.01 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
0.82 
1.63 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
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(h) Route 8 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
1.05 
3.48 
1.44 
4.71 
2.87 
2.10 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.48 
0.60 
2.18 
0.49 
0.94 
0.96 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.30 
0.82 
1.63 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
 
 
Table 4.3 – Summary of the results – not considering cost factors  
  Route 1  Route 2  Route 3  Route 4  Route 5  Route 6  Route 7  Route 8 
Total safety 
index  0.22  0.22  4.87  4.91  0.05  0.05  1.19  1.21 
Non-
responding 
unit operation 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
2 
 
6 
 
6 
 
3 
 
3 
 
 
In Khan and Amyotte‟s (2005) proposed method, the I2SI indices and the cost indices 
were studied separately to choose the best production route. However, in this study, 
some  modifications  are  made  to  obtain  a  unique  final  index  for  each  unit 
operation/equipment: the I2SI is divided by the ratio of the inherent safety index over 
the conventional safety index, and the resulting index is called safety-cost index (Eq 
4.3). The same equation as Eq 2.13  is applied to combine new safety-cost indices and 
give the total safety-cost index of the system (Eq 4.4 ). According to the initial I2SI 
method,  the  greater  amount  of  the  I2SI  shows  the  inherently  safer  unit 
operation/equipment. Meanwhile, the difference between the inherent safety cost and the Chapter 4. Tool Development                                                                                      90 
 
 
conventional safety cost indicates the additional cost resulting from the application of 
the inherent safety features. Less difference is desired which justifies the economical 
benefits of the application of the inherent safety features instead of the conventional 
safety controls. Hence, the greater amounts of the new safety-cost index, indicate safer 
and more economic unit operations/equipment. Thus, the routes with the greater total 
safety-cost indices are considered as better process options.   
 
Safety-cost index = I2SI / (ISCI / CSCI)                                                               (Eq 4.3) 
 
                     (Eq 4.4)       
 
To  implement  the  modified  method  using  place  weighted  Petri  net,  a  three-element 
weight factor is defined for each place. The I2SI, CSCI and ISCI calculated for each unit 
operation/equipment are replaced with these three elements. Moreover, instead of one 
equation used in the previous version, two equations are applied for safety calculations 
in the new version: Eqs 4.3 and 4.4 are used to compute the safety-cost indices of the 
unit operations/equipment and the total safety-cost index of each route, respectively. To 
express the negative impact of the number of non-responding unit operations/equipment 
to the inherent safety principles in each route on the total safety of that process, this 
factor is named “Penalty factor” in this modified version. The I2SI, ISCI, CSCI and 
safety-cost index related to each unit operation/equipment are presented in Table 4.4 a-
h. The results of application of the new method are also given in the Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.4 – Input data considering the cost factors 
(a) Route 1 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI  Safety-cost index 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.74 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.98 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.90 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
 
 
 
 
(b) Route 2 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI  Safety-cost index 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
1.05 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.74 
1.48 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.98 
1.30 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.90 
0.92 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
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(c) Route 3 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI  Safety-cost index 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
3.48 
1.41 
4.64 
2.70 
2.04 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.74 
0.67 
2.20 
0.50 
1.01 
1.01 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.98 
0.82 
1.63 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.90 
4.26 
1.04 
10.1 
4.73 
2.54 
 
 
 
 
(d) Route 4 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI  Safety-cost index 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
1.05 
3.13 
1.44 
4.71 
2.87 
2.10 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.74 
1.48 
0.60 
2.18 
0.49 
0.94 
0.96 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.90 
0.98 
1.30 
0.82 
1.63 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.90 
0.92 
4.28 
1.08 
10.5 
5.40 
2.76 
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(e) Route 5 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI  Safety-cost index 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.30 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
 
 
 
 
 
(f) Route 6 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI  Safety-cost index 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
1.05 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.48 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.30 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
0.92 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
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(g) Route 7 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI  Safety-cost index 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
3.48 
1.41 
4.64 
2.70 
2.04 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
0.67 
2.20 
0.50 
1.01 
1.01 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
0.82 
1.63 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
4.26 
1.04 
10.1 
4.73 
2.54 
 
 
 
(h) Route 8 
Unit operation  I2SI  ISCI  CSCI  Safety-cost index 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
1.05 
3.48 
1.44 
4.71 
2.87 
2.10 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.48 
0.60 
2.18 
0.49 
0.94 
0.96 
1.20 
1.03 
0.75 
0.98 
1.30 
0.82 
1.63 
1.09 
1.77 
1.26 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
0.92 
4.28 
1.08 
10.5 
5.40 
2.76 
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Table 4.5 – Summary of the results – considering cost factors 
  Route 1  Route 2  Route 3  Route 4  Route 5  Route 6  Route 7  Route 8 
Total safety-
cost index  0.25  0.24  12.04  12.65  0.05  0.05  2.58  2.71 
Penalty 
factor 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
2 
 
6 
 
6 
 
3 
 
3 
 
 
4.3.4  Discussion 
From the Table 4.3 and 4.5 it becomes clear that the routes number 3 and 4 have shown 
better responses to the application of the inherent safety method. The number of non-
responding unit operations/equipment to the application of the inherent safety principles 
in these routes are 2 which is the smallest number in the both tables. Table 4.3 gives 
4.87 and 4.91 as the I2SIsystem value and Table 4.5 represents 12.04 and 12.65 as the total 
safety-cost indices values for routes 3 and 4, respectively. The final indices values for 
route 4 in both methods are slightly higher than the parallel indices for route 3 which 
indicates  the  necessity  of  further  investigations  on  these  routes  to  make  the  final 
decision about the optimal option. In both tables, routes 5 and 6 have the smallest total 
indices values of 0.05 and largest number of non-responding unit operations/equipment 
of 6 which means these production routes have shown less response to the application of 
the inherent safety method. 
 
Route  number  4  with  the  highest  total  index  value  contains  all  the  safety  features 
introduced in the super-net model which is the same as route number 3 in Khan and 
Amyotte (2005). On the other hand, route 5 contains no additional safety feature which 
is the same as the base case in the previous study. The similarity of the outcomes in this 
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verifies the performance and reliability of the proposed place weighted Petri net tool to 
be applied for safety evaluation purpose.        
 
On the other hand, in this case study, Table 4.2 represents the results of implementing 
the original I2SI safety assessment method using the proposed place weighted Petri net, 
while Table 4.4 gives the results of application of the modified I2SI method using the 
same place weighted Petri net tool. The aim of the modifications made on I2SI in this 
chapter,  was  to  introduce  one  final  index  instead  of  three  indices  for  each  unit 
operation/equipment in order to develop an easier comparison process. The consistency 
of the outcomes of application of the modified method with the original one proves the 
fact that these modifications have improved the usability of the method without any 
adverse impact on the efficiency of the evaluation results.  
 
Compared to the other safety evaluation tools reviewed in chapter 2, the place weighted 
Petri net provides two significant opportunities in addition to its efficient and reliable 
performance. The first one is providing an integrated framework to implement the safety 
evaluation  concurrently  with  the  process  modelling  due  to  its  great  graphical  and 
mathematical  modelling abilities. Meanwhile,  it  provides the ability to automatically 
generate all possible production routes. These would result in significant reduction in 
the direct human role  in the process development phase and consequently  lead to a 
reduction in human errors, time and expenses.     
 
Overall, the proposed Petri net tool should be considered as an appropriate alternative to 
execute safety assessment in the early design stages. Furthermore, a suitable ground for 
comparing  different  process  options  based  on  their  safety  characteristics,  can  be 
provided for decision-makers.   
                     
4.4  Conclusion   
This chapter has provided a brief background on the Petri net and their mathematical 
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option to integrate safety evaluation into the early process design stages. It has also been 
explained  that  Petri  net,  with  their  ability  to  model  the  process  graphically  and  to 
carryout  safety  assessment  mathematically,  allow  for  automatic  generation  of  all 
possible combinations of a basic process option and various additional safety features 
available for that process. This leads to a significant reduction in the human involvement 
in the process development phase and consequently reduction in the possible human 
errors.  
 
Moreover, it has been described that this approach attempts to create a super-net model 
of all possible process options based on their similarities and differences. This super-net 
model  consists  of  common  sub-nets  and  individual  sub-nets  recognized  in  process 
alternatives. Application of the common sub-nets results in decreasing the size of the 
super-net  model  by  avoiding  the  repetitive  components.  Hence,  in  the  execution  of 
safety assessment using developed super-net model a great amount of time and energy is 
saved by avoiding the repetitive calculations. 
 
The chapter also provided a case study to demonstrate the performance of the proposed 
tool.  This  case  study  is  adapted  from  the  literature  to  offer  a  suitable  ground  for 
comparison  between  the  developed  Petri  net  tool  and  the  other  previously  used 
alternatives.    
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C Ch ha ap pt te er r   5 5   
   A Ap pp pl li ic ca at ti io on n   o of f   O Ot th he er r   P Pe et tr ri i   N Ne et ts s      
5.1  Introduction   
Chapter 4 briefly described the Petri net modelling tool and explained two basic types of 
general Petri net and timed place Petri net. The modified version of the timed place Petri 
net  was  also  introduced  as  the  place  weighted  Petri  net  to  be  applied  as  the  safety 
evaluation  tool  chosen  for  this  study.  Stochastic  and  fuzzy  Petri  net  are  brought to 
attention in Chapter 5 for further investigation in the developing integrated framework 
for  safety  assessment  and  process  design.  These  options  have  shown  significant 
potential to be adapted for the purpose of this study due to their basic characteristics.     
 
Section 5.2 reviews stochastic Petri net and its compatibility with the probabilistic risk 
analysis method to develop an integrated framework for safety evaluation and process 
design. Fuzzy Petri net and its specifications are investigated in Section 5.3. Application 
of this Petri net in conjunction with the fuzzy risk analysis is also studied is this section. 
Finally, the conclusion of this chapter is given in Section 5.4.  
   
5.2  Stochastic Petri net   
A  variety  of  Petri  net  have  been  widely  used  in  modelling  of  different  systems. 
Stochastic Petri net is one of the Petri net methods that has been applied effectively in 
production systems (Jiang et al., 1999). The rationale for why a stochastic Petri net is 
seen as relevant for modelling these systems is discussed below. Chapter 5. Application of Other Petri Nets                                                                101 
 
 
5.2.1  Stochastic Petri net and risk analysis  
In  a  manufacturing  system  some  events  may  not  occur  when  they  are  supposed  to 
happen even if all the required predecessor activities are completed and preconditions 
are met. This unpredictability is due to the nature of the activities in these systems. This 
uncertain behaviour is called stochastic behaviour and these activities and events are 
called  stochastic activities. The stochastic activities are applied to model the risk of 
failure of the unit operations in a production system. With a stochastic activity it is 
possible to model the random breakdown of unit operations and equipment (Ciardo et 
al., 1994; Jiang et al., 1999; Parzen, 1999). 
 
The proposed Petri  net modelling and  safety assessment implementation tool  in this 
project  is  extended  into  stochastic  Petri  net  to  provide  the  possibility  to  deal  with 
uncertain safety behaviour of the unit operations/equipment and include their associated 
risk of failure in the model of the total system. The stochastic Petri net developed in this 
study contains stochastic transitions.  
 
A stochastic Petri net is defined as a six-tuple (Zhou et al., 1990): 
 
  P = {P1, P2, …, Pn}  is a finite set of places; 
  T = {T1, T2, …, Tn}  is a finite set of transitions with  PUT ≠ Ø  and  P∩T = Ø; 
  I: P×T →R
+  is the input incidence matrix; 
  O: T×P →R
+  is the output incidence matrix; 
  m: P →R
+  is the set of positive integers whose i
th  component,  m(Pi),i ∊ {1, 2, 
…, m}, represents the number of tokens in the i
th  place; 
  f: T →R
+  is the set of firing rates whose i
th  component,  f(Pi),i ∊ {1, 2, …, m}, 
represents the failure rate of the i
th  place. 
 
The  firing  of  an  enabled  stochastic  transition  is  governed  by  the  probability  data 
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transition  in  the  stochastic  Petri  net  may  or  may  not  fire  according  to the  assigned 
probability data. Based on this characteristic, it is possible to model the failure of the 
unit operations and machine breakdown in a production route. In addition, the tokens 
transfer failure data from one stage in the process into the next stage by moving from 
one place to another place in a Petri net model. This allows Petri net to calculate the 
total risk associated with the system (Jiang et al., 1999).   
 
In a production system, once a unit operation fails to start an activity or a machine is in 
breakdown mode a decision should be made if the repair or replacement is necessary. 
The required time for repair or replacement is also a random variable which can be 
defined as firing time delay to the stochastic transitions in a stochastic Petri net model. 
During this random time, the tokens remain in the input places and wait to be removed 
to the next place at the end of the firing time delay.  
 
To develop a stochastic Petri net model, first the system can be modelled using the 
general  Petri  net  approach.  In  the  next  step,  the  failure  probability  of  each  unit 
operation/equipment and the random firing time delay can be allocated to the transition 
shows the start of the activity to obtain the stochastic transition. These probability data 
may be obtained from available databases or using the experts‟ opinions. In addition, the 
appropriate equations have to be introduced to calculate the total risk associated with the 
system in each stage and at the end of the process (Eqs 2.1 & 2.2). The stochastic Petri 
net model can be run in the same environment as the general Petri net model using the 
same programming language.  
 
Risk = failure rate × consequences                                                                     (Eq 2.1) 
                                                                            (Eq 2.2)      
 
Where   
i=0, …, N   indicates the unit operation/equipment. 
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5.2.2  Case study  
The acrylic acid case study is re-applied in this section to demonstrate the application 
and performance of the  stochastic Petri  net as a safety analysis  implementation and 
process modelling tool. The probabilistic risk analysis method is executed using this 
tool. The risk associated with each unit operation/equipment and the total risk related to 
the  entire  process  are  calculated  using  Eqs  2.1  and  2.2,  respectively.  The  required 
probability  data  and  severity  of  the  consequences  are  obtained  from  the  available 
databases (Lees, 1996). In the case of absence of the exact data, the information related 
to the similar conditions and cases is used.  
 
Considering  the  chief  objective  of  this  study  which  is  the  integration  of  safety 
assessment and process design, delay in processing time do not appear to be a major 
concern. Therefore, it is assumed that the firing time delays related to the stochastic 
transitions are equal to zero. That is, once a failure or breakdown happens the required 
repair  or  replacement  takes  place  immediately  and  in  zero  time.  Hence,  the  unit 
operation/equipment is able to return to the normal condition and safe mode instantly 
after the occurrence of any failure.  
 
The starting point for development of the stochastic place weighted Petri net model of 
the acrylic acid case study is the place weighted Petri net model developed in Section 
3.2. The indices representing the severity of the consequences related to the failure of 
each unit operation/equipment are then allocated to the respective places as the weight 
factors. In this case study it is assumed that experts‟ opinions are the source to obtain the 
severity  of  the  consequences  data.  These  qualitative  severities  are  converted  to  the 
numerical  indices  using  Table  5.1.  This  table  is  developed  based  on  similar  tables 
available  in  the  literature  (Lees,  1996).  Next,  the  failure  rates  of  unit 
operations/equipment,  in  the  form  of  probability  data,  are  assigned  to  the  relevant 
transitions which show the start of the activities and events. These probability data are 
generated considering the safety level of each unit operation/equipment given in the 
original case study and the failure rate of the similar cases reported in the literature 
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for the purposes of this study which is development of a new integrated framework and 
demonstration its performance. Tables 5.2 a-h give the input data used in this case study.  
 
A super-net model similar to Figure 3.5 is developed in this case study including the 
same sub-nets as Figure 3.6 a-d. The model is implemented in Visual Studio using C++ 
codes given in Appendix B. The final results are given in Table 5.3. 
 
 
Table 5.1 – Guideline to quantify the  magnitude of consequences of the failure 
Severity of the consequences   Index 
Extremely high  10 
Very high  9 
Not greatly high but noticeable   8 
Noticeable  7 
Moderately noticeable  6 
Reasonable  5 
Low  4 
Significantly low  3 
Ignorable   1 or 2 
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Table 5.2 a-h – Input data – stochastic Petri net case study 
 (a) Route 1  
Unit operation  Failure rate 
Severity of the 
consequences  index 
Risk factor 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
3 
4 
2 
4 
3 
1 
2 
0.13 
0.18 
0.04 
0.08 
0.16 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
 
 
 
(b) Route 2 
Unit operation  Failure rate 
Severity of the 
consequences  index 
Risk factor 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
3 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
1 
2 
0.13 
0.18 
0.04 
0.08 
0.16 
0.08 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
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(c) Route 3 
Unit operation  Failure rate 
Severity of the 
consequences  index 
Risk factor 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
3 
4 
2 
4 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
0.13 
0.18 
0.04 
0.08 
0.16 
0.12 
0.04 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
 
 
(d) Route 4 
Unit operation  Failure rate 
Severity of the 
consequences  index 
Risk factor 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
3 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
0.13 
0.18 
0.04 
0.08 
0.16 
0.08 
0.12 
0.04 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
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(e) Route 5 
Unit operation  Failure rate 
Severity of the 
consequences  index 
Risk factor 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
3 
4 
4 
3 
1 
2 
0.13 
0.18 
0.04 
0.16 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
 
 
 
 
(f) Route 6 
Unit operation  Failure rate 
Severity of the 
consequences  index 
Risk factor 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
3 
4 
4 
2 
3 
1 
2 
0.13 
0.18 
0.04 
0.16 
0.08 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
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(g) Route 7 
Unit operation  Failure rate 
Severity of the 
consequences  index 
Risk factor 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
3 
4 
4 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
0.13 
0.18 
0.04 
0.16 
0.12 
0.04 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
 
 
 
(h) Route 8 
Unit operation  Failure rate 
Severity of the 
consequences  index 
Risk factor 
Compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Absorber 
Splitter 
Acid extractor 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. Column1 
Dist. Column2 
Dist. Column3 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
1 
3 
4 
4 
2 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
0.13 
0.18 
0.04 
0.16 
0.08 
0.12 
0.04 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
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Table 5.3 – Summary of the results – stochastic Petri net case study 
  Route1  Route2  Route3  Route4  Route5  Route6  Route7  Route8 
Total risk factor  0.83  1.27  0.87  1.49  0.75  1.19  0.79  1.41 
 
 
5.2.3  Discussion 
Application of the stochastic Petri net tool resulted in automatic generation of 8 possible 
production alternatives for acrylic acid and calculation of the total risk factor of each 
route simultaneously. 
  
Table 5.3 represents that the total risk factor of 0.75 and 0.79 related to the routes 5 and 
7, respectively, are the smallest risk factors followed by routes 1 and 3 with total risk 
factors of 0.83 and 0.87. Therefore, these options are the safer options amongst all 8 
generated routes according to the total risk of the production route.          
                       
5.3  Fuzzy Petri net  
Fuzzy Petri net is another type of Petri net that can be applied as a suitable method for 
process design and safety evaluation. According to the qualitative nature of the safety, 
the fuzzy concept could be considered as an appropriate means to measure and express 
the safety level of a system. The qualitative concepts are usually referred with linguistic 
information. Hence, to make the linguistic variables applicable as input data for safety 
evaluation  fuzzy  logic  has  been  adapted  to  different  safety  assessment  methods. 
Moreover, fuzzy logic has been combined with the general Petri net to develop a new 
Petri  net  version  for  modelling  the  systems  with  qualitative,  imprecise,  vague 
characteristics  and  information.  Fuzzy  logic  and  the  developed  fuzzy  Petri  net  are 
described in following sub-sections. 
 
Fuzzy logic: Fuzzy logic is a theory which assesses and describes the fuzziness of a 
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members. In other words, everything owns a degree of membership in one or more 
classes. This theory was introduced by logician and philosopher Lukasiewicz in the 
1930s and rediscovered and adapted for mathematical application by Lotfi-Zadeh in 
1965.  
 
Fuzzy logic is a set of rules which defines the degree of membership instead of crisp 
membership which is used in conventional binary logic. In binary logic a value may be 
false or true which is parallel to 0 or 1 however in fuzzy logic a value may be partly true 
and partly false. This degree of membership is expressed through a real number in the 
interval [0, 1] (Negnevitsky, 2002). 
 
Fuzzy logic or fuzzy set theory also known as possibility theory may be confused with 
probability theory.  The first one defines the degree of membership in a set while the 
second one shows the likelihood of an element to be in that set. The variables in fuzzy 
logic are linguistic variables which are divided into some fuzzy sets. The overlap of a 
fuzzy set with other fuzzy sets is the most important point in the fuzzy set theory which 
explains  how  a  member  can  belong  to  more  than  one  class  at  the  same  time.  The 
membership value shows the degree of belonging into a particular class (Gentile et al., 
2003). 
 
By not using crisp data the fuzzy logic is a proper approach to deal with systems which 
have a high level of uncertainty. Many engineering systems are known as systems which 
work based on uncertain, qualitative values and subjective knowledge such as expert 
systems, control systems and safety and risk modelling systems (Negnevitsky, 2002; Sii 
et al., 2001). 
 
Mathematical definition – fuzzy sets: A fuzzy set is a set with fuzzy boundaries. If X is 
the universe of discourse and x is its element, in traditional crisp set definition the 
characteristic function of A is fA(x); 
fA(x) :  X → 0, 1, 
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fA(x) =    
The traditional set is a two-element set which is equal to 1 if the x is an element of X and 
equal to 0 if x is not an element of X.  
 
However, in fuzzy set theory, the membership function of µA(x) defines fuzzy set A of 
universe X in which; 
 
µA(x) : X → [0, 1], 
 
Where 
µA(x) = 1 if x is totally in A; 
µA(x) = 0 if x is not in A; 
0 < µA(x) < 1 if x is partly in A. 
 
In a  fuzzy set, the value of  membership  function shows the degree to which  x  is  a 
member  of  set  A.  It  can  be  a  value  in  the  interval  [0,  1]  (Negnevitsky,  2002).  As 
mentioned earlier fuzzy sets may overlap with their nearest fuzzy sets so that a variable 
can belong to more than one fuzzy set at the same time with different a membership 
degree. Figure 5.1 gives a graphical demonstration of this fact. 
 
Variable (for example, Risk)
0
1
Low Medium High
 
Figure 5.1 – Graphical representation of the fuzzy sets 
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Fuzzy rule-based systems: The degree of membership allows fuzzy reasoning to deal 
with approximate rather than precise reasoning. Fuzzy logic, using fuzzy rules, provides 
the possibility to convert subjective human reasoning into Boolean based machine logic. 
Moreover, human expertise and knowledge can be represented in the form of fuzzy 
rules. Fuzzy logic usually uses IF-THEN rules or any equivalent options. The general 
format of a single rule is: 
 
if x is A then y is B  
 
in which x and y are linguistic values defined by the fuzzy set on universes of A and B, 
respectively (Xu et al., 2002). Each rule has two fuzzy propositions: an antecedent, if x 
is A, which is compared to input and a consequent that is the result, then y is B. The 
antecedent  must  be  true  before  the  consequence  can  be  claimed  (Bowles  &  Pelaez, 
1995). Any of the propositions in a fuzzy rule may be atomic or compound. 
 
Fuzzy rules are generated by experts or extracted from statistical data (Mendel, 1995). 
Some  examples  of  these  rules  are:  in  a  unit  operation,  if  failure  rate  is  High  AND 
severity  of  the  consequences  is  Low  then  the  condition  is  Unsafe;  if  failure  rate  is 
Medium AND severity of consequences is Ignorable then the condition is Very safe; if 
failure rate is Very high AND severity of consequences is High then the condition is 
Extremely unsafe.  
A  fuzzy  rule  may  have  multiple  antecedents  which  are  combined  together  with  the 
appropriate fuzzy operators such as AND or OR. Different parts of the antecedents are 
evaluated simultaneously and resoled to a single number based on the defined fuzzy sets 
and applied fuzzy operators. The output of each fuzzy rule is a fuzzy set; however, the 
output of a fuzzy system need to be a single number. 
 
A two-step process has to be undertaken to achieve a single crisp output using a fuzzy 
system. In the first step, the fuzzy system aggregates all output fuzzy sets into a single 
fuzzy set. In the next step, the obtained fuzzy set has to be defuzzified to give a single 
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The whole process of  mapping  from a given crisp  input to obtaining a  single crisp 
output is referred to as a fuzzy inference. Several fuzzy inferences are reported in the 
literature  such  as  Mamdani-style  and  Sugeno-style  inferences  (Mendel,  1995; 
Negnevitsky, 2002). The Mamdani-style inference is the most widely used technique; 
however,  it  is  not  computationally  efficient.  Sugeno  (1985)  slightly  modified  this 
method and introduced the Sugeno-style technique which is much easier to apply and 
contains less intense computations. 
 
The  entire  process  of  the  Sugeno-style  fuzzy  inference  is  completed  in  four  steps: 
fuzzification of the input variables, rule evaluation, aggregation of the rule consequents, 
and defuzzification. These four steps are illustrated in Figure 5.2 through a simple two-
input one-output problem including three rules as follows. 
 
In this problem x, y and z are linguistic variables; A1, A2 and A3 are linguistic values 
determined by fuzzy sets on universe of X; B1 and B2 are linguistic values determined 
by fuzzy sets on universe of Y; C1, C2 and C3 are linguistic values determined by fuzzy 
sets on universe of Z.      
 
In  this  method,  the  output  of  each  fuzzy  rule  is  constant  that  is,  the  membership 
functions of the consequents are defined as singleton spikes. As is illustrated in Figure 
5.2 all these singletons are taken into account through the aggregation process. The final 
crisp output is calculated as the weighted average of these singletons in the Sugeno-style 
inference. In the example given in Figure 5.2 the crisp output is obtained through the 
following calculation: 
Weighted average = ( M(k1) × k1 + M(k2) × k2 + M(k3) × k3 ) / ( M(k1) + M(k2) + 
M(k3) ) 
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Rule 1: IF   x is A3 (0.0)   OR   y is B1(0.2)    THEN    z is k1(0.2) 
Rule 2: IF   x is A2 (0.2)   OR   y is B2(0.8)    THEN    z is k2(0.2) 
Rule 3: IF   x is A1 (0.6)       THEN    z is k3(0.6) 
Aggregation of rule consequents
z is k1(0.2)                            z is k2 (0.2)                              z is k3 (0.6)                                                        aggregation
Defuzzification
Crisp output z1
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5.3.1  Fuzzy set theory and safety assessment 
Safety  and  risk  analysis  is  an  engineering  area  which  widely  deals  with  imprecise 
information. Moreover, when safety analysis results are required as input data for the 
decision making phase in the early design stages, these analyses should be conducted 
based on very uncertain and vague data which are available at that stage.  
 
Quantitative or semi-quantitative safety assessment methods force designers to measure 
the linguistic variables they usually use within a quantitative scale. Qualitative methods 
also need to be quantified through specific methods and indexing systems which are 
usually  based  on  crisp  data  and  involve  strict  and  crisp  boundaries.  These  types  of 
quantification methods introduce the additional uncertainty into safety data and decrease 
their accuracy.  
 
Uncertainty  associated  with  safety  data  may  be  the  result  of  their  fuzziness  or 
randomness therefore fuzzy theory is an appropriate method that can be applied in this 
area. This method is well suited to deal with uncertain data and is an efficient way to 
smooth down the strict boundaries.  With the aid of  fuzzy  variables  it  is possible to 
express expert estimates and describe uncertain inputs due to fuzzy variables‟ potential 
to approximately reflect the available data and finely portray the uncertainty (Cooper, 
1994).  
 
Several researches have been carried out to develop an applicable and proper framework 
to integrate fuzzy logic into either safety evaluation methods or implementation tools to 
achieve above mentioned enhancements. In some studies possibility theory which is the 
other name for  fuzzy set theory is used instead of traditional probability theory in order 
to take into account the uncertainty associated with the failure rate data, the severity of 
the consequences and detection of failure (Moller et al., 1999). 
 
Some researches have developed a fuzzy logic framework to deal with natural language 
used in expressing safety information and experts‟ opinions such as Failure Modes and 
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potential of  fuzzy  logic  in  combining and reflecting the qualitative relation  between 
failures and modes is of great importance in these type of methods (Bowles & Pelaez, 
1995; Xu et al., 2002). 
 
The other category of safety assessment methods which takes advantage of the fuzzy set 
theory, includes index based methods. In traditional indexing systems which are based 
on  Boolean  mathematics  and  intervals  with  sharp  boundaries  a  small  change  in  a 
parameter‟s value may cause a sudden change in the value of the related index. The 
ability of fuzzy sets and membership function in converting the crisp boundaries into 
fuzzy boundaries causes significant improvement in the accuracy of the results of these 
systems. Fuzzy logic introduces a smooth transition from one interval to another and 
also because of the possibility of multiple memberships, this approach may provide a 
more accurate analysis of uncertain data (Gentile et al., 2003). 
 
The above-mentioned approaches are some examples of the application of  fuzzy  set 
analysis in safety and risk evaluation techniques and methods. In earlier sections of this 
study Petri net has been introduced as a proper safety evaluation and process  modelling 
tool which has the capability of carrying out different qualitative and quantitative as 
well as  index  based safety assessment  methods. In  the  following sections high-level 
fuzzy  Petri  net  is  described  briefly  and  some  modifications  are  done  to  develop  a 
suitable tool to fulfil the purpose of this study. The performance of the proposed tool is 
demonstrated by revisiting the acrylic acid case study.  
 
5.3.2  Fuzzy set theory and Petri net modelling 
Petri net has been considered as a suitable alternative to represent rules in knowledge-
based  systems  in  the  literature.  Petri  net  has  the  ability  to  create  a  well  structured 
representation of the knowledge-based systems and clearly shows the relation between 
the rules.  
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Much research have been done to develop different formulation methods for fuzzy Petri 
net (Scarpelli et al., 1996; Srinivasan & Gracanin, 1993). 
 
In  this  study  a  high-level  fuzzy  Petri  net  is  adopted to  model  fuzzy  reasoning  risk 
analysis systems which is described as follows: 
  
In the high-level Petri net transitions and places represent the input linguistic variables 
and fuzzy sets related to unit operations‟ failure rates and severity of the consequences 
of the failures, respectively. The output linguistic variable which is the safety condition 
is signified by tokens. The membership values of the variables in the fuzzy sets are 
calculated using the proper equations defined in the Petri net model. The arcs connecting 
transitions  and  places  perform  fuzzy  rules  between  different  fuzzy  sets  and  fuzzy 
variables. The  mathematical definitions are as  follows and  Figure 5.3 illustrates this 
Petri net model: 
 
In each place pi    P the fuzzy sets of S = {s1, s2, s3, …, sm} show the severity of the 
consequences. 
In each transition tj  T the fuzzy sets of F = {f1, f2, f3, …, fk} show the failure rate of the 
unit operation.  
Each token in a place p    P shows the fuzzy set C = {c1, c2, c3, …, cl} representing the 
safety condition of respective unit operation  
Where  
i = 1, …, n is the number of unit operation; 
j = 1, …, n is the number of start points related to unit operations; 
m is the number of fuzzy sets showing the severity of the consequences; 
k is the number of fuzzy sets showing the failure rate of the unit operations; 
l is the number of fuzzy sets representing the safety condition of each unit operation. 
 
Firing rules are the same as general firing rules applied in general Petri net. A transition 
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the  tokens  may  be  removed  from  the  input  place  to  the  output  place  through  the 
connecting arc. This arc applies the defined  fuzzy rules  between start transition and 
following place and calculates the fuzzy value of the safety condition related to the unit 
operation. The fuzzy results of all rules evaluation are aggregated into a unique fuzzy 
value. This fuzzy value is changed to crisp value through a difuzzification process and 
the final value is transferred to the next unit operation by the tokens. The summation of 
all  defuzzified  safety  condition  values  gives  the  unique  risk  factor  of  each  process 
option at the end of the modelling process (Pedrycz & Gomide, 1994; Scarpelli et al., 
1996). 
 
 
F S
p1 p2
Fuzzy rules
t1
C
 
 
Figure 5.3 – Graphical representation of a Fuzzy Petri net  
 
 
5.3.3  Case study   
The performance of a fuzzy safety assessment system using fuzzy Petri net is shown in 
acrylic  acid  case  study  adapted  earlier  in  this  project.  This  fuzzy  safety  assessment 
system is based on the probabilistic risk analysis method. According to the uncertainty 
associated with the input data in the probabilistic risk analysis method, fuzzification of 
these data can be considered a suitable solution to deal with this issue. The fuzzy risk 
analysis method provides the opportunity for the application of the linguistic variables 
instead  of  numerical  variables.  The  four  steps  of  developing  a  fuzzy  risk  analysis 
inference are described as follows (Negnevitsky, 2002): 
 
Definition of the linguistic variables: in this step the input and output variables and 
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required including two input variables and one output variable. The “Failure Rate” and 
“Severity Of The Consequences” are the input variables defined for transitions showing 
the start of operations and places representing the unit operations, respectively. The 
“Safety Condition” is the output variable which is carried by tokens in the fuzzy Petri 
net.  Each  of  the  input  variables  are  described  by  five  fuzzy  sets:  ignorable;  low; 
medium; high; and very high. The interactions of these two variables are described by 
fuzzy rules which are represented on the connecting arcs in the fuzzy Petri net and result 
in production of the knowledge on the variable “Safety Condition” showing the output 
which is also described by five fuzzy sets of: extremely unsafe; very unsafe; unsafe; 
safe; and very safe. 
 
The respective numerical ranges assigned to linguistic variables are given in Tables 5.4, 
5.5 and 5.6. These ranges are obtained using the same data sources as in the probabilistic 
case study in section 5.2.2. The intervals are adjusted to be within the range of [0, 1] by 
dividing by 10 in the case of the severity of the consequences data.       
 
 
Table 5.4 – Linguistic variable of Failure Rate  
  Linguistic variable: Failure Rate 
Linguistic value  Very low  Low  Medium  High  Very high 
Numerical range  [0, 0.1]  [0.05, 0.15]  [0.1, 0.25]  [0.2, 0.4]  [0.3, 1] 
 
 
Table 5.5 – Linguistic variable of Severity of the Consequences 
  Linguistic variable: Severity Of The Consequences 
Linguistic value  Very low  Low  Medium  High  Very high 
Numerical range  [0, 0.1]  [0, 0.3]  [0.2, 0.4]  [0.35, 0.6]  [0.5, 1] 
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Table 5.6 – Linguistic variable of Safety Condition  
  Linguistic variable: Safety Condition 
Linguistic value  Extremely unsafe  Very unsafe  Unsafe  Safe  Very safe 
Numerical range  [0, 0.1]  [0.05, 0.25]  [0.1, 0.3]  [0.25, 0.5]  [0.3, 1] 
Singleton spike  0.05  0.15  0.20  0.42  0.45 
 
 
Determination of the fuzzy sets: in the second step, the shape of each fuzzy set should 
be determined. Amongst the variety of shapes that fuzzy sets may have a triangle or a 
trapezoid can adequately represent the experts‟ opinions. Moreover, application of each 
of these shapes simplifies the computation to a great extent.  
 
The fuzzy sets for all three variables are shown in Figures 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6. To obtain 
smooth response, it is important to provide sufficient overlaps in adjacent fuzzy sets. 
Different resources suggest that an overlap between 25 and 50 percent of the bases is 
suitable  for the triangle-to-triangle and trapezoid-to-triangle  fuzzy  sets  (Negnevitsky, 
2002). 
 
Failure Rate
0
1
Low Medium High Very high Very low
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
 
Figure 5.4 – Fuzzy sets related to the Failure Rate variable 
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Severity Of The Consequences
0
1
Low Medium High Very low Very high
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
 
Figure 5.5 – Fuzzy sets related to the Severity of the Consequences variable 
 
 
Safety Condition
0
1
Extremely
 unsafe
Very
unsafe Unsafe Safe Very safe
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4
 
Figure 5.6 – Fuzzy sets related to the Safety Condition variable 
 
 
 
Construction of fuzzy rules: in this step the fuzzy rules have to be formed. For this 
purpose an expert may be asked to describe the system behaviour based on the defined 
linguistic variables and their linguistic values. In the developed fuzzy Petri net model 
the  fuzzy  rules  are  assigned  to  the  arcs  connecting  the  start  transitions  to  the  unit 
operation places. 
 
For a three-variable system the fuzzy rules may be presented in a two-dimension matrix. 
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of rows and columns give the values of output variable. Table 5.7 shows the rule matrix 
created for this case study.        
 
Table 5.7 – Matrix of fuzzy rules  
  Severity of the consequences 
Failure rate  Ignorable  Low  Medium  High  Very high 
Very low  Very safe  Very safe  Safe  Safe  Safe 
Low   Very safe  Very safe  Safe  Unsafe  Unsafe 
Medium   Very safe  Safe  Unsafe  Unsafe  Very unsafe 
High   Safe  Unsafe  Very unsafe  Very unsafe  Ext unsafe 
Very high  Unsafe  Unsafe  Very unsafe  Ext unsafe  Ext unsafe 
 
 
 
Twenty five fuzzy rules can be obtained from this table which are described in Table 
5.8. 
 
Table 5.8 – Fuzzy rules  
Rule 
No. 
Antecedent   Consequent  
1  IF Failure rate = Very low AND Severity of the 
consequences = Ignorable 
THEN  Condition  =  Very 
safe 
2  IF Failure rate = Very low AND Severity of the 
consequences = Low 
THEN  Condition  =  Very 
safe 
3  IF Failure rate = Very low AND Severity of the 
consequences = Medium 
THEN Condition = Safe 
4  IF Failure rate = Very low AND Severity of the 
consequences = High 
THEN Condition = Safe 
5  IF Failure rate = Very low AND Severity of the 
consequences = Very high 
THEN Condition = Safe Chapter 5. Application of Other Petri Nets                                                                123 
 
 
Rule 
No. 
Antecedent   Consequent  
6  IF  Failure  rate  =  Low  AND  Severity  of  the 
consequences = Ignorable 
THEN  Condition  =  Very 
safe 
7  IF  Failure  rate  =  Low  AND  Severity  of  the 
consequences = Low 
THEN  Condition  =  Very 
safe 
8  IF  Failure  rate  =  Low  AND  Severity  of  the 
consequences = Medium 
THEN Condition = Safe 
9  IF  Failure  rate  =  Low    AND  Severity  of  the 
consequences = High 
THEN Condition = Unsafe 
10  IF  Failure  rate  =  Low  AND  Severity  of  the 
consequences = Very high 
THEN Condition = Unsafe 
11  IF Failure rate = Medium AND Severity of the 
consequences = Ignorable 
THEN  Condition  =  Very 
safe 
12  IF Failure rate = Medium AND Severity of the 
consequences = Low 
THEN Condition = Safe 
13  IF Failure rate = Medium AND Severity of the 
consequences = Medium 
THEN Condition = Unsafe 
14  IF Failure rate = Medium AND Severity of the 
consequences = High 
THEN Condition = Unsafe 
15  IF Failure rate = Medium AND Severity of the 
consequences = Very high 
THEN  Condition  =  Very 
unsafe 
16  IF  Failure  rate  =  High  AND  Severity  of  the 
consequences = Ignorable 
THEN Condition = Safe 
17  IF  Failure  rate  =  High  AND  Severity  of  the 
consequences = Low 
THEN Condition = Unsafe 
18  IF Failure rate = Medium AND Severity of the 
consequences = Medium 
THEN  Condition  =  Very 
unsafe 
19  IF  Failure  rate  =  High  AND  Severity  of  the 
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THEN  Condition  =  Very 
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Rule 
No. 
Antecedent   Consequent  
20  IF  Failure  rate  =  High  AND  Severity  of  the 
consequences = Very high 
THEN  Condition  = 
Extremely unsafe 
21  IF Failure rate = Very  high AND Severity of 
the consequences = Ignorable 
THEN Condition = Unsafe 
22  IF Failure rate = Very  high AND Severity of 
the consequences = Low 
THEN Condition = Unsafe 
23  IF Failure rate = Very  high AND Severity of 
the consequences = Medium 
THEN  Condition  =  Very 
unsafe 
24  IF Failure rate = Very  high AND Severity of 
the consequences = High 
THEN  Condition  = 
Extremely unsafe 
25  IF Failure rate = Very  high AND Severity of 
the consequences = Very high 
THEN  Condition  = 
Extremely unsafe 
 
 
 
Implication of the fuzzy system: next the fuzzy sets and fuzzy rules have to be encoded 
using an available fuzzy logic development tool or a programming language such as 
C++. The C++ programming language is applied in this project to develop the fuzzy 
system. The developed codes are available in Appendix B. 
 
Once the fuzzy inference has been developed the crisp data previously applied in the 
same case study in Section 5.2.2 are used as the input data in this system.   
 
5.3.4  Discussion 
The same as previous applications of this case study using the Petri net tool, the fuzzy 
approach also results in automatic generation of 8 possible routes. Table 5.9 shows that 
using  the  fuzzy  risk  analysis  method,  the  total  risk  factors  calculated  for  these  8 
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almost the same as the results obtained using the probabilistic risk analysis method and 
stochastic Petri net tool. However, some minor differences are observed which might be 
due to the impacts of fuzzification and the use of the smooth boundaries instead of sharp 
boundaries and crisp data.  
 
Three different groups are distinguished according to the obtained results. In the first 
group, including routes 1, 3, 5 and 7, the final risk factor value is 0.1. In the second and 
third groups, the calculated values for the final factor are 0.20 and 0.25, respectively. 
The unity of the final risk factor values of all alternatives in one group is a result of 
smoothing specification of the fuzzy approach. Amongst the detected groups, the first 
one contains the safest process options with the lowest fuzzy risk factor of 0.1. 
 
Table 5.9 – Summary of the results - fuzzy Petri net case study 
  Route1  Route2  Route3  Route4  Route5  Route6  Route7  Route8 
Total risk factor  0.10  0.25  0.10  0.20  0.10  0.25  0.10  0.20 
 
 
5.4  Conclusion   
The  stochastic  Petri  net  and  fuzzy  Petri  net  have  been  introduced  briefly  and  their 
capabilities to be applied as implementation tools for executing different safety and risk 
analysis methods  have been explained. The stochastic Petri net has been applied to 
perform the probabilistic risk analysis method and the fuzzy Petri net has been adapted 
to  carry  out  the  fuzzy  risk  analysis.  The  efficiency  of  their  performances  has  been 
demonstrated through the acrylic acid case study. 
 
The flexibility of the Petri net tool to be adapted and applied in variety of situations and 
systems in addition to the compatibility of different types of Petri nets with various 
safety  and  risk  evaluation  methods  have  been  outlined  in  this  chapter.  These 
characteristics plus the capability of this tool to be applied at any level of a plant life-
cycle further proves the suitability of Petri nets for the purposes of this study.     Chapter 5. Application of Other Petri Nets                                                                126 
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C Ch ha ap pt te er r   6 6   
M Me et th ho od do ol lo og gy y   D De ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t         
6.1  Introduction   
The combined Petri net tool proposed in this study aims to provide the possibility of 
conducting  safety  assessment  during  the  initial  stages  of  a  process  design  through 
developing  an  integrated  framework.  This  framework  efficiently  overcomes  the 
shortcoming of late safety consideration during the process design and the subsequent 
issues pointed out in Chapter 2. The limitation of the safety aspects that can be evaluated 
in  each  of  existing  method  is  another  important  lacking  area  which  makes  these 
approaches inefficient for conducting a comprehensive safety assessment. A modified 
safety and risk assessment method is required to account for wider spectrum of safety 
issues to offer an inclusive evaluation of the safety and risk status in a system.  Such 
safety and risk evaluation  method  is able to provide a reliable  comparison  base  for 
decision-making purposes. Thus, before proceeding with the application of the proposed 
implementation  tool,  a  methodology  development  is  proposed  in  this  chapter  as  a 
significant  contribution  to  the  available  literature.  The  methodology  development  is 
based  on  two  main  safety  assessment  methods  explained  in  Chapter  2;  the  inherent 
safety assessment method and the probabilistic risk analysis.  
 
The new methodology is described in detail in Section 6.2. The acrylic acid case study is 
revisited  in  Section  6.3  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  new  methodology.  The Chapter 6. Methodology Development                                                                       128 
 
 
chapter concludes in Section 6.4 by providing a discussion on the applicability of this 
methodology and the results.                
 
6.2  New methodology  
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, there is increasing interest among industries in safety 
assessment methodologies which are applicable in the initial stages of the process design 
and are capable of evaluating a wide range of safety aspects concurrently.  
 
The existing  methods come under two main  groups depending on the  nature of the 
safety issues that they attempt to evaluate. One major category of methods focuses on 
the  safety  of  the  process  conditions  including  chemical  conditions  and  physical 
conditions,  while  the  other  main  category  emphasises  the  risk  of  failure  of  the  unit 
operations involved in the process.  
Chemical  conditions  such  as  toxicity,  flammability  and  explosiveness  and  physical 
conditions such as pressure and temperature are considered as main factors influencing 
safety of a process in the first group. Inherent safety assessment is an example of this 
group (Heikkila, 1999; Heikkila et al., 1996). 
 
The second group accounts for the reliability level of equipment to start working or 
continue to work in different situations. Probabilistic risk assessment, fault tree analysis, 
failure  mode  and  effect  analysis,  and  layer  of  protection  analysis  come  under  this 
category (Fullwood & Hall, 1988; Hendershot, 2005). 
 
In this study one well developed technique from each group has been chosen for more 
detailed investigation based on the ability to intervene in the early stages of design. 
Inherent  safety  assessment  can  be  implemented  at  any  phase  of  design  by  using 
chemical  and  physical  information  of  a  process  available  at  that  particular  level. 
Probabilistic  risk  assessment  is  also  another  method  which  can  be  employed  early 
during the design process using experts‟ opinions and available databases. These two Chapter 6. Methodology Development                                                                       129 
 
 
methods have been described in detail in previous chapters. They also have been applied 
separately to a case study using the proposed Petri net implementation tool.  
 
In this step of the study, the possibility of combining these methods and developing a 
new method to evaluate a wider range of safety and risk aspects is investigated. The 
combined method has to be valid and reliable. Moreover, considering the main concern 
of this study, the safety assessment method needs to be relatively simple to be easily 
understood and applied by industries. For example, using the multiple-criteria decision-
making tool  is an alternative  method to evaluate  more safety  factors simultaneously 
(Dicdican & Haimes, 2005). However, this method and the similar available options are 
not  considered  as  suitable  methods  for  the  purpose  of  this  study  based  on  their 
complexity level and required calculations. As mentioned earlier, the emphasis of this 
project is on developing a safety assessment tool and technique without the need for 
special expertise. This characteristic would make the method capable to be used and 
shared as a common  language by all designers  with different  professional areas and 
various levels of expertise. 
 
6.2.1  Logical development 
Sections 2.3.4 and 4.3.3 showed that inherent safety approach using the I2SI indices 
aims to evaluate and quantify the inherent safety level of unit operations and the whole 
process based on the defined keywords of: simplification, minimization, substitution and 
moderation. The final I2SI index is calculated for each unit operation based on a number 
of sub-indices evaluating the chemical and physical conditions safety. The greater than 
unity index indicates the positive response of the unit operation to the inherent safety 
keywords. A function of the all individual I2SIs in a process is usually used to represent 
the safety factor of the entire process ( Eq 2.13 ). The greater I2SI and the total index 
represents the safer unit operation and process option, respectively.  
 
On the other hand, the probabilistic risk analysis method attempts to measure the risk 
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operations  and  the  severity  of  the  consequences  are  used  as  the  input  data,  the 
probability  risk  analysis  method  would  indicate  the  risk  factor  related  to  each  unit 
operation using Eq 2.1. The summation of all individual risk factors is usually used as 
the total risk factor of the entire process (Eq 2.2). The smaller the risk factor the safer 
the unit operation or the process option.  
 
A rational and valid combination of the factors introduced in the above methods would 
form a unique factor that could take into account both process conditions safety and risk 
of failure of the process via a unique factor. Comparing these methods show that the 
inherent  safety  index  quantifies  the  safety  level  of  a  system  while,  the  risk  factor 
measures the hazardous characteristic of that system. In other words, the final factors in 
these  methods  operate  in  opposite  directions;  the  greater  factor  in  the  first  method 
represents  the  safer  option  which  is  desired,  while  the  greater  factor  in  the  second 
approach indicates more hazardous option which is undesired. A possible solution to 
make these two factors unidirectional is to apply the positive amount of the desirable 
factors  together  with  the  negative  amount  of  the  undesirable  indices  (Eq  6.1).  The 
summation of these  factors gives a general  indication of  how safe and reliable  is  a 
process  in  comparison  with  the  other  possible  options.  It  should  be  noted  that  this 
integrated factor may not be a sufficient factor to show the safety level of an individual 
process  since  it  is  just  a  numerical  index  with  no  specific  dimension.  However,  it 
provides a suitable comparison base for decision-making purposes to choose the safer 
options  amongst  all  available  alternatives  considering  both  safety  and  reliability 
characteristics. 
 
Total safety factor = ( + total I2SI index ) + ( – total risk factor )                       (Eq 6.1) 
 
6.2.2  Mathematical development 
Based on the above-mentioned  logic the  inherent safety and risk  factors need to be 
mathematically combined to obtain a unique index for each process option. To create a Chapter 6. Methodology Development                                                                       131 
 
 
valid combination these two different factors need to be mathematically compatible in 
various aspects.  
 
Firstly, in a mathematical equation to apply addition or subtraction operators between 
different components they need to have similar dimensions or be dimensionless. Given 
that the I2SI and as a result the total I2SI  is a dimensionless component, the other 
component which is the risk factor has to be dimensionless as well (Khan & Amyotte, 
2005).  
 
To achieve a dimensionless risk factor using Eq 2.1 the only applicable solution is to 
make both failure rate and severity of the consequences dimensionless. An appropriate 
alternative for the failure rate of a unit operation suggested in the literature to serve this 
purpose is the ratio of the number of failures of that unit operation in a certain period of 
time to the total number of all failures in the process option during the same period of 
time (Eq 6.2). Since both sides of this  fraction  have the  same dimensions, the total 
fraction would be dimensionless (Lees, 1996).  
 
The total number of failures in this equation takes into account all possible failures with 
different sources that may happen over the defined period of time. A brief review of the 
literature revealed that there are some major sources which can be classified as the most 
common causes of the hazardous events in the process industries. Following categories 
of failure sources are mutually agreed via different researches: plant and equipment, 
human, and environmental. The share of each source in creating the hazardous events 
mentioned in various researches are not exactly the same; however, plant and equipment 
related failures are usually the most frequent failures followed by human errors. The 
percentage of the technical  failures ranges  from 40% to 60% of the total undesired 
events in the industries according to the literature (Baranzini & Christou, 2009; Flynn & 
Theodore, 2001; Kariuki & Lowe, 2007).  
 
To account for the number of failures caused by different sources other than plant and 
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the unit operations failure rates. The total number of technical failures is multiplied by 
this adjustment factor which is always greater than unity to take into account the number 
of failures caused by all major sources. The value of the adjustment factor may vary 
from one industry to another industry or even one case to another case in the same 
industry based on the available historical data and experts‟ opinions.       
 
  
                                                                                                                               (Eq 6.2) 
Where  
i=1,…, n  while n is the number of unit operations  
 t is the time period 
𝜎  is the adjustment factor    
 
The indices applied in the previous chapters indicating the severity of the consequences 
are also dimensionless. Each of these indices represents a linguistic value which defines 
the  severity  of  the  consequences  of  a  failure.  These  linguistic  variables  and  the 
respective indices are identified based on the experts‟ opinions and available databases 
(Table 5.1).  
  
The second important issue is that the range of the values that inherent safety indices 
and risk factors may obtain should be the same or close enough. Since the I2SI index is 
a  function of a  variety of other sub-indices  calculated using different databases and 
methods,  it  is  not  easily  possible  to  make  major  changes  in  the  range  of  these 
components  and  meanwhile  keep  the  final  index  valid.  Hence,  this  index  and  the 
respective  sub-indices  are  applied  in  this  study  as  they  have  been  proposed  in  the 
original study with no change in the range of their values. The values of two main sub-
indices of ISPI and HI  forming the  final I2SI  index range  from 1 to 200  (Khan  & 
Amyotte, 2004). Since these indices are combined through Eq 2.13, the final index value 
varies in the range of [0.005, 200].   
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To  be  compatible  with  the  I2SI  the  risk  factor  should  be  within  the  same  range. 
According  to  the  probability  theory,  Eq  6.2  and  also  considering  the  fact  that  the 
numerator of the fraction in this equation is always smaller than the denominator, the 
value of the failure rate is always within the range of [0, 1]. Hence, the range of the 
severity of the consequences which is the other component of the risk factor has to be 
modified to meet this criterion. This factor is quantified subjectively based on experts‟ 
opinions and divided in nine groups listed in Table 5.1. However, these values need to 
be normalised between 1 and 200 to be applicable in the proposed combined method. 
The linear interpolation method ( Eq 6.3) is applied to construct the points in the range 
of [1, 200] respective to the known points in the range of [1, 10]. Table 6.1 gives the 
new values representing the severity of  the consequences.  
 
y = ya + ( x – xa ) ( yb – ya ) / ( xb – xa )                                                                 (Eq 6.3) 
 
Where  
xa and xb are lower and upper limits, respectively in given range 
ya and yb are lower and upper limits, respectively in new range 
x is the known point in given range 
y is unknown point in the new range respective to point x 
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Table 6.1 – Severity of the Consequences normalised within the range of [1, 200] 
Severity of the consequences   Normalised Index [1, 200]  Rounded Index 
Extremely high  200  200 
Very high  177.9  178 
Not greatly high but noticeable   155.8  156 
Noticeable  133.7  134 
Moderately noticeable  111.5  111 
Reasonable  89.4  89 
Low  67.3  67 
Significantly low  45.2  45 
Ignorable   1…23  1…23 
 
 
Considering the new severity of the consequences data and the failure rate, the final risk 
factor which is a product of these two factors, ranges from 0 to 200 which is almost in 
the same range as I2SI factor.  
  
6.2.3  Methodology enhancement  
The next step of the methodology development focuses on enhancing the performance 
of  the  combined  method  by  modifying  its  individual  components.  A  more 
comprehensive  study on the results of application of the inherent safety method on the 
acrylic  acid  case  study  elucidates  that  the  total  I2SI  index  calculated  for  the  entire 
process route is directly affected by the number of unit operations existing in that route. 
This means that an increase in the number of unit operations would definitely increase 
the  value  of  the  total  I2SI  regardless  of  the  safety  characteristics  of  the  added  unit 
operations. This issue is due to the mathematical attributes of the Eq 2.12. Considering 
this equation, any additional individual I2SI which is always a positive value would 
result in a greater total I2SI, no matter whether the added I2SI is less than unity which 
indicates the poor safety situation of the related unit operation or is greater than unity 
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square  root  in  this  formula  regardless  of  the  number  of  contributing  factors 
unnecessarily intensifies the impact of the larger I2SI available in a system on the total 
value of I2SI. That is when a unit operation has a relatively noticeable greater I2SI in 
comparison with the other unit operations in a process option with more than two unit 
operations the large I2SI would have an emphasised impact on the total I2SI of the 
route. It happens according to the fact that the degree of the root is always 2 irrespective 
of the number of participating units. A modified technique and equation are required to 
overcome these problems. 
 
A possible solution which is suggested in this study is to apply the averaging technique 
to calculate a final index which indicates the general and normal safety situation of the 
process. Two different averaging systems may be applicable in this case: the arithmetic 
mean  and  the  geometric  mean.  These  two  methods  are  described  briefly  and  their 
mathematical equations are given as follows.  
 
Arithmetic  averaging  –  is  the  most  familiar  method  of  averaging  in  which  the 
summation of n factors are divided by n to obtain the norms of n factors (Eq 6.4). Since 
the arithmetic mean is a sum-based value, it is appropriate for the additive processes 
(Humphries, 2008).     
 
                                                                           (Eq 6.4) 
Where  
n is the number of factors (xi).  
 
Geometric averaging – to calculate the geometric mean of n factors they are multiplied 
together then the n
th root of the product is taken (Eq 6.5). The geometric means are 
product-based values which are suitable for multiplicative processes (Humphries, 2008).     
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                                                                       (Eq 6.5) 
Where  
n is the number of factors (xi).  
   
According  to  the  specification  of  these  averaging  techniques  and  the  multiplicative 
characteristic of the I2SI index, the geometric mean is more appropriate to be used in 
this study. Application of a proper averaging method would diminish the impact of the 
number of unit operations contributing in a system on the final value calculated for that 
system.  In  addition,  using  the  n
th    root  leads  to  levelling  the  weight  of  all  n  unit 
operations of the system on the calculated average factor. This new index is named the 
“average I2SIroute” which is given in Eq 6.6. 
 
                                                                   (Eq 6.6)      
Where  
i  =  1…n  indicates  the  unit  operation/equipment  and  n  is  the  total  number  of  unit 
operations/equipment. 
 
To be able to replace the total I2SIroute with the average I2SIroute in Eq 6.1 the second 
component of this equation which shows the total risk factor of the route has to be 
replaced with a compatible factor. To meet this requirement the average value of all risk 
factors related to the unit operations of the production route is applied instead of their 
summation.  Considering  the  multiplicative  nature  of  the  individual  risk  factors,  the 
geometric mean seems to be the appropriate option to represent the average risk value. 
Eq 6.7 is applied to calculate this value which is referred as “average riskroute” in this 
study. 
 
                                                                   (Eq 6.7)      
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i  =  1…n  indicates  the  unit  operation/equipment  and  n  is  the  total  number  of  unit 
operations/equipment. 
 
Implementing the above modifications changes Eq 6.1 to Eq 6.8 as given below.  
 
Final safety factor = Average I2SI route – Average Risk route                                  (Eq 6.8) 
 
This new method provides an enhanced measure of the safety level of the systems which 
can be used as a decision-making factor in conjunction with the other factors to compare 
different possible production alternatives and choose the safest one. The proposed final 
index is not directly affected by the number of unit operations existing in the process 
options. Hence, an increase in the number of unit operations does not increase the safety 
factor which indicates a safer option. On the other hand, the averaging technique does 
not also take into account that additional unit operations increase the complexity of the 
systems which may result in reduction in safety level. However, this problem can be 
overcome  by  considering  the  penalty  factor  introduced  earlier  in  this  study.  As 
explained  in  Chapter  4  penalty  factor  indicates  the  number  of  unit  operations  not 
responding  to  the  inherent  safety  keywords  (I2SI  less  than  unity).  It  means  if  the 
additional unit operations have adverse impacts on the safety level of the system the 
penalty factor would increase. By considering penalty factor as another decision-making 
factor the complexity of process options with larger number of unit operations would 
also be taken into account.    
 
Moreover, the new index gives even weights to all components of a system without 
emphasising inherently safer unit operations and highlighting their impacts on the final 
result. The final safety index ranges from -199.995 to 200 which is a relatively wide 
range giving enough flexibility to calculate the factor in different cases. This range is 
fixed  considering  the  minimum  and  maximum  possible  values  of  contributing 
parameters.    
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It should be mentioned again that although the proposed index may provide a sufficient 
comparison  base  for  decision-making  purposes  to  choose  the  safer  process  option 
amongst available alternatives, it is not a proper indicator for safety and risk level of an 
individual option. There is no pre-defined range of values indicating the safe or unsafe 
areas. Therefore, the final value of this factor for a single process option which is not 
supposed to be compared with other options does not provide any reliable information 
about the safety level of that process.  
 
To compare different process alternatives using the proposed index, the greater final 
safety factors represent the safer options. The range of final values of safety factors may 
vary from case to case. In some cases the final factor of all possible routes may get 
negative values while, in other cases they may all be positive. Even in a unique case, 
some factors might be in the negative range while the others take positive values. The 
decision-making process is not influenced by these ranges and the final decision is make 
based on the differences between the final value of indices. 
 
6.2.4  Tool enhancement 
Previous  chapters  revealed  that  the  Petri  net  modelling  tool  is  capable  of  being 
effectively applied as the process modelling and safety assessment implementation tool. 
A  place  weighted  Petri  net  has  also  been  developed  and  applied  to  perform  the 
concurrent process modelling and inherent safety assessment. Moreover, the stochastic 
Petri net has been introduced as a suitable option to execute probabilistic risk analysis at 
the same time as process design.      
 
In  the  new  methodology  developed  in  this  chapter  inherent  safety  assessment  and 
probabilistic risk analysis are applied as basic methods. Therefore, taking advantages of 
the individual abilities of both place weighted Petri net and stochastic Petri net together 
would  provide  an  appropriate  means  with  enough  flexibility  to  implement  the  new 
methodology simultaneously with the process design.  
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In this study, this combined Petri net tool is called place weighted stochastic Petri net. 
The specifications of different nodes in the proposed Petri net are as follows:   
  
  Places  (Pi)  represent  unit  operations.  Each  place  owns  a  two-element  weight 
factor Pi(w1&2) in which w1 holds the I2SI value and w2 holds severity of the 
consequences factor related to the unit operation failure.  
  Transitions (Tj) show the start of operations of the units. These are stochastic 
transitions which their firing are governed by the failure rates of unit operations 
dedicated to the transitions Tj(f). The same assumption as in previous chapters is 
applied here; if a unit operation (Pi) fails to operate with the probability of Ti(f) , 
the repair or replacement is done in zero time and the unit operation would be 
back in process and would be ready for use after zero time.  
  Arcs connect places to the transitions and transitions to the places.     
   Tokens  are  raw  materials,  semi-finished  products  and  final  products  which 
move  from  the  initial  place  in  the  Petri  net  model  to  the  final  place  via 
transitions  and  arcs  illustrating  the  flow  of  materials.  They  also  transfer  the 
safety data throughout the model.   
  
The proposed method and tool are applied and tested in the acrylic acid case study in the 
following part of this chapter and the results are discussed subsequently. 
                             
6.3  Application of the new methodology on the acrylic acid case study  
Following the application of the acrylic acid case study in Chapter 3 and 4, this case 
study is applied in this chapter to evaluate the performance of the proposed method. As 
mentioned earlier, in this chapter the proposed method is based on two well-defined 
safety assessment approaches of inherent safety and probabilistic risk analysis.  
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6.3.1  Implementation and results 
The  input data related to the  inherent safety  method is the same as data previously 
provided in Table 4.4. The basic data related to the probabilistic risk analysis is also the 
same as data given in Table 5.2. However, some modifications are required to make this 
data applicable in the new proposed method. 
 
The failure rate and severity of the consequences are two groups of data used in the 
probabilistic risk analysis method which both need to be modified to be compatible with 
the inherent safety data. First of all, the probability of the failures has to be changed to a 
dimensionless factor. To serve this purpose, Eq 6.2 is applied with assuming an average 
value of  𝜎 = 2 for the adjustment factor which means the share of the technical failures 
is 50% of the total likely failures. Moreover, the indices indicating the severity of the 
consequences in chapter 4 have to be adjusted to the new range of [1, 200] using Table 
6.1. The  modified  input  data  associated  with  all  unit  operations  for  probability  risk 
analysis purpose is given in Table 6.2.   
 
The  proposed  methodology  is  implemented  on  this  case  study  using  the  introduced 
combined Petri net tool and abovementioned input data. The information related to the 
places and transitions are given in Table 6.3. Eqs 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 are defined in the 
Petri net model for safety assessment calculations. The safety information calculated 
using the Pi (w1 & 2) and Tj(f) input data in each step is transferred to the next step by the 
tokens.  The  model  is  run  in  Visual  Studio  environment  using  C++  programming 
language. The C++ codes and related explanation is given in Appendix B. Table 6.4 
presents the final results of running the Petri net model.  
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Table 6.2 – Modified input data related to the unit operations in PRA method 
Unit operation  Number of failures  Failure rate  Severity of the consequences 
Air compressor   10  0.13  1 
Feed mixer  5  0.06  45 
Quench tower  3  0.04  23 
Reactor  1  0.01  67 
Off-gas absorber  3  0.04  67 
Solvent splitter  3  0.04  23 
Dist. columnI  3  0.04  45 
Dist. columnII  3  0.04  1 
Dist. columnIII  3  0.04  23 
Solvent mixer  3  0.04  1 
Extraction tower  3  0.04  45 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 – Places’ weight factors and transitions’ firing rates 
(a) Route 1  
Unit operation  Pi  Pi (w1)  Pi (w2)  Tj  Tj(f) 
Air compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Off-gas  absorber 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
P2 
P6 
P8 
P7 
P10 
P17 
P18 
P19 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1 
45 
67 
23 
67 
45 
1 
23 
T1 
T3 
T5 
T4 
T6 
T7 
T24 
T24 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
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(b) Route 2 
Unit operation  Pi  Pi (w1)  Pi (w2)  Tj  Tj(f) 
Air compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Off-gas  absorber 
Solvent splitter 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
P2 
P6 
P8 
P7 
P10 
P15 
P17 
P18 
P19 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
1.05 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1 
45 
67 
23 
67 
23 
45 
1 
23 
T1 
T3 
T5 
T4 
T6 
T8 
T8 
T24 
T24 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
 
 
 
 
(c) Route 3 
Unit operation  Pi  Pi (w1)  Pi (w2)  Tj  Tj(f) 
Air compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Off-gas  absorber 
Extraction tower 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
P2 
P6 
P8 
P7 
P10 
P24 
P30 
P25 
P26 
P29 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
3.48 
1.41 
4.64 
2.70 
2.04 
1 
45 
67 
23 
67 
45 
23 
45 
1 
23 
T1 
T3 
T5 
T4 
T6 
T9 
T19&21 
T18 
T19 
T18 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
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(d) Route 4 
Unit operation  Pi  Pi (w1)  Pi (w2)  Tj  Tj(f) 
Air compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Quench tower 
Off-gas absorber 
Solvent  splitter  
Extraction tower 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
P2 
P6 
P8 
P7 
P10 
P15 
P24 
P30 
P25 
P26 
P29 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
2.50 
2.19 
1.05 
3.13 
1.44 
4.71 
2.87 
2.10 
1 
45 
67 
23 
67 
23 
45 
23 
45 
1 
23 
T1 
T3 
T5 
T4 
T6 
T10 
T10 
T19&21 
T18 
T19 
T18 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
 
 
 
 
(e) Route 5 
Unit operation  Pi  Pi (w1)  Pi (w2)  Tj  Tj(f) 
Air compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Off-gas  absorber 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
P2 
P6 
P11 
P13 
P17 
P18 
P19 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1 
45 
67 
67 
45 
1 
23 
T1 
T3 
T11 
T12 
T13 
T24 
T24 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
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(f) Route 6 
Unit operation  Pi  Pi (w1)  Pi (w2)  Tj  Tj(f) 
Air compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Off-gas  absorber 
Solvent splitter 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
P2 
P6 
P11 
P13 
P15 
P17 
P18 
P19 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
1.05 
0.45 
0.49 
0.39 
1 
45 
67 
67 
23 
45 
1 
23 
T1 
T3 
T11 
T12 
T14 
T14 
T24 
T24 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
 
 
 
 
(g) Route 7. 
Unit operation  Pi  Pi (w1)  Pi (w2)  Tj  Tj(f) 
Air compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Off-gas  absorber 
Extraction tower 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
P2 
P6 
P11 
P13 
P24 
P30 
P25 
P26 
P29 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
3.48 
1.41 
4.64 
2.70 
2.04 
1 
45 
67 
67 
45 
23 
45 
1 
23 
T1 
T3 
T11 
T12 
T15 
T19&21 
T18 
T19 
T18 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
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(h) Route 8 
Unit operation  Pi  Pi (w1)  Pi (w2)  Tj  Tj(f) 
Air compressor 
Feed mixer 
Reactor 
Off-gas  absorber 
Solvent splitter 
Extraction tower 
Solvent mixer 
Dist. ColumnI 
Dist. ColumnII 
Dist. ColumnIII 
P2 
P6 
P11 
P13 
P15 
P24 
P30 
P25 
P26 
P29 
1.39 
0.34 
0.21 
0.33 
1.05 
3.48 
1.44 
4.71 
2.87 
2.10 
1 
45 
67 
67 
23 
45 
23 
45 
1 
23 
T1 
T3 
T11 
T12 
T16 
T16 
T19&21 
T18 
T19 
T18 
0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 – Summary of the results – new methodology 
 
 
6.3.2  Discussion 
In Table 6.4 the routes with a greater average safety  index are considered the safer 
options. The penalty factor which is the number of non-responding unit operations to the 
application of the inherent safety keywords are also presented in this table. Two safest 
options using the  new approach are routes 3 and 4 with decision-making  factors of 
(0.76, 2) and (0.68, 2), respectively. Comparing these factors shows that route 3 is the 
  Route1  Route2  Route3  Route4  Route5  Route6  Route7  Route8 
Average  
safety index  0.02  0.03  0.76  0.68  -0.20  -0.18  0.35  0.32 
Penalty 
factor 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
2 
 
6 
 
6 
 
3 
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optimal case with greater average safety index. Route 5 with the decision-making factor 
of (-0.20, 6) is the worst process option based on the new method. 
 
The  final  results  of  applying  the  proposed  method  are  slightly  different  from  the 
outcomes of the application of the original I2SI system. Two safer options are the same 
in both methods; however, the best route is different. It can be explained as a result of 
considering more safety factors in the new method compared to the I2SI technique. The 
process route 4 including all additional safety features, is the best option according to 
the  original  I2SI;  while,  considering  risk  factors  as  a  part  of  the  safety  assessment 
process in the new method results in altering the safest route from number 4 to the 
number 3 which contains fewer additional inherent safety features. This means that the 
extra inherent safety feature may increase the inherent safeness of the process; however, 
it  also  increases  the  risk  of  failure  of  the  production  route.  The  adverse  impact  of 
including an extra unit operation in this process in terms of increasing the total risk 
factor is greater than the inherent safety benefit that this unit operation may introduce to 
the process option. Hence, taking into account a wider range of safety factors through 
the proposed method changes the final result of the safety evaluation in this case study 
compared to the original method.          
     
6.4  Conclusion  
This  chapter  has  introduced  a  methodology  for  providing  adequate  decision-making 
factors to help with comparing various process alternatives according to their safety 
level  and  choosing  the  optimal  case.  The  proposed  methodology  is  based  on  two 
efficient assessment methods of the inherent safety approach and the probabilistic risk 
analysis  method and uses Petri  net as the  implementation tool. Development of this 
methodology is the major goal of the current study. The methodology combines two 
different well-defined safety and risk evaluation approaches and develops the capability 
to address a wide spectrum of safety issues through a unique assessment process. It 
accounts for the chemical and physical conditions safety as well as risk of failure of the 
unit  operations  in  the  production  routes.  Furthermore,  by  taking  advantage  of  the Chapter 6. Methodology Development                                                                       147 
 
 
powerful Petri net modelling tool, the new method creates an integrated framework to 
analyse the inherent safety and total risk of the process simultaneously with the process 
design.  To  provide  a  practical  and  sufficient  implementation  tool  for  the  proposed 
methodology, the developed Place weighted Petri net in Chapter 4 has been combined 
with the stochastic Petri net in this chapter. The modified Petri net tool can appropriately 
act as an implementation tool for the purpose of this study.    
 
The chapter detailed the different steps of developing the new methodology including 
the  logic  development,  mathematics  development,  methodology  enhancement  and 
finally the tool enhancement process. The performance of this approach has been tested 
on the acrylic acid case study and the results have been discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 6. Methodology Development                                                                       148 
 
 
References 
 
Baranzini, D., & Christou, M. D. (2009). Human factors data traceability and analysis in 
the European Community's Major Accident Reporting System [Electronic 
Version], 12. Retrieved 15/04/2009 from 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/lp66j0n061385474/. 
Dicdican, R. Y., & Haimes, Y. Y. (2005). Relating multiobjective decision tree to 
multiobjective risk impact analysis method Systems Engineering, 8(2), 95-108. 
Flynn, A. M., & Theodore, L. (2001). Health, Safety & Accident Management in the 
Chemical Process Industries (2 ed. Vol. 1): CRC Press. 
Fullwood, R. R., & Hall, R. E. (1988). Probabilistic Risk Assessment in the Nuclear 
Power Industry (Vol. 1): Elmsford, NY ; Pergamon Book Inc. 
Heikkila, A. M. (1999). Inherent safety in process plant design; An index-based 
approach. Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo. 
Heikkila, A. M., Hurme, M., & Jarvelainen, M. (1996). Safety considerations in process 
synthesis. Computers & Chemical Engineering, 20(782p), S115-S120. 
Hendershot, D. (2005). An overview of inherently safer design Paper presented at the 
20th annual CCPS international conference, Atlanta, Georgia. 
Humphries, L. (2008). Aplications and solutions.   Retrieved 01/11/2008, from 
www.ThinkingApplied.com 
Kariuki, S. G., & Lowe, K. (2007). Integrating human factors into process hazard 
analysis. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 92(1), 1764-1773. 
Khan, F., & Amyotte, P. (2004). Integrated inherent safety index (I2SI): A tool for 
inherent safety evaluation. Process Safety Progress, 23(2), 136-148. 
Khan, F., & Amyotte, P. (2005). I2SI: A comprehensive quantitative tool for inherently 
safety and cost evaluation. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
18(4-6), 310-326. 
Lees, F. P. (1996). Loss prevention in the process industries: hazard identification, 
assessment, and control (2nd ed.): Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
 
   
   
   
   Chapter 7. Industrial Case Study                                                                                 149 
 
 
   
   
C Ch ha ap pt te er r   7 7   
I In nd du us st tr ri ia al l   C Ca as se e   S St tu ud dy y      
7.1  Introduction   
A  new  safety assessment  methodology and an appropriate  implementation tool  have 
been developed in previous chapters of this study. In Chapter 6  the new approach has 
been tested on the acrylic acid case study. Application of the proposed method on a 
large-scale  industrial  production  plant  would  help  to  evaluate  the  reliability  of  the 
modelling tool and assessment process in a situation which is relatively close to actual 
situation. To serve this purpose, the gold  mining process  is adapted  in this chapter. 
Moreover, in the acrylic acid case study one basic process option was available and the 
other process alternatives were created by adding different inherent safety features to the 
basic process to improve the safety condition to different extents. However, in the gold 
mining  case  study  three  different  basic  design  options  operating  based  on  various 
technologies are selected and the super-net model is formed based on the common and 
individual unit operations existing in these processes.  
 
The gold mining process and different relevant technologies selected in this study are 
explained in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3 the Petri net tool is applied to create the super-
net model including all production routes. Next, the safety evaluation is implemented 
using the proposed method and the results of this evaluation are discussed in Section 
7.4. Finally, Section 7.5 concludes the chapter.                         
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7.2  The gold mining process    
Mining industry is one of the major industries in Australia and around the world. Gold 
processing specifically is of great importance for Australian economy. Application of 
the proposed method on some of the widely-used gold processing methods provides the 
opportunity for this research to demonstrate the powerful applicability of the proposed 
safety assessment method and tool in a real industrial case. 
 
In general, gold processing comprises three major steps: ore mining; ore processing; and 
gold  recovery  (Beaconsfield  Gold  N.L.,  2007;  InfoMine  Inc.,  2008;  Kalgoorlie 
Consolidated  Gold  Mines,  2008;  Newmont  Mining  Corporation,  2008;  SPG  Media 
Limited, 2008; Whitney & Whitney Inc, 2005). These steps are briefly described as 
follows: 
 
Ore mining – this step includes different operations as follows: 
 
  Exploration: exploration process starts with finding the right place of a deposit 
and analysing the samples to make sure that the deposit contains enough gold to 
allow an economic gold production process. 
  Open pit mining: drilling and explosion are used in a surface mine to make the 
hauling possible. 
  Underground mining: in some cases using a tunnel results in more economically 
mining of ore. A series of tunnels provides the access to the ore and then again 
drilling and explosion are used to break the ore. 
  Loading and hauling: the broken ore is loaded into trucks to be transported to the 
processing plants. 
 
Ore processing – the first step of operation in this phase is crushing and grinding the ore, 
then crushed ore is classified based on the size. The appropriate parts are thickened to be 
ready for oxidation process and finally the last step of ore processing is leaching. These 
unit operations are explained as follows (Libris, 2004): 
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  Crushing and grinding: based on the ore specifications different types of crusher 
may be used to break the ore into smaller rocks. Gyratory crusher, jaw crusher 
and  cone  crusher  are  some  examples  of  these  crushers.  Crushing  process  is 
continued with separating different size rocks obtained from primary crushing. 
Small enough rocks are ready for grinding however larger rocks may be crushed 
again to reach the appropriate size for grinding. Grinding is done using different 
mills such as ball mill and SAG mill. Grinding mills break the rocks into very 
fine rock particles. The process of crushing and grinding may be repeated several 
times  to  reach  the  extremely  small  size  rocks. The  final  particles  are  washed 
through mill with water creating a mixture called slurry which goes to the next 
process. 
  Thickening and floatation: special chemicals are used to thicken the slurry and 
make  a  concentrated  feed  for  floatation  process.  These  chemicals  are  better 
attached to air than being in water so when air is added to floatation cell, almost 
all particles containing gold join to the air bubbles. These bubbles form a froth on 
the top of the floatation tank which is collected into storage tanks. The content of 
these  tanks  are  thickened  by  removing  some  water.  The  solid  part  is  sent  to 
stockpile while the remaining slurry is moved to leaching step. 
  CIL and CIP processes: carbon in leach (CIL) and carbon in pulp (CIP) processes 
are used to remove gold from slurry by adding carbon into mixture. Since carbon 
has a wide surface area, it is able to absorb large amount of gold from slurry. 
Carbonation is the last step of ore processing phase. In the next phase of process, 
gold has to be recover from loaded carbon (Libris, 2004). 
 
Gold recovery – recovery is the final phase in gold processing which is generally done 
in the following steps (Newmont Waihi Gold, 2008): 
 
  Elution: gold is washed of from carbon in elution circuit using extremely hot 
water. Some special chemicals  such as cyanide  are used  in elution column to 
make a thickened solution of gold. This solution  has to be processed through 
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  Stripping:  stripping  is  a  method  of  separation  of  different  chemicals.  In  this 
method vapour stream is used to wash metal  from carbon surface which is in 
liquid stream form. This method is an alternative for elution hence the output has 
to be processed in electrowinning cells. 
  Electrowinning: electrolysis technology with stainless steel cathodes is used in 
this step of recovery phase. The muddy mixture left from electrowinning is dried 
and moved to next step. 
  Smelting:  the  material  from  previous  step  is  mixed  with  specific  chemicals 
generally known as fluxes and heated in furnaces for several hours in extremely 
high temperature. The molten material forms bullion bars and fluxes are removed 
containing impurities. The bars of bullion contain a 99% pure mixture of gold and 
silver which have to be refined to separate gold and silver. 
 
Several  methods  and  various  types  of  equipment  are  available  to  accomplish  above 
described activities. Obviously the choice of method and equipment is the key factor 
affecting safety level of processing route. Three different methods are adapted in this 
research which are described below. 
 
7.2.1  Kalgoorlie gold mines 
Kalgoorlie  Consolidated Gold Mines (KCGM) is one of the major gold producers in 
Australia (InfoMine Inc., 2008; Kalgoorlie Consolidated Gold Mines, 2008; Whitney & 
Whitney Inc, 2005). The production process of this producer involves several steps as 
follows:  
 
  Crushing: which includes primary crusher for open pit ore and then scats recycle 
crusher;   
  Grinding: through Sag mills and ball mills; 
  Floatation: floatation cells are used to change the slurry into a concentrated form; 
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  Carbon in leach: some CIL cells are used in this unit to collect the gold into a 
great rich grade on carbon; 
  Stripping: gold is washed from the carbon surface in a stripping circuit. 
  Electrowinning: electrical current is used to remove the gold from solution.  
  Smelting: the collected gold is melted in a furnace to shaped as bullions. 
 
The flowsheet in Figure 7.1 illustrates this process in some details. 
 
Open Pit Primary Crusher
Recycle
Crusher
Cyclone Sag Mill
Grinding
Mill
Floatation
Tailing Thickener
Leach Tank
Roasting
CIL/CIP
A.A.R.L.
Stripping
Circuit
Concentrate
Thickener
Filter
Reactant
Lime
Cyanide
Tailing
Caustic
Cyanide
Electrowinning
Furnace
Stockpile
Gold Bullion
 
Figure 7.1 – Kalgoorlie gold mines flowsheet (Kalgoorlie Consolidated Gold Mines, 2008) 
 
7.2.2  Porgera gold mine 
In  this  mine,  underground  ore  and  open  pit  ore  are  both  used  for  gold  production 
purpose (SPG Media Limited, 2008; Whitney & Whitney Inc, 2005). Following steps 
are under taken in Porgera gold mine to produce gold bullion from the ore: 
 
  Crushing: gyratory crusher and underground crusher are used in first step to crush 
open pit ore and underground ore respectively; 
  Grinding: SAG mills and ball mills are grinding equipment; 
  Floatation: floatation circuit and thickeners thicken the slurry; 
  Carbonate reaction: carbon oxidation is used to refine the gold; 
  CIL/CIP: carbon in leach and carbon in pulp processes collect the gold on the 
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  Elution:  elution  is  the  first  step  of  recovery  in  this  method  in  which  gold  is 
washed from the carbon surface in elution vessels. 
  Electrowinning: the same as in Kalgoorlie gold mine. 
  Smelting: melting the gold is the final phase of recovery. 
 
Described steps are demonstrated in following flowsheet (Figure 7.2). 
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Sag Mill
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Floatation
Carbonate 
Reaction 
Circuit
Leach Tank
Electrowinning
Cell
Thickener
P-54
Grinding
 Mill
Autoclaves Thickener
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Gold Bullion
Underground
Ore
Underground
Crusher
Furnace 
Stockpile
 
Figure 7.2 – Porgera gold mine flowsheet (SPG Media Limited, 2008) 
 
7.2.3  Beaconsfield gold mines 
Beaconsfield gold mines is another group of mines in Australia which use a different 
technology to recover gold from the gold ore (Beaconsfield Gold N.L., 2007; Whitney 
&  Whitney Inc, 2005). The gold production  in  this group of  mines  is done through 
following steps: 
 
  Crushing: cone crusher and Jaw crusher are two types of crusher used in this 
process option; 
  Grinding: ball mill is used as the grinding equipment; 
  Thickening: thickeners are applied to condense the slurry; 
  Bio-oxidation: the bacterial agents are used to refine the gold; 
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  Vacuum de-gassing: vacuuming facility is used to separate the additional gases 
such as CO2 and O2. 
  Zinc dusting: fine zinc metal is used to recover gold. 
  Smelting: finally the recovered gold is melted in a furnace. 
 
This gold production process is illustrated in the flowsheet given in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3 – Beaconsfield gold mines flowsheet (Beaconsfield Gold N.L., 2007) 
 
7.3  The gold mining Petri net model         
Place weighted stochastic Petri net is applied to develop the super-net model of these 
three process alternatives. This super-net model is shown in Figure 7.4. Table 7.1 gives 
the description of each place in this Petri net model. The similar unit operations in these 
processes are modelled as common sub-nets. Ten common sub-nets are identified in this 
super-net with the list of unit operations involved in each is presented in Table 7.2. 
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Figure 7.4 – Super-net model – gold mining case study 
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Table 7.1 – Interpretation of all places in Figure 7.4 
Place   Unit operation  Place   Unit operations 
P0  Start point  P23  Vacuum de-gassing 
P1  Underground ore  P24  Zinc dusting 
P2  Underground crusher  P25  Carbon reaction 
P3  Open pit ore  P26  Autoclave 
P4  Crusher  P27  Wash thickener 
P5  No operation  P28  Leach tank 
P6  Stock pile  P29  Thickener 
P7  SAG mill  P30  CIP/CIL 
P8  Crusher  P31  Carbon column 
P9  Cone crusher  P32  Elution 
P10  Ball mill  P33  Thickener 
P11  No operation  P34  Belt filter 
P12  Cyclone  P35  Roaster 
P13  Mill  P36  Thickener 
P14  Floatation  P37  Leach tank 
P15  Re-grind mill  P38  CIP/CIL 
P16  Thickener  P39  Stripping circuit 
P17  Bio oxidation cell  P40  Electrowinning 
P18  Thickener  P41  Smelting furnace 
P19  Belt filter  P42  Bullion 
P20  CIP/CIL  P43  Lime cyanide 
P21  Belt filter  P44  Caustic cyanide  
P22  Clarifier      
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Table 7.2 – Interpretation of all common sub-nets and respective places 
Sub-net   Unit operations 
1  Underground ore, underground crusher 
2  Open pit ore, crusher 
3  Stock pile, SAG mill, crusher 
4  Cone crusher, ball mill 
5  Cyclone, mill 
6  Bio oxidation, thickener, belt filter, CIP/CIL, belt filter, clarifier, vacuum de-
gassing, zinc dusting 
7  Carbonate  reaction,  autoclave,  wash  thickener,  leach  tank,  thickener, 
CIP/CIL, carbon columns, elution  
8  Thickener, belt filter, roaster, thickener, leach tank, CIP/CIL, stripping circuit  
9  Electrowinning 
10  Smelting furnace, bullion  
 
 
As  mentioned  before, to implement the new safety assessment method the proposed 
place weighted stochastic Petri net is applied. In this type of Petri net each place has a 
two-element weight factor holding the safety input data. The transitions are stochastic 
transitions with defined not-firing probability representing the operation failure rate. The 
process of calculating the input safety data and the relevant nodes in the Petri net model 
are described in following section.    
 
7.4  Safety evaluation 
Two  safety  and  risk  assessment  method  are  implemented  to  calculate  the  proposed 
average safety index (Eq.6.8) for different process options in this case study.  
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7.4.1  Inherent safety assessment 
In  this  safety  evaluation  method  several  indices  have  to  be  calculated,  defined  and 
combined through certain equations to achieve the final I2SI for each unit operation. 
The  data  required  for  these  calculations  are  retrieved  and/or  generated  using  the 
available databases, experts‟ opinions and the data applied in the similar cases in the 
literature (Lees, 1996). Table 7.3 shows the safety input data and the final I2SI (Pi(w1)) 
computed for each unit operation. The calculation procedure has been explained briefly 
in chapter 2. The detailed explanation of this method is available in Appendix A.  
 
Next, Eq.6.6 is applied to calculate the average I2SI index for the entire production 
route. 
 
7.4.2  Probabilistic risk analysis 
This method is based on two pieces of input data: failures rates and severity of the 
consequences which may be obtained again using the databases, experts‟ opinions and 
data in the similar cases (Lees, 1996). The risk factor related to each unit operation is 
defined through Eq.2.1 . The list of the operations, respective places (Pi) and severity of 
the consequences of their failures (Pi(w2)) in addition to the start transitions (Tj) and the 
relevant failure rates (Tj(f)) are given in Table 7.4.        
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Table 7.3- Input data – Inherent safety assessment method 
Pi  ISPIi  HIi  Pi(w1)  Pi  ISPIi  HIi  Pi(w2) 
P2  1.0  3.16  0.33  P24  1.0  4.77  0.22 
P4  1.0  3.16  0.33  P25  1.0  4.77  0.22 
P7  1.0  3.16  0.33  P26  1.0  3.16  0.33 
P8  1.0  3.16  0.33  P27  1.0  0.73  1.41 
P9  1.0  3.16  0.33  P28  5.6  2.50  2.22 
P10  1.0  3.16  0.33  P29  5.6  2.92  1.91 
P12  1.0  4.77  0.22  P30  5.6  2.50  2.22 
P13  1.0  3.16  0.33  P31  6.0  2.44  2.46 
P14  1.0  0.73  1.41  P32  6.6  3.36  1.96 
P15  1.0  3.16  0.33  P33  5.6  3.00  1.85 
P16  5.6  2.92  1.91  P34  2.2  2.06  1.09 
P17  1.0  4.77  0.22  P35  1.0  4.77  0.22 
P18  5.6  2.92  1.91  P36  5.6  2.92  1.91 
P19  2.2  2.06  1.09  P37  5.6  2.50  2.22 
P20  5.6  2.50  2.22  P38  5.6  2.50  2.22 
P21  2.2  2.06  1.09  P39  1.0  0.73  1.41 
P22  2.2  2.06  1.09  P40  6.6  3.00  2.19 
P23  6.0  2.44  2.46  P41  1.0  4.77  0.22 
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Table 7.4 – Input data – probabilistic risk analysis 
Pi  Pi(w2)  Tj  Tj(f)  Pi  Pi(w2)  Tj  Tj(f) 
P2  67  T1  0.015  P24  45  T23  0.020 
P4  67  T4  0.015  P25  111  T25  0.020 
P7  45  T7  0.015  P26  67  T26  0.015 
P8  67  T8  0.015  P27  89  T27  0.005 
P9  45  T9  0.015  P28  45  T28  0.015 
P10  23  T10  0.015  P29  23  T29  0.010 
P12  1  T12  0.020  P30  23  T29  0.010 
P13  23  T13  0.015  P31  23  T30  0.010 
P14  23  T13  0.015  P32  23  T31  0.015 
P15  89  T14  0.005  P33  45  T33  0.015 
P16  45  T15  0.010  P34  23  T34  0.010 
P17  89  T16  0.020  P35  89  T35  0.020 
P18  23  T17  0.015  P36  23  T33  0.015 
P19  45  T18  0.010  P37  45  T36  0.010 
P20  45  T19  0.010  P38  111  T37  0.010 
P21  23  T20  0.010  P39  89  T38  0.005 
P22  67  T21  0.010  P40  23  T39  0.015 
P23  45  T22  0.010  P41  1  T40  0.020 
 
 
Eq 6.7 is applied to calculate the average risk factor associated with each   process 
alternative.  
 
Finally, using Eq.6.8 the Petri net model computes the average safety index related to 
each production route. The penalty factor which is the number of non -responding unit 
operations  to  the  inherent  safety  keywords  are  also  defined  through  the  safety 
evaluation. The developed Petri net model is executed in the Visual Studio environment 
using C++ codes which are available in Appendix  B. The implementation resulted in 
generation of  12  possible combinations of common sub-nets and other unit operations Chapter 7. Industrial Case Study                                                                                 162 
 
 
of the 3 initial processes. The average safety index and penalty factor for each option are 
calculated concurrently during the route generation process. The flowsheets of these 12  
processes and the respective Petri net models are given in Figure 7.5 a-l. The summary 
of the results of safety analysis for these generated  routes is presented in Table 7.5. 
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l) Route 12 
Figure 7.5 - Flowsheets of the 12 generated routes and respective Petri net models 
 
 
Table 7.5 – Summary of the results – application of the proposed method on gold mining 
case study 
  Route1   Route2  Route3  Route4 
Average safety index  0.189  0.228  0.228  0.271 
Penalty factor  11  10  10  9 
Num of Equ.  19  18  18  17 
  Route5  Route6  Route7  Route8 
Average safety index  0.256  0.294  0.336  0.382 
Penalty factor  13  12  11  10 
Num of Equ.  22  21  20  19 
  Route9  Route10  Route11  Route12 
Average safety index  0.213  0.256  0.303  0.356 
Penalty factor  11  10  9  8 
Num of Equ.  19  18  17  16 
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7.4.3  Discussion  
According to the proposed approach the process options with larger average safety index 
are safer options. These production routes may be further investigated to make decision 
about the optimal case. One of the other factors that may be taken into account for more 
detail analysis on safer process alternatives is the penalty factor. Smaller penalty factor 
shows that the larger number of unit operations in relevant process would show positive 
response to the application of the inherent safety principles. The reason is that in any 
process option each unit operation that does not respond to the inherent safety principles 
is considered as a penalty point for that process option. Hence, the larger penalty factor 
shows the larger number of not responding unit operations into inherent safety keywords 
which is a negative point in regards with the safety level of a process alternative.   
 
In Table 7.5 routes number 8 and 12 can be classified as safer possible production routes 
considering the larger value of their average safety index. Among these alternatives, 
route number 12 has the less number of unit operations non-responding to the inherent 
safety keywords. Consequently, this process option may be consider as the optimal route 
for gold production purposes.  
 
The best option from the safety and failure risk point of view resulted by application of 
the proposed method in this study is based on roasting technology. However, this route 
is different from the basic option using this technology and the possibility and feasibility 
of this operation needs further investigation.  
       
7.5  Conclusion   
The industrial application of the proposed integrated framework for safety evaluation 
and process design was studied through the gold mining process. Three gold mines were 
selected as the base cases:  Kalgoorlie, Porgera, and Beaconsfield gold  mines. These 
three mines apply roasting technology, carbon oxidation technology and bio oxidation 
technique respectively, to extract and recover gold bullion from gold ore.  
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Application of the Petri net modelling tool and creating the super-net model based on 
these initial options provided the ability to automatically generate possible routes which 
resulted in forming of 12 different routes for gold production. This result confirmed the 
fact that there always may be a number of possible process options which are ignored by 
designers during the process design phases. Creation of 9 different options in addition to 
the 3 available initial cases showed the ability of proposed Petri net tool to overcome 
this  limitation.  Furthermore,  the  safety  and  risk  assessment  was  also  implemented 
concurrently with the process design and resulted in calculation of a unique final factor 
representing the safety level and failure risk of each alternative. These indices may be 
easily applied as decision-making factors to rank the available processes based on their 
safety and failure risk and therefore choosing the optimal case among all. The developed 
technique and tool  in this study demonstrated enough  flexibility  and potential to be 
applied  at  any  stage  of  the  process  design  particularly  during  the  early  phases. 
Consequently, the results obtained using this approach may be used to make pro-active 
decisions to improve the safety and reliability level of the processes.         
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C Ch ha ap pt te er r   8 8   
C Co on nc cl lu us si io on ns s   a an nd d   F Fu ut tu ur re e   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h      
8.1  Conclusions   
This study has: 
 
  Reviewed and structured the available literature addressing the safety and risk 
evaluation methods and tools in process industry. 
  Identified the major categories of safety assessment methods according to their 
evaluation approaches and areas of concern. It has also investigated the major 
techniques in each category in more detail. 
  Applied two efficient safety evaluation methods of inherent safety method and 
probabilistic  risk  analysis  as  basic  techniques  and  developed  a  combined 
methodology  which  has  the  potential  to  cover  a  wide  range  of  safety  and 
reliability issues. 
  Identified  and  described  the  Petri  net  tool  as  an  efficient  option  for  safety 
assessment implementation to be applied in an integrated framework for safety 
evaluation and process design.  
  Introduced the place weighted Petri net and combined it with the stochastic Petri 
net and developed a competent version of Petri net tool for concurrent safety 
evaluation  and  process  design  using  the  proposed  safety  and  risk  evaluation 
technique.    Chapter 8. Conclusion and Future Research                                                              175 
 
 
 
  Developed the integrated framework for safety evaluation and process design 
with the capability to automatically generate all possible process options based 
on  available  initial  processes  and  implement  the  safety  assessment 
simultaneously with the process design. 
 
The major contributions of this study are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
 
The most significant contribution of this study was the investigation of Petri net tool as a 
possible  means  for  integration of safety evaluation  into the  initial phases of process 
design  in  the  process  industry.  It  developed  an  automated  integrated  framework  for 
process design and safety assessment. The Petri net was  introduced as an automatic 
route generator for the first time in this study. It was shown that a Petri net tool is an 
appropriate  option  for  achieving  integrated  framework  because  it  provides  a  simple 
graphical  modelling  technique  with  powerful  mathematical  abilities  for  integrated 
process design and concurrent safety evaluations. It has great flexibility to be adapted in 
various types of processes as modelling tool and in the meantime offers the required 
facilities to implement different safety and risk analysis methods. For example, it can 
appropriately model continuous as well as batch processing plants. In addition, it has the 
potential  to  implement  safety  assessment  techniques  with  complicated  mathematical 
concepts  and  computations  such  as  fuzzy  approaches  as  well  as  relatively  simple 
methods such as probabilistic risk analysis. It also permits concurrency which means 
completely independent calculations and evaluations may be executed simultaneously 
through  a  Petri  net  model.  Other  important  facilities  provided  by  a  Petri  net  tool 
includes:  
 
  the  ability  to  integrate  all  initial  process  options  in  a  super-net  model  with 
common sub-nets and individual sub-nets. These sub-nets represent the similar 
unit operations and unlike unit operations existing in the different basic options, 
respectively. 
  the possibility to be applied in various phases all over the process life-cycle with 
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  the  potential  to  be  applied  as  common  language  amongst  all  contributors  to 
process regardless of their professional areas and levels of expertise according to 
its simple and easy to understand and use approach. 
 
This study also modified the general Petri net and introduced the place weighted Petri 
net which has the ability to carry additional data related to the places. This data can be 
used as the input data into other calculations such as those related to process modelling. 
For example, the input safety data may be assigned to the unit operations using the 
places‟ weight factors and be applied during safety evaluation which is supposed to be 
done concurrently with the process modelling.  
 
Another major contribution of this study was a new comparison factor for decision-
making  purposes  to  evaluate  safety  level  and  failure  risk  in  different  process 
alternatives, compare them together based on the provided factor and select the most 
reliable option. It was shown that each of existing safety evaluation methods addresses a 
limited range of safety problems such as chemical and /or physical conditions safety, 
environmental  safety,  and  reliability.  Therefore,  the  comparison  factors  provided  by 
these methods are based on the results of evaluation of some specific aspects of safety 
within the processes. If a wider range of safety issues are required to be addressed, 
designers need to undertake some different safety analysis methods separately which 
end up with several final safety factors. An extra effort is required to make an item-by-
item comparison or develop an appropriate method to combine these factors together 
and obtain a final unique factor for decision-making purposes. This study developed a 
combined measure based on two major techniques of inherent safety and probabilistic 
risk analysis for each unit operation in a process. A function of all individual measures 
in a process was proposed as the final index related to the entire process. This unique 
index  might  be  applied  as  a  proper  decision-making  factor  to  rank  all  available 
production routes based on their safety and reliability levels. This methodology provides 
the  opportunity  to  consider  more  safety  aspects  through  a  unique  safety  evaluation 
process and obtain a unique final decision-making factor per process option. In addition, 
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cycle based on the available input data in each phase. Since the final factor calculated in 
this method is applied for comparison purposes the extent of accuracy of the input data 
does not play an important role in the whole process. However, the similarity of the data 
accuracy level and resources in all processes is of great importance from the standpoint 
of reliability and validity of the final factors.    
 
As a final point, it should be mentioned that a combination of place weighted Petri net 
and stochastic Petri net called place weighted stochastic Petri net was introduced in this 
study  for  the  first  time  and  was  applied  to  implement  the  proposed  new  safety 
assessment  methodology  at  the  same  time  with  process  design.  This  integrated 
framework provides designers with the ability to conduct process design and risk and 
safety evaluation through a single process. Based on the final safety factors obtained for 
each possible process option the safest and most reliable options are selected for more 
feasibility studies to choose the final alternative.               
     
8.2  Future research directions  
During  the  period  of  this  study,  six  areas  of  research  were  identified  for  future 
investigation. These are outlined in the following part. 
 
Testing the robustness of the results – A specific algorithm needs to be developed to 
automatically  run  a  large  number  of  experiments  to  test  the  robustness  of  results. 
Alternatively, a methodology can be proposed for investigating the effect of parametric 
uncertainties. It requires a high load of work which was out of time and scope of this 
research.    
 
Real large-scale industrial application – Although the proposed methodology and tool 
were tested on acrylic acid production and gold recovery plants, the evaluation of the 
performance of this approach has been of limited scope. The acrylic acid production 
pant was a small-scale plant with a limited number of unit operations adapted from the 
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larger and more complicated plant which also was developed based on the available data 
in the literature to serve the purpose of the current research. The input data applied in 
this case was generated based on the existing data in similar cases in the literature. It is, 
therefore, necessary to apply and test the proposed methodology to a number of more 
complicated case studies with exact and accurate input data to strengthen the credibility 
of  this  approach.  Moreover,  a  real  large-scale  industrial  case  study  is  required  to 
evaluate  the  results  of  the  developed  approach  and  verify  its  performance  from  an 
industrial prospective. 
 
More mathematical investigation – The overall safety measure proposed in this study 
was created based on a straightforward linear function of two existing factors. However, 
there may be other more complicated functions applicable to serve the same purpose 
which  gives  more  reliable  and  accurate  combined  factors.  An  extensive  research  is 
required  to  investigate  the  other  possible  combination  techniques  to  develop  other 
mathematically valid measures with more precise performance.  
 
Object-oriented  approach  –  The  Petri  net  models  developed  in  this  work  were 
implemented in a Visual Studio environment using the C++ coding language. Although 
this approach adequately served the purposes of this study, the object oriented approach 
may be considered as a better and more efficient method in this regard. In this approach 
different nodes in a Petri net model can be defined as objects. A group of similar objects 
form a specific class. Each object may store its own data and its own functions. The data 
represents the object‟s characteristics and the functions show how an object is related 
with other objects from the same or different class. The data can be used to carry safety 
characteristics of the unit operations and the functions would define how different nodes 
are  related  to  each  other  and  how  safety  evaluation  has  to  be  done.  Therefore,  to 
enhance  the  coding  part  in  the  future  studies,  the  use  of  object  oriented  method  is 
recommended. 
 
Economic  analysis  –  The  economic  efficiency  of  the  proposed  method  has  to  be 
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developing specific economic measures to quantify the economic aspects of proposed 
method  and  compare  it  with  the  other  existing  methods.  According  to  the  defined 
framework  and  time  limit  of  this  research  and  the  required  work  load  to  conduct 
economic investigation it can be suggested as another possible area for future study 
 
Sustainability  and  environmental  safety  consideration  –  The  final  and  most 
important  suggestion  for  the  future  investigations  is  to  consider  sustainability  and 
environmental safety factors as additional concepts with great significance during the 
safety evaluation process. These aspects were not included in this study as each of them 
needs a separate sophisticated and extensive investigation to be adequately addressed. 
According to the recent increasing concerns about environmental issues created by the 
industries  and  the  importance  of  sustainability  considerations  in  industrial 
developments,  these  concepts  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  during  the  initial 
phases of the process design. While environmental considerations address the adverse 
impacts  of  industrial  activities  on  the  surrounding  environment,  the  sustainability 
concept is about meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future  generations  to  meet  their  own  needs.  Future  investigation  may,  therefore,  be 
dedicated to developing practical methods and measures for evaluating these aspects in 
industries  and  representing  the  results  of  this  evaluation  in  the  form  of  factors  and 
indices. These factors can be applied in conjunction with other safety and risk evaluation 
factors  for  decision-making  purposes.  This  will  serve  to  perform  a  complete  and 
comprehensive evaluation of the process options integrated into process design stage. It 
will  demonstrate  that  all  required  evaluations  related  to  safety,  risk,  reliability, 
sustainability,  environmental  issues,  and  other  related  areas  can  be  integrated  into 
process design phase using the proposed method and based on the ability of Petri nets to 
execute parallel functions.        
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Appendix A 
 
Indexing System 
 
A.1  Integrated inherent safety index 
 
Inherent safety concept has been introduced in literature review chapter (Chapter 2) and 
applied  in  this  research  as  a  suitable  basic  method  to  develop  a  new  methodology. 
Moreover,  Integrated Inherent  Safety  Index,  proposed  by  Khan  and  Amyotte  (2004, 
2005) has been adapted as sufficient quantification technique to measure the extent of 
applicability of inherent safety guidewords and their impacts on process safety. This 
indexing  system  has  been  explained  briefly  in  Chapters  2.  However,  for  better 
understanding  and ease of use the calculation procedure of different  indices  in I2SI 
system provided by Khan and Amyotte in the references (Khan & Amyotte, 2004, 2005) 
is given in this appendix. All  charts, graphs and tables in this appendix are adapted from 
the original works.  
 
A.1.1  Integrated inherent safety index ( I2SI ) calculation 
           
Conceptual  frameworks  of  I2SI  and  its  two  main  components;  HI  and  ISPI  are 
illustrated in Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 respectively.  
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Figure A.1- Conceptual framework of the I2SI 
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Figure A.2- Conceptual framework of the HI 
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Figure A.3- Conceptual framework of the ISPI 
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The hazard index ( HI ) is comprised of two sub-indices: damage index (DI) and process 
and hazard control index (PHCI). The damage index is a function of four important 
parameters,  namely:  fire  and  explosion,  acute  toxicity,  chronic  toxicity,  and 
environmental  damage.  The  DI  is  computed  for  each  of  these  parameters  using  the 
curves  in  Figures  A.4  and  A.5,  which  effectively  convert  damage  radii  to  damage 
indices by scaling up to 100.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.4- (a) Damage index graph for fire and explosion. (b) Damage index graph for 
acute toxicity. (c) Damage index graph for chronic toxicity. 
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Figure A.4 were developed for the scenarios of fire and explosion, and toxic release and 
dispersion for acute as well as chronic cases, for a range of chemicals using the SWeHI 
approach. Within the SWeHI methodology, the damage radii term, DR, incorporates 
DR1 for fire and explosion hazards and DR2 for toxic hazards. The quantification of 
DR1 (fire and explosion damage radii) and DR2 (toxic damage radii) is done through a 
series of steps. A brief outline of the steps is presented here. 
 
Quantification of damage radii for fire and explosion hazards 
Important steps involved in quantifying DR1 are as follows: 
  Classification of the various units in the plant into three main categories. 
  Evaluation of energy factors. 
  Assignment of penalties. 
  Estimation of damage radii (DR1), which in the SWeHI methodology is termed 
as B1. 
According to the first step, the various process units involved in the chemical process 
industries have been classified into three different groups: (1) storage units, (2) units 
involving  physical  operations  such  as  heat  transfer,  mass  transfer,  phase  change, 
pumping and compression, and (3) units involving chemical reactions. Subsequent steps 
are unique to each unit and are carried out as per the SWeHI methodology. 
Quantification of damage radii for acute and chronic toxicity hazards 
The parameter DR2 quantifies the toxic load (acute and/or chronic) over an area in terms 
of the radius of the area (in meters) that is lethally affected by a toxic load having a 50% 
probability of causing fatality. This parameter is similar to the toxic damage index B2 of 
the  SWeHI  system  and  is  derived  using  transport  phenomena  and  empirical  models 
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chemicals,  the  toxicity  of  the  chemicals,  the  operating  conditions,  and  the  site 
characteristics. 
The estimation of DR2 is done with a core factor and several penalty factors. The core 
factor (G in SWeHI terminology) is dependent on the release conditions such as the state 
of the chemicals  involved and the plant operating conditions. Penalties are assigned 
based on the chemical characteristics, operating conditions and surrounding (ambient) 
characteristics. Finally, the penalties and the core factor are combined to give DR2. 
Quantification of damage index for environmental damage 
The DI calculation for environmental damage (Figure A.5) is adapted from the previous 
work  of  Khan,  Sadiq,  and  Veitch.  Here,  the  environmental  damage  index  is 
characterized by considering the impairment impact for air, water and soil. Monographs 
were developed for each environment (air, water, and soil) as shown in Figure A.5(a)–
(c). It may be seen in Figure A.5(a)–(c) that for each environment, there are three lines 
classified as A, B, and C. This classification was done to account for the characteristics 
of the released chemicals according to the NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 
rankings for toxic/corrosive and reactive chemicals. Chemicals having an NFPA ranking 
less than 2 were classified as A, 2 and 3 as B, and 4 as C. These three DI's - one for each 
environment  -  are  combined  through  following  equation  to  give  the  DI  for 
environmental damage: 
DIen=Min{100,[(DIair)
3+(DIwater)
3+(DIsoil)
3]
1/3} 
The damage indices computed for each of these effects (fire and explosion (fe), acute 
(ac) toxicity, chronic (ch) toxicity and environmental (en) impairment) are combined as 
per following equation to give the final DI. 
DI=Min{200,[(DIfe)
2+(DIac)
2+(DIch)
2+(DIen)
2]
1/2} 
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Figure A.5- (a) Damage index graph for air pollution. (b) Damage index graph for water 
pollution. (c) Damage index graph for soil pollution. 
 
 
Process and hazard control index (PHCI) 
The other sub-index, PHCI, is calculated for various add-on process and hazard control 
measures that are required or are present in the system. The framework of the PHCI 
calculation  is  given  in  Khan  and  Amyotte  (2003).  Briefly,  this  index  is  quantified 
subjectively based on a mutually agreed scale among process safety experts. The index 
ranges from 1 to 10 for any control arrangement and is quantified based on the necessity 
of this control arrangement in maintaining safe operation. This necessity is divided into 
nine groups as listed in Table A.1. For any given control system, based on necessity 
(from Table A.1), an index (PHCI) may be derived from Figure A.6. This process is Appendix A. Indexing System                                                                                      188 
 
 
 
 
repeated for all possible control systems. The PHCI's of these different control systems 
are finally combined through following equation to give the final PHCI: 
 
PHCI=[PHCIp+PHCIt+PHCIf+PHCIl+PHCIc+PHCIiv+PHCIb+PHCIfr+PHCIs+PHCId] 
where p stands for pressure, t for temperature, f for flow, l for level, c for concentration, 
iv for inert venting, b for blastwall, fr for fire resistance wall, s for sprinkler system, and 
d for forced dilution. 
 
 
Table A.1- Guideline to decide extent of requirement of control arrangements  
Description  Extent of requirement 
Essential  10 
Very important  9 
Important  8 
Not greatly important but required  7 
Required  6 
Requirement is moderate  5 
Good if available  4 
Requirement does not affect process  3 
Not required  1–2 
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Figure A.6- Monograph for process and hazard control index (PHCI) 
 
Finally, the DI is divided by the PHCI to calculate a value of hazard index (HI): 
 
HI = DI / PHCI 
 
Inherent safety potential index (ISPI) 
Similar to the Hazard Index (HI), the inherent safety potential index (ISPI) is comprised 
of  two  sub-indices:  an  inherent  safety  index  (ISI)  and  a  second  process  and  hazard 
control index (PHCI). To quantify the ISPI, the first step is to calculate an inherent 
safety  index  (ISI).  Again,  the  framework  for  this  procedure  has  been  previously 
discussed by  Khan and Amyotte (2003). 
The  ISI  computation  follows  the  same  procedure  as  a  HAZOP  study  in  which 
guidewords  (in  the  present  case,  inherent  safety  principles  such  as  minimization, 
substitution, etc.) are applied to the process system. Based on the extent of applicability 
and the ability to reduce the hazard, an index value is computed for each guideword. 
Figure  A.7  shows  index  values  for  various  ranges  of  applicability  for  four  of  the 
guidewords.  To  decide  on  the  abscissa  values  (extent  of  applicability  and  ability  to 
reduce  the  hazard),  guidelines  are  developed  as  reported  in  Table  A.2.  For  the Appendix A. Indexing System                                                                                      190 
 
 
 
 
guideword  simplification  -  where  the  current  authors  experienced  difficulty  in 
quantifying  this  subjective  parameter  -  the  index  value  can  be  decided  using  the 
guidelines presented in Table A.3 (which admittedly are subjective themselves). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.7- (a) Inherent safety index for Minimization guideword. (b) Inherent safety 
index for Substitution guidewod. (c) Inherent safety index for Attenuation guideword. (d) 
Inherent safety index for Limiting Of guideword. 
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Table A.2- Guidelines to decide the extent of applicability of inherent safety guidewords 
Description  Extent Indicator 
Completely applied and hazard eliminated  10 
Completely applied and most significant hazard 
reduced 
9 
Completely applied and hazard reduced  8 
Completely applied and hazard moderately reduced  7 
Significantly applied and hazard eliminated  6 
Significantly applied and hazard reduced  5 
Applicable and hazard may be eliminated  4 
Applicable and hazard may be reduced  3 
May be applicable and hazard may be eliminated  2 
May be applicable and hazard may be reduced  1 
 
 
Table A.3- Guidelines to decide ISI value for guideword simplification    
Description  Inherent safety index 
Process simplified to large extent and hazard eliminated  100 
Process simplified to large extent and most significant hazard 
reduced 
90 
Process simplified to large extent and hazard reduced  80 
Process simplified to large extent and hazard reduced moderately  70 
Process simplified and hazard eliminated  60 
Process simplified and hazard reduced  50 
Process simplified moderately and hazard reduced  40 
Process simplified moderately and hazard reduced moderately  30 
No significant process simplification and hazard reduced 
moderately 
20 
No significant process simplification and no substantial hazard 
reduction 
10 
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Figure  A.7(a),  (b)  and  (d)  present  the  characterization  of  the  ISI  for  minimization, 
substitution and limiting of, respectively. In the case of attenuation, there are three main 
operating parameters identified that control the attenuation process: (1) temperature, (2) 
pressure, and (3) toxicity/corrosiveness of the chemicals. Monographs were developed 
and are shown in Figure A.7(c) for these operating parameters; the index value may be 
estimated  based  on  the  extent  of  applicability  of  the  guideword  to  these  operating 
conditions. It is worth mentioning that the extent of attenuation guideword applicability 
in  the  case  of  toxicity  may  be  measured  in  terms  of  reduction  in  LC50  values 
(LC50intial/LC50changed). The final inherent safety index for attenuation may be estimated 
by combining the three indices through following equation: 
ISIa=Min{100,[(ISItemp)
3+(ISIpres)
3+(ISItoxi)
3]
1/3} 
Subsequently,  the  ISI  values  calculated  for  the  different  guidewords  (as  defined  in 
Figure A.7) are combined through equation below to give a final overall ISI. 
ISI=Min{200,[(ISIm)
2+(ISIsu)
2+(ISIa)
2+(ISIsi)
2+(ISIl)
2]
1/2} 
After analyzing the applicability of inherent safety principles (guidewords), there may 
still be a requirement to install add-on process and hazard control measures. These are 
accounted for using the same procedure as utilized in the hazard index (HI) calculation 
procedure and discussed in an earlier section. This index is quantified subjectively based 
on a mutually agreed scale among process safety experts. The index ranges from 1 to 10 
for any control arrangement and  is quantified  based on the necessity of this control 
arrangement in maintaining safe operation. This necessity is divided into nine groups as 
listed in Table A.1. For any given control system, based on necessity (from Table A.1), 
an  index  (PHCI)  may  be  derived  from  Figure  A.6.  This  process  is  repeated  for  all 
possible control systems. The PHCI's of these ten different control systems are finally 
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Finally, the inherent safety potential index (ISPI) is computed in a manner similar to the 
hazard index (HI), by dividing the ISI with the PHCI: 
ISPI = ISI / PHCI 
A.1.2  Cost indexing procedure 
In order to account for the financial aspects of inherent safety, a cost indexing system 
was developed. The conceptual framework of the cost indexing procedure is shown in 
the right-hand side of Figure A.1. This indexing system is comprised of two sub-indices: 
a conventional safety cost index (CSCI) and an inherent safety cost index (ISCI), the 
details of which are presented in the following sections. 
Conventional safety cost index (CSCI) 
The conventional safety cost index (CSCI) is computed as shown in this equation: 
CSCI = CConvSafety / CLoss 
The numerator, CConvSafety, is the sum of the costs of process control measures and add-
on (end-of-pipe) safety measures (i.e. CConvSafety=CControl+CAdd-on). Calculation of these 
two components of CConvSafety is described in the sections subsequent to the following 
explanation of the denominator in above equation, CLoss. 
Cost of losses 
For  any  given  incident  scenario,  the  loss  index  is  comprised  of  four  components: 
production  loss (PL), asset  loss (AL), human  health  loss (HHL), and environmental 
cleanup  cost  (ECC),  which  are  governed  as  shown  in  Figure  A.8.  These  four 
components are summed to give the total cost of loss via following equation. 
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Figure A.8- Procedure to calculate losses 
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A brief illustration of each loss type is given below. 
Production loss 
For a given scenario, the production loss is calculated based on production hours lost 
multiplied by the cost of the each production hour: 
CPL = Likely downtime (hours) × Production value ($/hour) 
Asset loss 
Incidents (scenarios) involving fire, explosion, or other similar events may cause loss of 
physical assets, such as damage to property, loss of equipment, etc. Asset loss may be 
simply calculated as: 
CAL = Asset density ($/area) × Damage area 
It is important to note that the damage radii employed in the current work represent a 
50% probability of damage. 
Human health loss 
For  a  given  scenario,  human  health  loss  is  calculated  in  terms  of  the  number  of 
fatalities/injuries and the costs associated with fatality and/or injury: 
CHHL = Damage area × Population density (people/area) × Cost of fatality/injury ($) 
As  mentioned  above,  the  damage  radii  represent  a  50%  probability  of  fatality.  The 
authors acknowledge that there can be high degrees of subjectiveness and discomfort 
associated with assigning a dollar value to fatality and/or injury. While the value of a 
human life is immeasurable, it is possible to employ indicators such as insurance costs, 
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procedure finds its most widespread application in relative terms, such considerations 
should not introduce significant uncertainty into the results. 
Environmental cleanup cost 
The  environmental  cleanup  cost  for  soil,  water  and  air  environments  are  calculated 
based on the mass or volume contaminated. The mass of contaminated soil is calculated 
by adopting a general soil density of 2650 kg/m
3 and a depth of contamination of 0.5 m. 
The volume of contaminated water is calculated by considering the contaminated area 
multiplied by a 1-m depth of contamination; for contaminated air, the area multiplier is a 
height of 10 m. Thus, the individual cleanup costs of: 
CSoil=Mass  of  contaminated  soil  ×  Cleanup  cost($/mass)×NH,  CWater=Volume  of 
contaminated water×Cleanup cost ($/volume)×NH, and 
CAir=Volume  of  contaminated  air  *  Dilution  or  cleanup  cost  ($/volume)×NH  are 
summed to yield the total environmental cleanup cost via below equation. 
CECC=CSoil+CWater+CAir 
The term NH represents the NFPA rank of the chemical as related to health hazards. To 
aid the user, we have developed a generalized table for cleanup costs (Table A.4), based 
on the detailed review of remediation costs of contaminated sites conducted by Khan, 
Husain and Hejazi (2004). 
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Table A.4- Range of cleanup costs for different chemical types 
Pollutant  Cost 
  Soil media (000$/ton)  Water media (000$/m
3)  Air media (000$/m
3) 
Heavy metals  0.10–0.30  2.0–4.0  3.0–5.0 
Metals  0.07–0.15  1.5–3.0  1.0–2.0 
Organic solvents  0.05–0.08  1.0–2.0  0.5–1.5 
Inorganic 
solvents 
0.01–0.05  0.5–1.5  0.5–1.0 
 
 
Process control measure costs 
The cost of process control measures may be calculated as follows: 
 
where Ci represents the cost of a given process control measure implemented N times, 
and n is the total number of control systems implemented. The cost of individual control 
measures may be taken from Table A.5, which was developed through a detailed survey 
of available control devices from various suppliers. To better represent the survey data, 
cost is subdivided into three different categories according to the severity of operating 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix A. Indexing System                                                                                      198 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5- Classification of process control measure costs 
Control system  Cost (000$) 
  Class A  Class B  Class C 
Pressure control  2–4  4–9  9–15 
Temperature control  1–3  3–6  6–12 
Flow control  3–6  6–11  11–18 
Level control  2–5  5–9  9–12 
pH control  1–3  3–6  6–12 
Additional control system (density control, concentration 
control, etc.) 
2–5  5–11  11–19 
 
 
Class A: Process system/component operating in normal capacity/normal severity, and 
requiring a conventional control system; for example, control measures for steam pipes, 
liquid chemicals, etc. 
Class  B:  Process  system  operating  under  high  capacity/hazardous  chemical/severe 
operating conditions, and requiring an advanced control system; for example, control 
measures for pressurized gases, flammable liquids, high gas/liquid flowrates, steam, etc. 
Class  C:  Process  system  operating  under  very  high  capacity/  highly  hazardous 
chemical/extremely  severe  operating  conditions,  and  requiring  an  advanced  control 
system;  for  example,  control  measures  for  liquefied  gases,  flammable  gases,  high 
gas/liquid flowrates, steam, handling fine dusts, etc. 
Add-on safety measure costs 
In a  manner similar to the process control  measure costs, the cost of  add-on safety 
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where Cj represents the cost of a given add-on safety measure implemented N times, and 
n is the total number of add-on safety systems implemented. The cost of individual add-
on  measures  may  be  taken  from  Table  A.6,  which  was  developed  using  the  same 
procedure as for Table A.5. 
 
Table A.6- Classification of add-on safety measure costs 
Control system  Cost (000$) of one unit 
  Class A  Class B  Class C 
Alarms  0.5–1.5  2–4  4–11 
Detectors  2–3.5  4–8  9–20 
Firefighting equipment  6–10  10–20  21–30 
Blastwall  5–9  10–16  16–25 
Sprinkling system  3–5  5–15  15–25 
Inert gas blanketing 
system 
4–10  10–17  18–30 
Fire resistance wall  4–8  9–15  15–30 
Other safety measures  3–7  8–14  14–32 
 
 
Inherent safety cost index (ISCI) 
The inherent safety cost index (ISCI) is computed through following equation: 
ISCI = CInhSafety / CLoss 
The  denominator  in  above  equation,  CLoss,  is  the  same  as  in  equation  for  the 
conventional  safety  cost  index.  The  numerator, CInhSafety,  is  the  sum  of  the  costs  of 
inherent  safety  implementation,  process  control  measures  and  add-on  (end-of-pipe) 
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add-on safety measures are calculated using the formulations discussed in the preceding 
sections (recognizing, of course, that these costs may change with the implementation of 
inherent  safety  measures).  A  method  to  quantify  the  costs  for  inherent  safety 
implementation is described in the following section. 
Inherent safety implementation costs 
Inherent safety implementation costs are estimated based on the extent of application of 
the inherent safety guidewords and the costs associated with their application, as shown 
in Figure A.9. The cost is calculated for the application of each guideword. For example, 
the  cost  of  solvent  replacement  and  the  associated  changes  is  estimated  and  thus 
provides a measure of the cost of the guideword substitution. This cost is divided by a 
factor  called  the  extent  of  applicability,  which  denotes  the  extent  to  which  the 
guideword  will  eliminate/reduce  the  hazards.  The  total  cost  of  inherent  safety 
implementation is represented by following equation: 
CInherent=CM/EM+CS/ES+CA/EA+CSi/ESi+CL/EL 
where  CM,  CS,  CA,  CSi,  and  CL  represent  the  costs  of  minimization,  substitution, 
attenuation, simplification, and limitation of effects, respectively. EM, ES, EA, ESi, and 
EL are the extent of applicability of the respective inherent safety principles (see Table 
A.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix A. Indexing System                                                                                      201 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.9- Framework for inherent safety cost computation 
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  CInhSafety = CInherent + CControl +  
CAdd-on 
 
CInherent = CM / EM + CS / ES + 
 CA / EA + CSi / ESi + CL / EL  
 
Repeat the process 
for all units 
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A.2  Gold mining process 
 
The I2SI related to each unit operation in gold mining case study presented in Table 7.3 
in Chapter 7 has been calculated through the procedure described above. Tables A.7-
A.11 below give the detail input data applied to calculate the final I2SIs in gold mining 
process. 
 
 
Table A.7- Gold mining input data- I2SI and its two main sub-indices: ISPI & HI  
Pi  ISPI  HI  I2SI  Pi  ISPI  HI  I2SI 
P2  1.0  3.16  0.33  P24  1.0  4.77  0.22 
P4  1.0  3.16  0.33  P25  1.0  4.77  0.22 
P7  1.0  3.16  0.33  P26  1.0  3.16  0.33 
P8  1.0  3.16  0.33  P27  1.0  0.73  1.41 
P9  1.0  3.16  0.33  P28  5.6  2.50  2.22 
P10  1.0  3.16  0.33  P29  5.6  2.92  1.91 
P12  1.0  4.77  0.22  P30  5.6  2.50  2.22 
P13  1.0  3.16  0.33  P31  6.0  2.44  2.46 
P14  1.0  0.73  1.41  P32  6.6  3.36  1.96 
P15  1.0  3.16  0.33  P33  5.6  3.00  1.85 
P16  5.6  2.92  1.91  P34  2.2  2.06  1.09 
P17  1.0  4.77  0.22  P35  1.0  4.77  0.22 
P18  5.6  2.92  1.91  P36  5.6  2.92  1.91 
P19  2.2  2.06  1.09  P37  5.6  2.50  2.22 
P20  5.6  2.50  2.22  P38  5.6  2.50  2.22 
P21  2.2  2.06  1.09  P39  1.0  0.73  1.41 
P22  2.2  2.06  1.09  P40  6.6  3.00  2.19 
P23  6.0  2.44  2.46  P41  1.0  4.77  0.22 
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Table A.8- Input data for the calculation of ISI 
Pi  Minimization  Substitution  Limitation   Simplification  Attenuation   ISI 
          Temp.  Press.  Toxi.   Total    
P2  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P4  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P7  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P8  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P9  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P10  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P12  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P13  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P14  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P15  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P16  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P17  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P18  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P19  4  8  4  20  2  2  2  2.88  22.5 
P20  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P21  4  8  4  20  2  2  2  2.88  22.5 
P22  4  8  4  20  2  2  2  2.88  22.5 
P23  10  30  10  50  3  3  1  3.80  60.1 
P24  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P25  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P26  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P27  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P28  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P29  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P30  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P31  10  30  10  50  3  3  1  3.80  60.1 
P32  10  40  10  50  3  3  1  3.80  65.7 
P33  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P34  4  8  4  20  2  2  2  2.88  22.5 
P35  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P36  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P37  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P38  8  20  6  50  7  8  0  9.49  55.6 
P39  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
P40  10  40  10  50  3  3  1  3.80  65.7 
P41  1  2  1  10  1  1  0  1.26  10.4 
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Table A.9- Input data for the calculation of PHCI   
Pi  Press.  Temp.  Flow  level  Conc.  In. Ven.  Blast  Fire    Spr.   Forc. Dilu.   PHCI 
P2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P4  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P7  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P8  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P9  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P10  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P13  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P14  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P15  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P16  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P17  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P18  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P19  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P20  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P21  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P22  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P23  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P24  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P25  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P26  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P27  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P28  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P29  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P30  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P31  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P32  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P33  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P34  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P35  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P36  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P37  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P38  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P39  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P40  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P41  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
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Table A.10- Input data for the calculation of DI 
Pi  Fire & Explosion  Acute Toxicity   Chronic Toxicity   Environmental Damage   DI 
        Air   Water   Soil    Total    
P2  30  10  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  31.6 
P4  30  10  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  31.6 
P7  30  10  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  31.6 
P8  30  10  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  31.6 
P9  30  10  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  31.6 
P10  30  10  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  31.6 
P12  40  25  7  0.01  0.1  0.001  0.100  47.7 
P13  30  10  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  31.6 
P14  7  2  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  7.3 
P15  30  10  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  31.6 
P16  25  15  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  29.2 
P17  40  25  7  0.01  0.1  0.001  0.100  47.7 
P18  25  15  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  29.2 
P19  20  5  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  20.6 
P20  20  15  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  25.0 
P21  20  5  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  20.6 
P22  20  5  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  20.6 
P23  20  14  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  24.4 
P24  40  25  7  0.01  0.1  0.001  0.100  47.7 
P25  40  25  7  0.01  0.1  0.001  0.100  47.7 
P26  30  10  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  31.6 
P27  7  2  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  7.3 
P28  20  15  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  25.0 
P29  25  15  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  29.2 
P30  20  15  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  25.0 
P31  20  14  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  24.4 
P32  30  15  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  33.6 
P33  26  15  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  30.0 
P34  20  5  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  20.6 
P35  40  25  7  0.01  0.1  0.001  0.100  47.7 
P36  25  15  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  29.2 
P37  20  15  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  25.0 
P38  20  15  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  25.0 
P39  7  2  1  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  7.3 
P40  26  15  1  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.013  30.0 
P41  40  25  7  0.01  0.1  0.001  0.100  47.7 
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Table A.11- Input data for the calculation of PHCI after implementing inherent safety 
principles  
Pi  Press.  Temp.  Flow  level  Conc.  In. Ven.  Blast  Fire    Spr.   Forc. Dilu.   PHCI 
P2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P4  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P7  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P8  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P9  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P10  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P13  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P14  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P15  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P16  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P17  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P18  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P19  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P20  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P21  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P22  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P23  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P24  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P25  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P26  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P27  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P28  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P29  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P30  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P31  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P32  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P33  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P34  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P35  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P36  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P37  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P38  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P39  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P40  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
P41  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  10 
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Appendix B 
 
C++ Codes  
 
All C++ codes which have been developed in this research to run the Petri net models 
are provided in an attached CD as Appendix B.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix C. Glossary Of Technical Terms                                                                 209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Glossary Of Technical Terms 
 
Acidification: 1) the decrease of acid neutralizing capacity in water or base saturation in 
soil  caused  by  natural  or  anthropogenic  processes  (Cheremisinoff,  2002).  2)  Ocean 
acidification is the name given to the ongoing decrease in the pH of the Earth's oceans, 
caused by their uptake of anthropogenic carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Between 
1751 and 1994 surface ocean pH is estimated to have decreased from approximately 
8.179 to 8.104 (a change of −0.075) (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). 
 
Additive: 1) designating or involving an equation whose terms are of the first degree 
(Miller,  2009).  2)  additive  process:  characterized  or  produced  by  addition  (Miller, 
2009). 
 
Area used/species diversity: Species diversity is an index that incorporates the number 
of species in an area and also their relative abundance. It is generally a  much more 
useful value than species richness (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). 
 
Atomic rule: A fuzzy rule with single antecedent and consequent is called an atomic 
fuzzy rule (Negnevitsky, 2002). An example of the atomic rules is as follows: 
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THEN weight is heavy  
 
Battery  limit:  1)  battery  limit  refers  to  an  area  in  a  refinery  or  chemical  plant 
encompassing a processing unit or battery of units along with their related utilities and 
services (Answers Corporation, 2009a). 2) The word "battery limit" is used to indicate 
the location up to which a custodian responsibility area / piping ends. The word battery 
is used to represent a set of units (Answers Corporation, 2009b). 3) “Battery  limits may 
be defined as a geographic boundary, real or imaginary, around the processing plant 
which converts raw material to finished products” (Brennan, 1998). 
 
Chemistry  block  diagram:  block  diagram  is  a  diagram  of  a  system,  in  which  the 
principal parts or functions are represented by blocks connected by lines, that show the 
relationships of the blocks. They are heavily used in the engineering world in hardware 
design, software design, and process flow diagrams (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). 
Chemistry block diagram is the same as process flow diagram. 
 
Compound  rule:  A  compound  fuzzy  rule  can  have  multiple  antecedent  and/or 
consequent, for example (Negnevitsky, 2002):  
IF project duration is long 
AND project funding is adequate 
THEN risk is high 
 
Concurrency:  In  computer  science,  concurrency  is  a  property  of  systems  in  which 
several computations are executing simultaneously, and potentially interacting with each 
other. A number of mathematical models have been developed for general concurrent 
computation including Petri net, process calculi, the synchronous model and the Actor 
model (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). In a Petri  net  model, the  concurrency  is 
modelled by two or more transitions which are enabled and may fire independently.  
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Criticality analysis: 1) a criticality analysis, which is used to chart the probability of 
failure modes against the severity of their consequences. The result highlights failure 
modes with relatively high probability and severity of consequences, allowing remedial 
effort to be directed where it will produce the greatest value (Wikimedia Foundation 
Inc.,  2001).  2)  Prioritizing  the  risks  based  on  their  probability  of  occurrence  or the 
severity of their consequences to chose the best corrective action is referred as criticality 
analysis (Bowles & Pelaez, 1995). 
 
Deductive reasoning: sometimes called deductive logic, is reasoning which constructs 
or evaluates deductive arguments. In logic, an argument is said to be deductive when the 
truth of the conclusion is purported to follow necessarily or be a logical consequence of 
the  premises  and  (consequently)  its  corresponding  conditional  is  a  necessary  truth. 
Deductive arguments are said to be valid or invalid, never true or false. A deductive 
argument  is  valid  if  and  only  if  the  truth  of  the  conclusion  actually  does  follow 
necessarily (or is indeed a logical consequence of) the premises and (consequently) its 
corresponding conditional is a necessary truth. If a deductive argument is not valid then 
it  is  invalid.  A  valid  deductive  argument  with  true  premises  is  said  to  be  sound;  a 
deductive argument which is invalid or has one or more false premises or both is said to 
be not sound (unsound) (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). 
 
Deterministic  method:  deterministic  system  or  method  is  a  system  in  which  no 
randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system. Deterministic 
models  thus  produce  the  same  output  for  a  given  starting  condition  (Wikimedia 
Foundation Inc., 2001). Deterministic  method  ignores the probabilistic  nature of the 
system reliability (Mohanta et al., 2007). 
 
Ecotoxicity  (terrestrial,  aquatic):  Ecotoxicity,  the  subject  of  study  of  the  field  of 
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biological, chemical or physical stressors to affect  ecosystems. Such stressors  might 
occur in the natural environment at densities, concentrations or levels high enough to 
disrupt the natural biochemistry, physiology, behaviour and interactions of the living 
organisms that comprise the ecosystem. 
Ecotoxicology has been defined as "the branch of toxicology concerned with the study 
of  toxic  effects,  caused  by  natural  or  synthetic  pollutants,  to  the  constituents  of 
ecosystems, animal (including human), vegetable and microbial, in an integral context” 
(Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001).  
Energy consumption: 1) amount of energy consumed in a process or system, or by an 
organization or society (WebFinanceInc., 2009). 2) The amount of energy consumed in 
the form in which it is acquired by the user. The term excludes electrical generation and 
distribution losses (HIE, 2009). 
 
Environmental cleanup cost (soil, water, air): 1) “Environmental clean-up refers to 
action taken to deal with the release of a hazardous substance that could affect humans 
and/or the environment. The term clean-up is sometimes used interchangeably with the 
terms  remedial  action,  response  action  or  corrective  action  as  opposed to the  terms 
preventive action or anticipatory action” (Glossary of Environment Statistics, 1997). 2) 
“environmental remediation deals with the removal of pollution or contaminants from 
environmental  media  such  as  soil,  groundwater,  sediment,  or  surface  water  for  the 
general  protection  of  human  health  and  the  environment  or  from  a  brownfield  site 
intended for redevelopment” (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). 
 
Eutrophication (terrestrial, aquatic): is an increase in the concentration of chemical 
nutrients in an ecosystem to an extent that increases in the primary productivity of the 
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environmental effects such as anoxia and severe reductions in water quality, fish, and 
other animal populations may occur. 
 
Although  traditionally  thought  of  as  enrichment  of  aquatic  systems  by  addition  of 
fertilizers into lakes, bays, or other semi-enclosed waters (even slow-moving rivers), 
terrestrial ecosystems are subject to similarly adverse impacts (Wikimedia Foundation 
Inc., 2001).  
 
 
Greenhouse effect: 1) The greenhouse effect is the heating of the surface of a planet or 
moon  due  to  the  presence  of  an  atmosphere  containing  gases  that  absorb  and  emit 
infrared  radiation.  Thus,  greenhouse  gases  trap  heat  within  the  surface-troposphere 
system. This mechanism is fundamentally different from that of an actual greenhouse, 
which  works  by  isolating  warm  air  inside  the  structure  so  that  heat  is  not  lost  by 
convection.  The  greenhouse  effect  was  discovered  by  Joseph  Fourier  in  1824,  first 
reliably experimented on by John Tyndall in 1858, and first reported quantitatively by 
Svante Arrhenius  in 1896 (Wikimedia  Foundation Inc., 2001). 2) the combustion of 
fossil fuels has resulted in an increase in the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere. 
Carbon dioxide has the effect of insulating the Earth against the loss of heat, and hence 
the mean temperature is in part dependent on carbon dioxide levels. The whole process 
is referred to as greenhouse effect (Mobley, 2001). 
 
Human toxicity: The degree to which a substance or mixture of substances can harm 
humans or animals. Acute toxicity involves harmful effects in an organism through a 
single or short-term exposure. Chronic toxicity is the ability of a substance or mixture of 
substances to cause harmful effects over an extended period, usually upon repeated or 
continuous  exposure  sometimes  lasting  for  the  entire  life  of  the  exposed  organism. 
Subchronic toxicity is the ability of the substance to cause effects for more than one year 
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Nitrate  toxicosis  in  humans  occurs  through  enterohepatic  metabolism  of  nitrates  to 
ammonia,  with  nitrite  being  an  intermediate.  Nitrites  oxidize  the  iron  atoms  in 
hemoglobin  from  ferrous  iron  (2+)  to  ferric  iron  (3+),  rendering  it  unable  to  carry 
oxygen.  This  process  can  lead  to  generalized  lack  of  oxygen  in  organ  tissue  and  a 
dangerous  condition  called  called  methemoglobinemia  (Wikimedia  Foundation  Inc., 
2001).  
 
Inductive  reasoning:  is  a  type  of  reasoning  which  involves  moving  from  a  set  of 
specific facts to a general conclusion (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). 
 
Inside battery limit (ISBL): “Inside battery limits refers to whatever happens or located 
within battery limits”(Brennan, 1998). 
 
Linguistic variable (catastrophic, critical, marginal, negligible): 1) “Loosely speaking, 
a  linguistic  variable  is  a  variable  whose  values  are  words  or  phrases” 
(Andriantiatsaholiniaina et al., 2004). Catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible can 
be the examples of different linguistic variable might be used to express the severity of 
the consequences of a hazardous event. The definition of each variable and its covering 
area is quite subjective and may vary from one application to another. 
 
Mass  Separating  Agent  (MSA):  mass  separating  agents  (MSAs),  such  as  solvents, 
adsorbents, stripping agents, and ion exchange resins are used for removal of pollutants 
(Garrison et al., 1995).  
 
Multiplicative: 1) tending or having the power to multiply or increase in number or 
quantity or degree (Miller, 2009). 2) of, relating to, or associated with a mathematical 
operation of multiplication (Merriam-Webster, 2009).  
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Noise:  Noise  pollution  (or  environmental  noise)  is  displeasing  human-,  animal-  or 
machine-created sound that disrupts the activity or balance of  human or animal  life 
(Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001).  
Odour: An odor or odour (see spelling differences) is a volatilized chemical compound, 
generally at a very low concentration, that humans or other animals perceive by the 
sense of olfaction (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001).  
 
Outside  battery  limit  (OSBL):  “outside  battery  limits,  also  referred  to  as  „off-site‟, 
include: 
Storage and handling facilities for raw materials and finished products; 
Utilities generation facilities such as boilers and plant for cooling water supply, 
plants for compressed air and purge gas supply, and effluent treatment facilities; 
Buildings  and  service  facilities  for  process  plants  incorporating  laboratories, 
workshops,  offices,  warehouses,  cafeteria  and  medical  facilities”  (Brennan, 
1998).  
 
Ozone depletion: Ozone depletion describes two distinct, but related observations:  a 
slow, steady decline of about 4% per decade in the total volume of ozone in Earth's 
stratosphere (ozone layer) since the late 1970s, and a much larger, but seasonal, decrease 
in  stratospheric  ozone  over  Earth's  polar  regions  during  the  same  period.  The  latter 
phenomenon is commonly referred to as the ozone hole (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 
2001).  
 
Parallelism: Parallel computing is a form of computation in which many calculations 
are carried out simultaneously,[1] operating on the principle that large problems can 
often be divided into smaller ones, which are then solved concurrently ("in parallel"). 
There are several different forms of parallel computing: bit-level, instruction level, data, 
and task parallelism (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). 
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Parallel tasks and functions in a system which is modelled using Petri net tool would be 
executed based on the “concurrency” attribute.  
 
Photochemical smog: Smog is a kind of air pollution; the word "smog" is a portmanteau 
of smoke and fog. Classic smog results from large amounts of coal burning in an area 
caused by a mixture of smoke and sulfur dioxide. Modern smog does not usually come 
from  coal  but  from  vehicular  and  industrial  emissions  that  are  acted  on  in  the 
atmosphere by sunlight to form secondary pollutants that also combine with the primary 
emissions to form photochemical smog (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001).  
 
Preventive  and  corrective  measure:  1)  preventive  actions  are  taken  to  keep  unit 
operations  working  and/or  extend  the  life  of  unit  operations.  Corrective  actions  are 
conducted to make unit operations working again (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). 2) 
Any specific operation, a modification in the design or actual replacement that prevents 
a  hazardous  situation  from  occurring  or  corrects  and  repairs  the  consequences  of  a 
hazardous situation may be considered as a preventive and corrective measure (Carlotti 
et al., 2004).  
 
Resource consumption: is the destruction or transformation of the resources, and hence 
a change  in quality  and quantity, of  material or energy  flows (G¨oßling-Reisemann, 
2008).  
 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA): NFPA is a U.S. organization (albeit 
with  some  international  members)  charged  with  creating  and  maintaining  minimum 
standards and requirements for fire prevention and suppression activities, training, and 
equipment, as well as other life-safety codes and standards. This includes everything 
from building codes to the personal protective equipment utilized by firefighters while 
extinguishing a blaze (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001). 
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Universe of discourse: indicates the relevant set of entities that are being dealt with by 
quantifiers. The term "universe of discourse" generally refers to the entire set of terms 
used in a specific discourse (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2001).  
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